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The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, is clear about the fundamental necessity 
for the international community to act in partnership to prevent vio­
lent conflict. Given recent shifts in global power dynamics, there is an 
apparent need for international policy issues to be addressed in ways 
that are inclusive of a wider variety of perspectives and approaches. 
Chinese policy actors are increasingly interested in fostering their 
own discourse on issues of prevention and peacebuilding, rooted in 
Chinese experience, and engaging with peers from other contexts. The 
chapters in this volume explore the rationale for conflict prevention 
and review prevailing academic and practitioner discourses on funda­
mental questions such as why conflicts should be prevented and whether 
“mainstream approaches” are still relevant.
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resolution, Chinese politics, and International Relations.
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Understanding conflict prevention  
in the shifting global context
Rachel F. Madenyika and Jason G. Tower 
The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in the immediate after­
math of the Second World War, is clear about the fundamental necessity 
for the international community to act in partnership to prevent violent 
conflict. The Charter is also clear that this must be a multi­ dimensional 
endeavor, which requires that equal weight be given to peace and 
security, economic and social development, and human dignity.
As the ninth Secretary­ General of the United Nations (UN), 
António Guterres, took office, two trends became apparent. First, the 
international community increasingly focused on addressing preven­
tion, with a growing realization of the relationships between human 
displacement, humanitarian need, inequality and exclusion, climate 
change, and an increase in potential and actual violent conflict. Second, 
given shifts in global power dynamics, the need was apparent for inter­
national policy issues to be addressed in a way that is inclusive of a 
wider variety of perspectives and approaches.
In particular, it has become clear that Chinese policy actors are 
increasingly interested in fostering their own discourse on issues of pre­
vention and peacebuilding, rooted in Chinese experience, and engaging 
with peers from other contexts. China’s position has evolved from one 
of “entering the world” to one of global leadership. In a relatively short 
time, China has signed agreements and launched initiatives covering a 
wide range of global governance issues, including monetary policies, cur­
rency exchange, trade, anti­ corruption, and peace and security (Tower). 
Compared with China’s involvement in global governance just a decade 
ago, the change is dramatic, and there is therefore a timely opportunity 
for dialogue with international peers on these central themes.
Against this background, the Quaker United Nation Office (QUNO) 
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with PeaceNexus and in close partnership with the Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), jointly organized a series of 
dialogues that took place in Switzerland, China, and the United States. 
This pilot project sought to intensify the exchange between five Chinese 
and five Swiss researchers on ways of contributing to the ongoing 
United Nations’ and international debate on peacebuilding in general, 
and the prevention of violent conflict in particular. The seminars stra­
tegically aimed to deepen the mutual understanding of the notion of 
prevention, and of existing and new instruments available to prevent 
violent conflicts from emerging, continuing, or relapsing, and to iden­
tify areas for cooperation. The researchers explored the rationale for 
conflict prevention and reviewed prevailing academic and practitioner 
discourses on fundamental questions, such as why conflicts should be 
prevented and whether “mainstream approaches” are still relevant. 
What mechanisms and tools exist to prevent conflict, and how effective 
is prevention today? What opportunities and challenges exist in pre­
ventive diplomacy efforts?
The project was designed to promote trust and relationship­ building 
among the Chinese and Swiss scholars as they shared their insights and 
experience while exploring common ground. In designing the dialogue 
sessions, special care was taken to avoid any appearance of a contest or 
competition between points of view. The premise was that providing a 
protected space for these discussions would allow a more complete pic­
ture of preventive approaches to emerge and encourage forward thinking 
in this field. During this project, the scholars collaboratively developed 
a comprehensive list of thematic policy areas that each contributed to 
this joint publication. Interest in developing future conversations on the 
topic of mediation was deemed the strongest achievement of this dia­
logue, especially given that there are so few scholars working on inter­
national conflict mediation in China.
The innovations this project represents are important to the discourse 
on conflict prevention. There have been few dialogues between Chinese 
and Western scholars on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Peace 
and conflict studies as a discipline in China is relatively new, and it is only 
recently that China started to develop this field. While in some quarters 
there is a notion that Chinese views are at odds with Western views and 
vice versa, the project by methodology and design proved otherwise. It 
promoted trust and relationship­ building among the scholars as they 
shared insights and experience by exploring common ground.
Approaches to the idea of prevention are constantly developing, and 
the scholars provided considerable richness of perspectives, which fell 
easily into infinite areas of work. By providing a protected space for 
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these discussions, a more complete picture of preventive approaches 
emerged, particularly around the peace and development nexus. This 
project built a space where scholars could engage openly, take risks, and 
share perspectives on debates within each country. This was achieved 
by considering different traditions, barriers, blockages, and areas for 
cooperation. Throughout the project, scholars grappled with some of 
the key questions in the literature on the effectiveness of peacebuilding, 
and the role of multilateral organizations in conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding relevant to sequencing and institutional reform. Scholars 
further identified how approaches to addressing violent conflict might 
in some cases be managed, and in other cases be leveraged to build a 
stronger foundation for cooperation.
Towards a multi- dimensional response to complex crises
In recent years, the repeated occurrence of  global peace and security 
crises has raised significant doubts about the capacity of  the United 
Nations to prevent violence and maintain security. Since 2010, 
the number of  major violent conflicts has tripled, while a growing 
number of  lower intensity conflicts have experienced significant escal­
ation (World Bank and United Nations). A  combination of  global 
challenges including climate change, illicit trafficking, and shifting 
global power structures has contributed to the growing level of  crises 
and has made societies more vulnerable to conflict. Transformations 
in technology, demographics, labor, and trade have greatly enhanced 
global awareness of  crises, bringing populations closer together and 
helping to reduce poverty, but have simultaneously brought new 
challenges that an aging global security architecture struggles to meet 
successfully (World Bank and United Nations). At the same time, the 
world’s most fragile and marginalized communities enjoy few of  the 
benefits of  these changes and bear the greatest shares of  the costs of 
conflict.
Recent research has allowed the international community to begin 
quantifying the costs of conflict. In 2016, the economic impact of 
violent conflict resulted in a global economic loss of 30 trillion USD, 
exceeding global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 14.76 trillion 
USD. In per capita terms, this translates into a loss of nearly 2,000 
USD per person (Institute for Economics & Peace). The vast economic 
losses suffered globally because of conflict represent one of the most 
compelling arguments for long­ term conflict prevention. According to 
the 2018 Global Peace Index, the average level of global peacefulness 
has declined for the fourth consecutive year. Thus, the international 
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community can no longer afford to under­ invest in prevention and 
should make it a priority for action.
In 2015, amidst these crises, the UN system came together to achieve land­
mark outcomes including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the Paris Agreement on climate change. Both received universal backing 
from the UN membership (Boutellis and Ó Súilleabháin). Aspirations to 
further strengthen the UN’s coherence, effectiveness, and ability to respond 
are evident in the comprehensive examinations of its peace and security 
efforts. During the same year, three reviews on peacebuilding, peace 
operations, and the implementation of the women, peace, and security 
agenda were conducted. The reviews pointed to the urgent need to bring 
together different parts of the UN system around a long­ term vision of 
peace, one that did not follow the common linear and sequenced approach 
to conflict response, but was rather a strategic commitment to a “culture 
of prevention” and to work within a “peace continuum” that encompasses 
“prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and long­ 
term development” (Guterres, Challenges and Opportunities). A common 
theme that emerged from the three reviews marked a fundamental shift 
in the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding, from a “post­ conflict” exer­
cise towards an emphasis on building peace as an ongoing undertaking. 
By formulating sustaining peace in the resolutions as “a goal and process 
… aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recur­
rence of conflict” (70/ 262 and 2282 respectively), the dual resolutions on 
peacebuilding and sustaining peace adopted unanimously by all nations in 
the General Assembly and Security Council set out to do just that. As a 
result, for the first time at the UN, “peacebuilding” and “prevention” have 
become close to synonymous under this new umbrella term – “Sustaining 
Peace”. Under this new framework, prevention is central, particularly 
when it is considered as a function of sustainable development and inclu­
sive governance.
The nature of the problem
Under existing dominant paradigms and through its symbiotic rela­
tionship to conflict, prevention at the UN continues to be conceived 
as a nationally owned and driven strategy for averting the outbreak of 
conflict and sustaining peace. The lack of conceptual clarity regarding 
the meaning of conflict prevention and what it entails makes it an 
unwieldly topic for rigorous study. However, some actors are begin­
ning to understand conflict prevention differently, as seen in academia 




such as Munuera and Lund (Conflict Prevention) saw conflict preven­
tion as “primarily diplomatic measures and actions used in regions 
of high vulnerability to prevent the escalation of tensions into armed 
conflict” (Carayannis and Stein). Along the same lines, Secretary­ 
General Boutros­ Ghali’s preventive diplomacy understood the concept 
as “action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, and 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts” (Boutros­ 
Ghali). On the other hand, authors such as Wallensteen referred to pre­
vention as actions that can prevent conflict, without limiting the tools to 
diplomatic means. More recently, a UN– World Bank report questioned 
the long­ standing assumption that income growth alone leads to peace, 
and introduced the business case for prevention: “the expected returns 
on prevention will be positive so long as the costs of prevention are 
less than the damages and/ or losses due to violence” (World Bank and 
United Nations).
While the term “prevention” seems to be accepted at the policy 
level, neither policymakers nor scholars agree on timing, sequencing, 
or required necessary tools. The dichotomy of prevention is evident, 
as operational prevention  – “pre­ empting the eruption of  violence” 
(Lund, “Preventing Violent Intrastate Conflicts”)  – and long­ term 
structural prevention efforts that tackle root causes of  conflict are 
both necessary. First introduced in the final report of  the Carnegie 
Commission launched in 1997, both operational and structural preven­
tion are considered equally important approaches that may be applied 
dependent on the stage of  a particular conflict. At one end of  the spec­
trum are the operational preventive activities which rely on third­ party 
interventions for the prevention of  imminent conflict or escalation. 
On the other end of  the spectrum are activities which focus on the 
deep­ rooted causes of  conflict and “aim to strengthen the institutions 
and social mechanisms of  states and societies, helping them to become 
more resilient to the causes and triggers of  conflict” (United Nations, 
Conflict Prevention). In the 2001 Report of  the Secretary­ General on 
Prevention of  Armed Conflict, “an effective preventive strategy” is said 
to require “a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short­ 
term and long­ term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, 
developmental, institutional, and other measures taken by the inter­
national community, in cooperation with national and regional actors” 
(United Nations, Prevention of Armed Conflict). Consensus on the 
scope of  conflict prevention is essential as conceptual parameters are 
critical for establishing and maintaining effective conflict prevention 
strategies.
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Emerging ideas for peace
Two streams of literature have developed relevant to academic dis­
course on prevention in China. The first is at the nexus of Chinese for­
eign policy and security studies, and the second at the nexus of peace 
and development. While still nascent, these literatures in their own 
right are in dialogue with both Western, and in some cases, other global 
discourses on these issues. That said, as might be expected, they are 
also deeply rooted in China’s own political traditions and influenced 
by pragmatic needs around China’s rapidly shifting international role.
When considering Chinese foreign policy and security studies, 
Chinese scholars seek to explore challenges emerging around China’s 
traditional foreign policy principles of peaceful coexistence, non­ 
intervention in domestic affairs of states, and new needs relevant to 
involvement in security governance (Wang, Creative Involvement). 
Current debates center around the primacy of the state versus non­ state 
actors in addressing security challenges; how to address Western and 
especially American dominance of international institutions; how to 
draw lessons from ancient Chinese models of global governance that 
might be applicable to the modern day (Yan); and how to address issues 
of growing institutional competition as China develops a role as a pro­
vider of global governance goods.
In the second area of debate on the peace and development nexus, the 
key focus centers on China’s experiences over 40 years of reform, which 
have prioritized economic development as a means of maintaining and 
enhancing stability (Wang and Hu). Some Chinese scholars argue that 
Western approaches focus too much on resolving governance issues, 
and not enough on addressing development in the form of infra­
structure, job creation, and market development (He). In some cases, 
scholars have argued for a “developmental peace” as a counter to “lib­
eral peace”. Critics of this perspective point out that not all forms of 
development will lead to peace and focus on some of the lessons that 
China has learned over the past decade in promoting large­ scale devel­
opment when it comes to promoting peace projects. Examples from 
Myanmar – where China supported large­ scale dams adjacent to cease­
fire lines  – have drawn considerable attention from Chinese scholars 
arguing for a more nuanced view of the relationship between develop­
ment and peace (Jiang).
So, how can the global community more effectively prevent violent 
conflict, as violent conflicts have become more complex and protracted? 
While acknowledging the challenges of definition, timing, sequen­




significant hurdle. It is therefore imperative to understand the norma­
tive and political impact of sustaining peace in diverse contexts.
To contribute towards strengthening such understanding, this book 
identifies tools that help navigate today’s uncertainties and attempts to 
conceptualize tomorrow’s practice of international peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention. The volume seeks to answer questions such as: Why 
should conflicts be prevented? Are “mainstream approaches” are still 
relevant? What mechanisms and tools exist to prevent conflict; how 
effective is prevention today? And, what opportunities and challenges 
exist in preventive diplomacy efforts?
The book makes the case for conflict prevention and provides 
insights for practitioners of peacebuilding and international relations 
such as policymakers, philanthropists, diplomats, development workers, 
researchers, and students.
Part I: the broader norms of prevention and building peace
The first section of this volume addresses prevention and resolution of 
violent conflict from a macro­ political as well as micro­ economic per­
spective. It asks three fundamental questions: (1) How do we sustain 
peace? (2)  Why should we promote peace and prevent war? (3)  How 
should we actually go about doing it? In his contribution, Björn 
Gehrmann offers a consideration of the shortcomings of various 
approaches to international peacebuilding. He identifies three practical 
measures which function to sustain peace by eliminating the drivers 
of conflict: investments in economic development; alignment of pol­
itical institutions; and how information is shared between conflicting 
parties. His chapter “How to sustain peace: a review of the scholarly 
debate” embraces the importance of these three measures as central to 
sustaining peace and suggests that the UN enhance its investment in 
research on the causes of war. In the following chapter, “Political vio­
lence prevention: definitions and implications”, Stephanie C. Hofmann 
stresses that conflict prevention policies already exist in the peace 
and development nexus. She underscores that the reinvigoration of 
concepts alone is not enough to create a policy but that normative 
concepts, mechanisms, resources, and capacities need to be attached to 
such concepts. She provides an overview of these concepts in various 
contexts including the United Nations, World Bank, European Union, 
and African Union. Yin He, in the next chapter “A tale of two ‘peaces’: 
peacebuilding in the twenty­ first century: liberal peace, developmental 
peace, and peacebuilding” stresses that liberal peace overemphasizes 
institution building, and places too little emphasis on development. In 
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his view, developmental peace more effectively helps address the eco­
nomic drivers of conflict than efforts to build institutions. He further 
highlights that their coexistence can greatly benefit the peacebuilding 
of post­ conflict states and explores means for building better coordin­
ation mechanisms between the two types of approaches. In the subse­
quent chapter, “How to curb conflict: policy lessons from the economic 
literature”, Dominic Rohner looks at peacebuilding through an eco­
nomic lens. He concludes that while the literature in conflict economics 
has gained an overview on major causes and consequences of armed 
fighting, up until recently the study of how particular policies can 
reduce conflict risks has been neglected. He recommends further empir­
ical policy research in this area. In his view, it is especially important to 
look at how different types of development interventions and different 
forms of economic support impact armed conflict.
Part II: approaches to preventing conflict
Part II of this volume presents elements of the approaches to 
peacebuilding. David Lanz’s chapter on “The deep roots of Swiss con­
flict prevention” draws attention to how conflict prevention represents 
a fundamental interest for Switzerland, given its disposition as a small 
state with a federal structure and a heterogeneous society. Lanz argues 
that, therefore, conflict prevention does not automatically emerge, but is 
outcome of accommodation and negotiations between different groups 
within the country. The Swiss culture of conflict management thus 
differs fundamentally from the Chinese approach even if the two coun­
tries share a similar interest in the reduction of political violence. In her 
practice­ oriented chapter, “Considerations for the design and preparation 
of national dialogue processes”, Katia Papagianni discusses the utility 
of national dialogues, a peace strategy that is used in conflict situations 
where political power within a country is widely dispersed among various 
groups, and where a new coalition government needs to be created. The 
chapter explains how national dialogue processes need to tackle the diffi­
cult decisions on what needs to be discussed and resolved, identifying key 
participants, designing the dialogue format, and above all being flexible 
and creative throughout the process. In the following chapter, “China and 
mediation: principles and practice”, Tiewa Liu maintains that China’s 
fundamental principles of non­ intervention and non­ use of force remain 
intact, but that China is currently working on integrating facilitative, 
evaluative, and transformative mediation approaches into its foreign 
policy. Mediation can be a successful tool in achieving stability in volatile 
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contexts where China has investments, and it can contribute to China’s 
long­ run national interests and international responsibilities.
Part III: opportunities for peace
In Part III, elements of the developmental approach to peace pro­
motion are addressed. In her chapter titled “How to understand the 
peacebuilding potential of the Belt and Road Initiative”, Dongyan 
Li points out that the peacebuilding potential of the Belt and Road 
Initiative has not been fully leveraged by BRI partners, and that this is a 
critical growth area. From a UN peacebuilding perspective, and as BRI 
is an economic cooperation– led initiative, China can and should make 
a strong contribution to UN peacebuilding and conflict prevention. 
Albrecht Schnabel’s contribution “Security sector reform and conflict 
prevention” sums up that security sector reform (SSR) is vital for con­
flict prevention and is key for successful regional cooperation, business, 
and development. He puts emphasis on linking the Swiss interest in pro­
viding SSR support with Chinese interests in advancing peace through 
development of an effective state, including a strong security sector, as 
part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Guihong Zhang outlines that the 
main goal and design of Chinese major power diplomacy in the new era 
is the idea of a “community of shared future for mankind”, as proposed 
by President Xi Jinping. In his contribution to this volume, “‘A commu­
nity of shared future for mankind’ and implications for conflict preven­
tion”, Zhang states that this idea will undoubtedly have implications for 
world peace and security and needs to be integrated with existing inter­
national principles and norms or transformed into new ones.
In the concluding chapter, “Future collaborative efforts to prevent 
conflict”, Rachel F. Madenyika and Jason G. Tower draw together the 
main themes and purpose of the project and volume and present: (1) the 
importance and impact of dialogue for prevention; and (2) the need to 
explore instruments and tools that are compatible with peace narratives, 
such as mediation, providing an opportunity for collaboration and an 
appetite to learn, diversify, and understand approaches to peace.
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expression of faith in action.
PeaceNexus Foundation
PeaceNexus is a Switzerland­ based foundation established in May 
2009. The PeaceNexus core mission is to provide peacebuilding­ 
relevant actors  – multilateral organizations, governments, non­ profit 
organizations, and business actors – with expertise and advice on how 
they can make best use of their peacebuilding role and capacity to help 
stabilize and reconcile conflict­ affected societies. PeaceNexus specializes 
in identifying relevant and cutting­ edge expertise, making it available 
to actors for peacebuilding, and structuring, sequencing, and accom­
panying the advisory process. It played a key role in facilitating both 
the fourth round of dialogue in this project and the launch event for the 
publication.
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
The Human Security Division of  the Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs is responsible for the promotion of  peace, human 
rights, and democracy. In the area of  peace policy, it focuses on the 









 1 Since 2009, QUNO and AFSC have engaged leading global Chinese 
academics on issues related to coordinated approaches to peacebuilding and 
the prevention of violent conflict through multilateral platforms. Identifying 
that Chinese researchers had limited field­ level engagement with a spectrum 
of peace operations, and especially with early warning, peacebuilding, and 
mediation, QUNO and AFSC worked to support Chinese academics’ engage­
ment and fieldwork, looking at the involvement of China and other key 
donor states in this space. This effort was catalytic, with Chinese participants 
publishing a wide range of policy and academic papers on a broad spectrum 
of peace operations and peacebuilding.
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The broader norms of 





1  How to sustain peace
A review of the scholarly debate
Björn Gehrmann1
Sustaining Peace: a new paradigm for international 
peacebuilding?
International peacebuilding is in a state of transition. This is probably 
best exemplified by the comprehensive reorganization of the United 
Nations’ political– operational structure, which was commissioned by 
UN member states as part of the “Sustaining Peace” resolutions of 
both Security Council and General Assembly, and executed by the 
UN’s new Secretary­ General, António Guterres, shortly after he took 
office in 2017 (United Nations Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace). 
This transition was triggered by two expert reports on the state of 
peacebuilding at the United Nations. In 2015, UN member states 
commissioned reviews of the existing approach to peace operations (by 
establishing a High­ Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations) and the international peacebuilding architecture (by way 
of an “Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Architecture”). Both reviews eschewed the lan­
guage of peacebuilding in favor of “Sustaining Peace” (United Nations 
Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Uniting Our Strengths). The reports 
caused the international community to reconsider its approach to 
peace operations and peacebuilding. Referring to the insights of these 
reports, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United 
Nations passed twin resolutions on “Sustaining Peace”, which embody 
this policy shift within the UN. The resolutions aim at strengthening 
the nexus between peace and security, sustainable development, and 
human rights. The main objective of the “Sustaining Peace” agenda is 
to establish a “holistic approach” that results in a more coherent UN 
policy and strengthens mutually reinforcing linkages between the UN’s 
three pillars. In accordance with the Sustaining Peace approach, UN 





prevention of political violence, which is based on the “recognition 
that efforts to sustain peace were necessary not only once conflict had 
broken out, but also long beforehand, through the prevention of con­
flict and addressing its root causes” (United Nations Peacebuilding and 
Sustaining Peace).
One of the most striking characteristics of the Sustaining Peace 
agenda is its emphasis on conflict prevention. In her chapter for this 
book, Stephanie Hofmann points out that conflict prevention should 
not be a goal in itself, since conflict as such is neither good nor bad. 
Instead, we should primarily be concerned about political violence. 
However, even a focus on the prevention of political violence does not 
significantly narrow down available political options. A wide array of 
policies can still be justified on this basis, along the temporal dimen­
sion (prevention of occurrence versus prevention of recurrence) or the 
instrumental dimension (persuasion versus coercion), as well as in terms 
of legitimacy (passive prevention versus active prevention) and feasi­
bility (willingness to fight versus ability to fight). In theory, prevention 
can comprise civilian measures such as strengthening political inclusion 
of underrepresented groups, and the use of force, especially military 
interventions. As Hofmann points out, in practice, many international 
actors engage in prevention, with substantial diversity in terms of the 
concrete policies pursued.
As David Lanz outlines in this volume, in Switzerland prevention is 
understood as a purely civilian effort to prevent the occurrence of pol­
itical violence by addressing a group’s willingness to fight, i.e. the root 
causes of group grievances. Among the instruments utilized are refer­
enda. In contrast, as Guihong Zhang explains, China views its efforts to 
establish a “new type of international relations” (combining democra­
tization of the international system and rule of law as means to oppose 
power politics and hegemony) as an effort in the prevention of conflict 
between states as well as the prevention of military intervention. At the 
same time, it emphasizes inclusive and sustainable development as the 
most appropriate tool for the prevention of intra­ state conflict.
The scholarly debate about peacebuilding
Deficiencies of the mainstream approach to peacebuilding
On the one hand, observers have increasingly perceived the main­
stream approach to peacebuilding, largely inspired by the “Liberal 




How to sustain peace 17
  17
the belief  in the transformative power of international peacebuilding 
has waned because many of the interventions undertaken …, and 
especially those in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and in Africa’s 
Great Lakes, and Horn regions are widely understood to have been 
ineffective.
The 2015 review of the UN’s approach to peacebuilding was preceded by 
a large number of critical assessments of peacebuilding by scholars (for 
a comprehensive overview of the critical debate on peacebuilding see 
Chetail and Jütersonke). The academic critique usually subsumes some 
themes of the UN peacebuilding into the broader liberal peacebuilding 
agenda, which emerged from an optimistic interpretation of prelim­
inary empirical results from studies of inter­ state warfare. Since lib­
eral democracies almost never go to war, many scholars and politicians 
expected that a transition from authoritarian rule to democratic gov­
ernance within states would bring peace (Doyle “Liberalism”; Maoz 
and Russett; Owen). On the basis of these findings, US president Bill 
Clinton presented in his 1994 State of the Union speech a new foreign 
policy agenda, the central aim of which was to promote democratization 
around the globe. The grand ambition was to establish a Liberal Peace, 
based on three pillars: republican representation, commitment to funda­
mental human rights, and transnational interdependence (Doyle “Three 
Pillars”).2 Liberal Peace became the dominant narrative of post– Cold 
War foreign affairs and served as inspiration for diverse foreign policy 
initiatives such as the foundation of the World Trade Organization, 
NATO and EU enlargement, robust UN peace operations (based on 
the “responsibility to protect”), and military interventions in countries 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, since its first formulation in the 1980s, the Liberal Peace 
hypothesis has been subject to critical scholarly scrutiny. The critique 
consists of two parts. The first strand of criticism addresses the concept 
of liberal peacebuilding as such. In an influential piece, Mansfield and 
Snyder (“Democratization”) criticize the proponents’ “naive enthusiasm” 
and argue for a strategy of “limited goals”, contending that rapidly dem­
ocratizing states are disproportionately likely to fight wars. Empirical 
scholars point out that Liberal Peace is a normative concept, a hypothesis 
that has been tested over and over, but whose causality has never been 
entirely confirmed (Hegre). The second strand of criticism mainly refers 
to the flawed implementation of a sound approach to peacebuilding 
by an irrationally exuberant international community. Observers have 
compared the “irrational exuberance” of liberal peacebuilders with the 




are often credited (or blamed) for coming up with the famous “efficient 
markets hypothesis”, which was used to justify a policy advocating for 
a more prominent role of the financial sector in society. However, the 
Global Financial Crisis is a manifest example of the shortcomings of 
this policy, which subsequently became an issue of national significance 
in the United States, culminating in a Congressional Hearing examining 
the flaws of the underlying economic ideas and concepts.3 The second 
strand of critique states that “the challenge today is not to replace or 
move ‘beyond’ liberal peacebuilding, but to reform existing approaches 
within a broadly liberal framework” (Paris 362).
Regardless of these critiques, Liberal Peace remains the fallback 
peace narrative, reflected in the foreign policies of the international 
community and the countries of the Western hemisphere. It remains to 
be seen to which degree the UN’s Sustaining Peace approach will be able 
to modify the liberal approach to peacebuilding. Critical observers have 
already pointed to the fact that Sustaining Peace in its current, embry­
onic form is “not specific enough to be operationalized” (de Coning 
“Sustaining Peace”).
Emerging designs for peace
In a parallel development that is independent of the peacebuilding 
community’s internal reflections, new ideas for peace are emer­
ging in the wake of a global wealth shift. This shift is mostly due to 
the impact of globalization, itself  a product of the post­ 1989 liberal 
drive towards transnational interdependence, on economic growth in 
Asia. Growth is shifting from “the West” to “the East”, mainly China. 
One of the consequences of this process of economic catch­ up is an 
“Easternization” of global politics (Rachman). As part of this process, 
emerging countries, first and foremost China, have increased their finan­
cial support for international institutions. At the UN, this has manifested 
itself – among other things – in a significant increase in Chinese support 
for UN peacekeeping operations (Stahle). At the same time, however, 
non­ Western support for the United Nations’ peacebuilding efforts in 
conflict­ afflicted and post­ conflict states has not picked up in the same 
fashion. For mostly political reasons, China has pursued a strategy of 
“selectively cautious participation” in UN peacebuilding operations 
(L. Zhao 354). As Zhao (351) describes, China  – while it has shown 
flexibility in practice – “is not in favor of peacebuilding conflated with 
military action, humanitarian intervention or regime change, and vig­
orously opposes any state­ building operations”. It is only recently that 
Chinese scholars have become more vocal in proposing alternative ways 
to achieve “positive peace”. Based on the assumption that “a country’s 
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international peace intervention policy is a … projection of a domestic 
peace experience onto foreign countries” (Wang 71), China is pioneering 
an approach that combines promoting peace and stability through 
social and economic development. The new term being coined for the 
Chinese approach to peacebuilding is “developmental peace” (Wang). 
It emphasizes the idea that “security and development are intrinsically 
linked, and peacebuilding would be impossible without achievement on 
the development front” (L. Zhao 352).
The Chinese approach is informed by more than a decade of first­ 
hand experience in developing countries, mainly in Sub­ Saharan Africa. 
It rests on two central pillars: sovereignty (implying political non­ 
interference from the outside), and non­ politicized development. They 
translate into two essential peace strategies: (1) promotion of economic 
and social development in terms of GDP per capita, in the absence of 
demands for enhanced financial governance;4 and (2) prioritization of 
the role of the state, backing state development initiatives where they 
may be found, with minimal reference to public perceptions or oppos­
ition voices to such initiatives.5 Notably, this approach does not prom­
inently feature a normative political ambition in terms of promoting 
liberalization of the existing type of political regime. As such, the role 
of civil society is not emphasized, and there is no essential focus on 
public participation and/ or strengthening of accountability of govern­
ment (Wang).
Empirical reality check: which measures sustain peace?
The debate about the best approach to sustaining peace is primarily pol­
itical. However, in parallel to the political debate, a young but growing 
scientific literature has started to produce important insights about the 
conditions for achieving and sustaining peace. In his chapter for this 
volume, Dominic Rohner introduces four generic policies for peace: 
(1) stability, (2) incentives, (3) institutions, and (4) trust. All four options 
are a product of empirical research into the causes of war. Each deals 
with a different cause. Whereas the first approach (stability) deals only 
with an opposition’s ability to fight, the latter three deal with its willing-
ness to fight, i.e. with the root causes of conflict.
The reason for investments in stability  – nowadays commonly 
referred to as stabilization  – is weakness of  the government, espe­
cially in security terms. The underlying logic is simple: in a political 
contest, the party with better military capabilities usually secures vic­
tory. Therefore, investments in the capacity of  the government, first 
and foremost into its enforcement (or repressive) capacity, should be 






government. Measures include capacity building for military, police, 
and judiciary through financing, equipment, training, and advice. 
Stabilization does not address root causes of  conflict such as individual 
poverty or group grievances. It prevents political violence through 
deterrence or ends it through repression, resulting in a state of  “nega­
tive peace”. As Albrecht Schnabel explains in his essay for this volume, 
enforcement capacity can be achieved through security sector reform, 
especially by establishing an uncontested monopoly of  violence. In 
other words, the state disables the opposition’s ability to fight; how­
ever, it does not target its willingness to fight. The problem with this 
approach is that in case of  a military windfall for the opposition (e.g. 
through wealthy outside sponsors), war would still occur (due to the 
opposition’s continued willingness to fight).6 Some observers criticize 
that stabilization represents an overly transactional approach to con­
flict resolution, neglecting the root causes of  the conflict. They fear 
that it is becoming the preferred intervention type of  the countries of 
the Western hemisphere, and that it has, in conjunction with counter­ 
terrorism, the potential to at least partially replace Liberal Peace as the 
dominant peace paradigm (Karlsrud).
The three other strategies are more ambitious. They try to 
achieve and sustain peace through an elimination of  the reasons for 
engaging in political violence. They will be analyzed in the following 
subsections.
Peace and institutions
The objective of  the first approach is to promote institutions that 
reduce political violence. This approach goes beyond simple democ­
racy promotion in that it distinguishes between the impacts on peace 
of  different forms of  democracies. The basic intuition is that power­ 
sharing mechanisms (such as grand coalitions, proportional representa­
tion, not majoritarian representation) and power­ dividing mechanisms 
(vertical separation of  powers such as federalism) prevent political 
groups from using violence to further their goals. In the former case, 
they do this through the requirement to find a compromise via intra­ 
governmental negotiation, and in the latter case, thanks to the elimin­
ation of  the requirement to negotiate with rivalling groups (due to the 
division).
However, Mansfield and Snyder (“Prone to Violence” 42) provide an 
example that cautions against a one­ size­ fits­ all institutional approach 
to peace, with a particular concern for the Middle East:
 
 
How to sustain peace 21
  21
In the Arab world, every state has at least one risk factor for failed, 
violent democratization. … Per capita incomes, literacy rates and 
citizen skills in most Muslim Middle Eastern states are below the 
levels normally needed to sustain democracy.
If  practiced, democracy promotion strategies should be sequenced to 
try to prevent negative outcomes. In the same spirit, Collier and Rohner 
(533) propose that in “low­ income countries, international promotion 
of democracy needs to be complemented by international strengthening 
of security”.
Peace and investment
The second approach tackles an individual’s incentives to participate in 
political violence. The underlying idea is to raise her opportunity costs 
of appropriation (of goods produced by others). This can be achieved 
either through an increase in the gains from production, i.e. her poten­
tial salary in the local labor market, or through a reduction of the gains 
from engaging in appropriation (political violence, but also economic vio­
lence). The former could be achieved through investments in local labor 
markets (increasing labor demand through employment programs and/ 
or increasing job market access through schooling), the latter through a 
penalization of forcefully appropriated lootable goods in the respective 
domestic and international markets (e.g. international certification 
schemes for “blood diamonds”). As Dominic Rohner points out in his 
essay, considering available causal evidence, investment in schooling is one 
of the most promising development­ for­ peace measures. This approach 
resembles the Chinese approach of peace through development. It differs, 
however, in its emphasis on building inalienable capacities of individuals, 
as opposed to building state capacity, which is, to some extent, alienable. 
In his essay in this volume, Guihong Zhang describes how there is not one 
single measure that causes development. In theory, there is a multitude 
of individual development policies, with different and at times opposing 
effects on peace  – think of uneven economic development between 
different ethnic groups in the same country, which is viewed as a key risk 
factor for political violence (Ray and Esteban).
Even though some development measures have been tied to a posi­
tive impact in terms of peace, it has not yet been established that 
investments in infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and hospitals have 
a direct positive effect on peace. In terms of causality, the best avail­




effect on growth (Dreher et  al.). Recent research also suggests that 
Chinese development aid, when compared with World Bank develop­
ment projects, tends to result (a) in more stability when considering less­ 
lethal conflicts by governments against civilians, and (b) in a stronger 
emphasis on rule­ following behavior and a higher acceptance of auto­
cratic regimes (Gehring et al.). As Dongyan Li explains in her essay in 
this volume, there is reason to believe that the Belt and Road Initiative, 
with its investments in conflict­ affected regions that would otherwise 
not take place, may offer an interesting potential for peace. However, 
the Chinese policy of debt­ financing infrastructure investments linked 
to the BRI has elicited the so­ called debt trap critique: If  BRI “follows 
Chinese practices to date for infrastructure financing, which often entail 
lending to sovereign borrowers, then BRI raises the risk of debt dis­
tress in some borrower countries” (Hurley et al.). This claim is disputed, 
however (M. Zhao).
Peace and information
The third approach relies on information and communication, with the 
aim of establishing inter­ group trust. The basic idea is to create mutual 
benefits, for example through the establishment of economically bene­
ficial trade relations (establishment of inter­ group trade associations), 
or through the re­ establishment of psychologically beneficial relations 
between formerly warring parties (bilateral pacification through, for 
example, mediation or (national) dialogue), or between perpetrators 
and victims through the joint treatment of grievances (community rec­
onciliation procedures).
Any successful peace strategy should consider the employment of 
“open­ ended” peace “mechanisms” such as mediation or national dia­
logue – “open­ ended” since they do not contain a prescription for a cer­
tain peace policy; “mechanism” since they do not require large capital 
investments, but rather rely on the willingness of the warring parties 
to come to a peaceful agreement, coupled with a structured communi­
cation process. In many cases, mediation and national dialogues result 
in a power­ sharing arrangement. The main difference between the two 
mechanisms is the context. Mediation usually occurs in a situation 
where two parties contest control of government (power duopoly). In 
her contribution to this volume, Katia Papagianni explains that national 
dialogues usually occur in situations where a larger number of parties 
are contesting political control, without a clear incumbent (power oli­
gopoly). Due to their open­ endedness, both mechanisms are versatile 
and compatible with different peace narratives.
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As Tiewa Liu points out in her essay for this volume, China has a 
long­ standing mediation culture, which is informed by Confucianism’s 
deeply embedded humanistic values of social harmony, respect for 
authority, and humility. They manifest in concepts of relationships and 
“harmony and cooperation”. Recent years have seen substantial pro­
gress in China’s international mediation activities. In countries such as 
Israel, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Syria, among others, diplomats 
from China increasingly engage in preventing, managing, or resolving 
conflict. In 2017, mainly triggered by the Belt and Road Initiative, 
Beijing was involved in nine conflicts (Legarda).
Tailor- made pathways to peace: institutions, investment, and 
information
Measured against the growing body of the scientific literature, none 
of the older and newer approaches to peacebuilding unites all of these 
policies under one umbrella. However, as Yin He demonstrates in his 
chapter for this book, the successful interplay of different approaches 
to peace is possible, even desirable. In East Timor, political stability 
was achieved by way of consensual democracy, and paved the way for 
a strong government with a priority to invest in development. This case 
might serve as an inspiration for sustaining peace.
The above example also gives an idea of what an evidence­ based 
approach to peace could look like: thorough diagnosis of the under­
lying problems, careful choice of appropriate remedies, sequential 
implementation. The World Bank and the United Nations refer to this 
approach as the identification of “country pathways to peace”, where 
each country pathway is shaped by “the endogenous risk factors that 
engender violence and support for countries to address their own crises” 
(World Bank and United Nations 262).
This review shows that in most contexts, an excessive focus on pol­
itical institutions or on economic incentives will not be sufficient to 
achieve peace. This reasoning resonates well with the findings of the 
Pathways for Peace report, which recognizes that “successful conflict 
prevention strategies increasingly need to align security, development, 
and diplomatic action over the long term” (World Bank and United 
Nations). Based on these reflections, how should we go about sustaining 
peace? As the contributions in this volume show, three general prac­
tical measures stand out: (a) investments in economic development in 
conflict­ affected regions, (b)  efforts to align political institutions with 
the needs of the people, and (c) the transmission of information between 




Is – Institutions, Investment, and Information – and embrace the hith­
erto untapped potentials to which recent empirical research points. This 
could be the beginning of truly complementary policies for peace.
That being said, how can we move ahead on this path? In the initially 
mentioned congressional hearing on the shortcomings of economic 
theory, the witnesses, were asked: “If  economics cannot currently iden­
tify emerging conditions that could threaten the Nation’s economic well­ 
being, what kind of work do we need to fund to receive such insights?” 
(Building a Science of Economics). In a similar vein, we should ask our­
selves: “If  political scientists and political economists cannot sufficiently 
identify emerging conditions that threaten a particular country’s – or 
even the world’s – peace, what kind of work should the international 
community fund to receive such insights?” Here is one obvious answer: 
We need more investment in theoretical and empirical research into the 
causes and consequences of, and the respective remedies for, war. This 
echoes the findings of a recent examination of the state of evidence for 
peace, which diagnoses a “dearth of studies that attempt to measure 
… actual peace and violence outcomes” (Brown et al. 55). The United 
Nations, with its mandate for “peace and security”, should lead this 
effort. An important step towards this goal would be to equip the UN 
with capacities for research that can match those of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund.
Notes
 1 Björn Gehrmann is a German Diplomat and Mediator MAS ETH MPP 
(“Master of Advanced Studies ETH Mediation in Peace Processes”) who 
worked for the Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs from 2017 to 2019. The views expressed in this article are 
his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs or those of the German Federal Foreign Office.
 2 The Liberal Peace relies on a number of smaller political and economic 
interventions: (1) promotion of republican representation through a 
strengthening of democratic, participatory norms or through external 
incentives such as development aid conditioned on compliance with criteria of 
good governance; (2) promotion of fundamental human rights through inter­
national standard setting, either in coded international public law, through 
the building of global institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, 
or through development aid conditioned on compliance with human rights; 
(3)  promotion of cross­ border trade and investment through the liberaliza­
tion of trade and investment by way of multilateral trade agreements and 
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conditioned on compliance with free market standards as embodied in the 
“Washington Consensus”.
 3 In the aftermath of the crisis, the (macro­ )economics profession was iden­
tified as one of the culprits and came under substantial public scrutiny. 
The Hearing took place in 2010 and was emblematically titled “Building a 
Science of Economics for the Real World” (Building a Science of Economics). 
Triggered by this unprecedented level of inquiry, macroeconomists started a 
process of professional introspection, debating the scientific shortcomings of 
their models and their policy advice, as is evident in a number of recent scien­
tific efforts, such as the “Rebuilding Macroeconomic Theory Project” (Vines 
and Wills).
 4 Mainly through unconditional development aid for infrastructure such as 
roads, bridges, and hospitals, and loans and investment secured by natural 
resources or other available equity.
 5 For this reason, some scholars refer to it as a “strong state– weak society” 
model, with a focus on national unity and territorial integrity.
 6 Connected to the idea of stability and a strong government are investments 
in legal capacity (mainly for the protection of property rights) and fiscal cap­
acity (mainly for the collection of taxes); see (Besley and Persson).
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Not all conflict is bad. As others have pointed out,
Conflict is the pursuit of contrary or seemingly incompatible 
interests – whether between individuals, groups or countries. It can 
be a major force for positive social change. In states with good gov­
ernance, strong civil society and robust political and social systems 
where human rights are protected, conflicting interests are managed 
and ways found for groups to pursue their goals peacefully.
(Department for International Development 6)
However, conflict can also turn violent. And violence rarely if  ever 
brings positive social change. In the last years, the number of violent 
conflicts has risen again, as has the death toll (Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program and International Peace Research Institute). People fear for 
the violation of their human rights and their peaceful everyday exist­
ence as violent conflict destroys social and political relationships that 
attempt to regulate “contrary or seemingly incompatible interests”.
When intervening in (post­ )conflicts – either in the form of military 
or civilian peace operations or as humanitarian action – national, inter­
national, regional, transnational, or nongovernmental actors face many 
constraints. First, actors’ military or civilian resources are often costly 
and/ or scarce. Second, humanitarian, development, and security actors 
often are required to commit for much longer than anticipated. A look 
at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, 
reveals that the
average length of time the ICRC has been present in the countries 
hosting its ten largest operations is more than 36 years. Protracted 
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conflicts are a major source of human suffering and a cause of 
protracted displacement, migration and development reversals.
(International Committee of the Red Cross 5)
Third, some actors more than others are selective as to where and how 
to intervene in violent conflict situations and follow political agendas 
not necessarily related to the conflict. This potentially jeopardizes other 
actors on the ground. Fourth, some actors and scholars have criticized 
foreign interventions as inappropriate measures to take – often lacking 
enough knowledge about the conflict in question (Englebert and Tull).
For all of these reasons and more, some (inter)national and trans­
national actors have introduced ideas and norms related to preventing 
violent conflict and sustaining peace to the agenda. Some have done 
so in more declaratory fashion, while others have established institu­
tional capacities and devoted resources to the said goal. But what 
exactly do we mean by preventing conflict? And how can such ideas be 
operationalized and implemented? First, this brief  discussion presents a 
few impressions that demonstrate that we are misnaming the phenom­
enon that should more accurately be called prevention of violent conflict 
or political violence prevention, not conflict prevention.1 Second, while it 
feels intuitively right for many actors to want sustainable peace and to 
prevent violent conflict from happening (though we should not forget 
that some actors benefit from violence), prevention can be understood 
in different ways. And actors can be committed to prevention while 
pursuing different approaches. By broadening the concept to many 
different activities, any social interaction that tries to sustain or recreate 
peaceful relations can therefore be called an effort in preventing violent 
conflict from (re)emerging. This can overburden any actor. Given the 
different ideas that surround preventing violent conflict, it is important 
for actors to clearly define what they understand their primary purpose 
to be.2 At the end of the day, we might need not a new concept to break 
out of organizational silos, but efficient on­ the­ ground coordination 
mechanisms to create more long­ lasting stability and possibly peace.
Different ideas on how to prevent violent conflict
Ideas of how to prevent violent conflict – and maintain some sort of 
peace, though what kind of peace is not always spelled out  – from 
happening, have existed for centuries. We can go back to Charles­ Irénée 
Castel de Saint Pierre who in 1713 argued for the creation of an inter­
national organization to maintain peace. Saint Pierre influenced Kant 






on the republican constitution of states, their economic interdepend­
ence, and a cosmopolitan minded population (Doyle). For both of these 
scholars, the structural conditions between actors have to change before 
establishing and maintaining peaceful relations. Today, we often refer 
to this as structural prevention with an emphasis on legal arrangements 
and institutions.
More recent scholarship has looked into the different qualities of 
peace arrangements and has linked those to the potential of preventing 
violent conflict in the future. The eminent peace scholar Johan Galtung 
focuses on negative (absence of war) and positive (absence of war + elim­
ination of structural inequalities) peace. Benjamin Miller emphasizes 
cold, normal, and warm peace (Miller). Either way, these scholars point 
out that if  we think of different peace arrangements, then some (e.g. 
warm or positive peace) are most conducive to sustainable peace while 
others (e.g. cold or negative peace) are rather shallow and can lead to 
the resumption of violence (Mac Ginty). From this, it is only a small 
jump to argue that preventive diplomacy3 is a necessary tool to address 
political tensions but that to establish warm or positive peace, it is insuf­
ficient without structural changes that address the conflict’s root causes. 
In other words, preventing violent conflict can either be an end to halt 
political violence or to create conditions for lasting peace.
When the Carnegie Commission issued their report on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict, they reminded the international community that we 
should distinguish between operational and structural prevention. In 
the context of the report, operational prevention is not understood in 
terms of preventive diplomacy but defines operational approaches to 
violent conflict prevention such as addressing an ongoing or imminent 
escalation of violence (e.g. tools that can help identify at­ risk demo­
graphics and develop targeted programs); structural approaches, on the 
other hand, take a longer­ term view looking at the impact on broader 
societal structures.
There exist, of course, many more definitions that fit under “preventing 
violent conflict” but as this short discussion has shown, how peace 
is defined can impact both the definition and the operationalization 
(i.e. what kind of resources are made available) of preventing violent 
conflict. Not only this, but we should also wonder whether preventing 
conflict or conflict prevention are not misnomers. Prevention of violent 
conflict or political violence prevention might much better describe what 
UN Secretary­ General António Guterres set out to do when he said 
in his remarks at a UN Security Council open debate on maintaining 
international peace and security on January 10, 2017: “Prevention is not 
merely a priority, but the priority”. To address his agenda, he asked for 
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a “whole new approach” which would at the same time connect existing 
efforts and break free of existing silos.
Normative developments and prevention
Ideas about how to prevent violent conflict from happening have existed 
for centuries, but, normatively speaking, many powerful actors were 
preoccupied with defending their territories or aggrandizing them, and 
therefore did not pick up on preventive diplomacy or violent conflict 
prevention. Only with international normative changes that started at 
the latest after World War II, with the development of more robust 
international treaties (e.g. defining international crimes or arguing when 
the use of force is appropriate), have national and international actors 
included aspects of violent conflict prevention in their resolutions and 
charters.
Normatively speaking, the emphasis still is primarily on interstate 
relations and the management of political violence rather than the pre­
vention of it. Conflict prevention is often an afterthought in legal texts. 
The UN sees the use of force as only permissible in rare circumstances 
of self­ defense (Art. 51 UN Charter). Otherwise, “all members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations” (Article 2 of the UN Charter). Instead, “all members shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” 
(Art. 2, UN Charter). Chapter VI of the UN Charter thereby outlines 
what measures member states can take to settle their conflicts peacefully: 
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle­
ment, or other peaceful means. If  these measures are not successful and 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) determines that a threat 
to peace exists, it can order the use of force against a member state’s 
will (Chapter VII UN Charter), including measures such as sanctions, 
embargoes, and the severance of diplomatic relations (Art. 41 and Art. 
42 UN Charter) and military intervention (Art. 43– 48 UN Charter).
Intrastate configurations and the protecting of  individuals/ 
civilians have become more prominent in international and trans­
national debates after many violent intrastate conflicts and political 
disintegrations in the 1990s. Many states have reacted to these conflicts 
by calling for more guidance as to how to intervene in intrastate affairs. 
One such process has resulted in the formulation and grouping of  a 




norm complex reconfirms the states’ and state­ led organizations’ role 
in preventing political violence, by protecting citizens and rebuilding 
social institutions in the interest of  peaceful relations. The protection 
of  civilians has become an important normative pillar as well. However, 
these normative developments do not emphasize prevention as much as 
the reduction of  political violence and the establishing of  stability after 
conflict has happened.
Raising questions about political violence prevention
The ideas and normative developments are closely linked to the 
questions of  what exactly should be prevented and how actors want to 
prevent it from happening. Decisions have to be made as to when and 
how long to engage. One set of  questions relates to decisions about 
prioritization of  certain factors: How much consideration should be 
given to systemic factors that can contribute to violent conflict? Does 
one want to prevent the immediate threat of  physical violence and 
is there a threshold that would trigger such action? Do intervening 
actors see monitoring the situation (either from afar or up close, i.e. 
first, second, or third generation early warning systems) as the main 
task? Should the intervention have as a goal to stabilize the (poten­
tial) conflict situation (e.g. through the establishment of  dispute reso­
lution mechanisms of  mediation efforts) or are other political goals 
such as democratization also envisaged (e.g. by strengthening a par­
ticular interpretation of  the rule of  law)? Is it “enough” to address 
triggers or should so­ called root causes also be included in a pre­
vention policy? How do we know whether the root causes are really 
the root?
Another set of questions that should be taken into consideration 
is the potential unintended consequences of intervening activities: 
Under what conditions do international interventions prolong pol­
itical violence? By calling activities “preventing conflict” are we not 
already reconfirming conflicting lines instead of overcoming them? 
And how can we make sure that prevention is not being used to justify 
preventive war?
And a third set of questions is about feasibility: What kind of activ­
ities are actors willing to commit to, or capable of committing to? Is 
early warning what we need in situations where reporting is going on 
all over the world, i.e. we know of tensions but sometimes do not know 
how to interpret them sufficiently? Aggravating the issue of focusing 
on potential root causes is that conflict dynamics could have changed 
cleavage patterns to such a degree that root causes are hard to identify.
 
Political violence prevention 33
  3
Implementing political violence prevention: conceptual 
ambiguities and organizational turfs
As the last sections have shown, in conceiving a policy to prevent political 
violence from happening, many conceptual, normative, and operational 
choices have to be made. When we look at international organizations 
as well as their mandates and activities, we see that “conflict preven­
tion” or “preventive diplomacy” are not simply ideas but compre­
hensive concepts that contain, generate, and sustain many processes, 
approaches, and stages needed to prevent political violence from (re)
emerging. While many international organizations have been created to 
prevent the recurrence of violence (Haftel and Hofmann) among and/ or 
outside their membership, concrete policies have often been formulated 
later (Ackermann). Today, most international organizations with trade, 
development, and security mandates not only have included the goal of 
sustaining peace among their membership in their treaties and declar­
ations but also have developed institutional structures and capabilities 
to do so. In the UN family alone, various agencies see themselves active 
in this domain. Next to them, regional organizations have also set out to 
take issues related to political violence prevention on board.
These organizations often understand the prevention of polit­
ical violence from their bureaucratic and political silos (Hofmann). 
Organizational actors who have been working on issues that can be 
framed as “political violence prevention” but might organizationally 
be called peacebuilding, conflict management, or sustainable peace, do 
not necessarily want to give up responsibilities when a “new” concept 
needs to be operationalized and implemented. I  will briefly mention 
a few organizational conceptualizations and activities that fall under 
political violence prevention to demonstrate operational overlap and 
ambiguities. The outline below should be understood schematically as 
it does not give enough credit to organizational activities and changes 
over time.
The United Nations
UN language oscillates between preventive diplomacy, conflict preven­
tion, and an agenda for sustaining peace – closely interrelated concepts 
that nonetheless bear different politics. These different concepts have 
different constituencies within the UN system, which creates conceptual 
boundary issues and implementation responsibilities. The Agenda for 
Peace called for fact­ finding and analysis­ to identify at the earliest pos­





the need for Preventive Diplomacy to resolve the most immediate 
problems with attention to underlying causes of conflict. The 2001 
Report of the Secretary- General on Prevention of Armed Conflict (United 
Nations General Assembly) called for “an effective preventive strategy” 
which requires “a comprehensive approach that encompasses both 
short­ term and long­ term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human 
rights, developmental, institutional, and other measures taken by the 
international community, in cooperation with national and regional 
actors”. And a Statement by the President of the Security Council in 
January 2018 reads “The Security Council further recalls that a com­
prehensive conflict prevention strategy should include, inter alia, early 
warning, preventive deployment, mediation, peacekeeping, non­ prolif­
eration, accountability measures as well as post­ conflict peacebuilding, 
and recognizes that these components are interdependent, complemen­
tary, and non­ sequential.”
The United Nations Development Programme, for example, engages 
less with conceptual innovations than with adapting new concepts to 
their already ongoing activities. Its understanding of preventing con­
flict is end­ driven. “UNDP’s work on conflict prevention promotes 
social cohesion by empowering nations and communities to become 
inclusive and resilient to external and internal shocks. This is done by 
supporting and strengthening key relevant governance institutions” 
(United Nations Development Programme).
The United Nations and the World Bank
An inter­ organizational report between the World Bank and the 
UN, Pathways for Peace  – Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent 
Conflict, includes many different activities and actors when considering 
conflict prevention. It is one of the first texts published by international 
organizations that emphasized that not only states are responsible in 
preventing violent conflict. The report stresses “activities aimed at 
preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of 
conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hos­
tilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, 
reconstruction, and development” (World Bank and United Nations 
77). It is, as such, more people­ oriented and advocates an integrated and 
proactive approach. It furthermore adds a further dimension to vio­
lent conflict prevention (next to structural and operational): systemic 
prevention.
 
Political violence prevention 35
  35
The African Union
After its inception in 2002, the African Union established a Conflict 
Prevention and Early Warning Division whose mandate is
to provide timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace 
and security in Africa to the AU decision­ makers. The Division 
focuses on the operationalization of some aspects of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) including the Continental 
Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW) and 
the AU Border Programme (AUBP).
The AU thereby tries to include the Early Warning Systems of African 
subregional organizations (based on a Memorandum of Understanding 
in 2008). While it is still in the process of building structures that could 
be used for both preventive diplomacy and more comprehensive violent 
conflict prevention, pundits observe that “Currently, the AU’s focus is 
on conflict prevention through initiatives such as diplomacy efforts and 
mediation” (de Carvalho 3).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and ASEAN 
Regional Forum
The Southeast and East Asian UN member states are inclined to 
refrain from the concept of conflict prevention and rather stress confi­
dence­ building and consensual and noncoercive preventive diplomacy.4 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and various ASEAN­ 
Plus arrangements (such as ASEAN + 8)  are institutional structures 
to be used for these ends. Under Article 32 (c) of the ASEAN Charter, 
the chairman shall “ensure an effective and timely response to urgent 
issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN, including providing its 
good offices and such other arrangements to immediately address these 
concerns”. In other words,
Preventive diplomacy in Southeast Asia has been defined narrowly 
to minimize the role for those outside the region and to reinforce 
ASEAN’s strong doctrine of non­ interference in the internal affairs 
of member countries. It marginalizes other multilateral institutions 
and excludes nongovernmental organizations. ARF defines pre­






states to prevent disputes or conflicts that could threaten regional 
peace and stability, to prevent such disputes from escalating into 
armed confrontation, or to minimize the impact of such conflicts 
on the region.
(Della­ Giacoma)
Della­ Giacoma continues by outlining the eight key principles of pre­
ventive diplomacy, which are that it
(i) uses peaceful methods such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
and conciliation; (ii) is noncoercive; (iii) is timely; (iv) requires trust 
and confidence; (v) involves consultation and consensus; (vi) is vol­
untary; (vii) applies to direct conflict between states; and (viii) is 
conducted in accordance with international law.
(Della­ Giacoma)
An ARF document entitled Concept and Principles of Preventive 
Diplomacy (PD) even points out that
agreement on the definition and, more importantly, a common 
understanding of the concept of PD and the principles governing 
the practice of PD, would be useful for further progress on the 
development of PD within the ARF … the definition has proven 
to be controversial.
No full and concrete mechanism for fostering preventive diplomacy has 
been institutionalized yet.
The European Union
The EU can be considered a political violence prevention initiative 
itself. After World War II, it was created to avoid conflict in the future. 
Next to this, it has many institutional frameworks and tools at hand to 
engage in political violence prevention.
The EU external action for the prevention of conflicts is based 
on: Early identification of risk of violent conflict, and closing the 
gap to early action; Improved understanding of conflict situations 
(root causes, actors and dynamics); Enhanced identification of the 
range of options for EU action; Conflict­ sensitive programming of 
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external assistance … Mediation is part of the EU’s on­ the­ ground 
preventive diplomacy and is a component of the EU’s conflict pre­
vention and peace­ building toolbox for conflict countries.
(European External Action Service)
Member states, and in particular those who operate in Sub­ Saharan 
Africa under the EU umbrella, push the EU to provide military 
assistance as part of its violence prevention policies. In other words, 
the EU understands and enacts political violence prevention through 
the diplomatic, development, and security lenses. These different 
approaches are not coordinated under a single institutional umbrella, 
however.
Political violence prevention involves many actors and coordin­
ation is hard to come by, even if  these actors are all located in one 
and the same international organization. Within the EU, prevention is 
the responsibility of different actors and instruments across the EU’s 
external action remits. Security, development, and human rights might 
be conceptually interlinked but this does not make them automatically 
mutually reinforcing. For the EU, what this means in practice is that pol­
itical violence prevention is situated in the Commission, the European 
External Action Service and the Council as well as member states, while 
foreign policy, security, development, and humanitarian agendas are 
kept apart. In addition, within the organization, these institutional set 
ups have often not only responded to “needs” but also been based on 
institutional logics and turf wars. Talk today about fragility and resili­
ence, for example, is also a way to give the European Commission some 
operational turf back.5
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The OSCE sees itself  as a “key instrument for early warning, con­
flict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post­ conflict 
rehabilitation” (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). 
One of  its main tools to achieve conflict prevention is its Conflict 
Prevention Centre which serves as “an OSCE­ wide early warning 
focal point, facilitates dialogue, supports mediation and other con­
flict preventions and resolution efforts”. In addition, it supports field 
missions. As with some other organizations, early warning is a corner­
stone of  preventing violent conflict and the organization is more 





As this brief  eclectic selection of  international organizations 
illustrates, not all international organizations understand and act upon 
the prevention of  political violence in the same way. They furthermore 
do not always sit easily with the UN or other regional frameworks 
that also want to intervene in the same geographical space. Last but 
not least, they vary significantly in their institutional capacity in 
terms of  tools and resources. In short, political violence prevention 
is operationalized differently in different international organizations 
depending on their organizational structures and normative prior­
ities (e.g. noninterference, human rights, development, stability); this 
makes an assessment of  success  – which is hard in any case  – even 
harder.
Conclusion
Policies that could be framed as political violence prevention have 
already existed in different cloths such as peacebuilding or develop­
ment. Consequently, the resurgent interest in preventing political vio­
lence encroaches on policy and operational turfs that are arguably 
already institutionalized. Hence, actors who subscribe to the preven­
tion of political violence should first take stock of current institu­
tional infrastructures and assess whether new resources and capacities 
are needed to tackle the challenge. Actors should ask themselves what 
needs to happen for these existing mechanisms so that they become 
“preventive”. Before coming up with new tools and more sophisticated 
early warning systems (some of which have already been developed and 
used before the conflict prevention discourse became en vogue), it would 
be good to evaluate what has worked and what has not worked and why. 
In any case, the reinvigoration of concepts alone is not enough to create 
a policy. Normative concepts, mechanisms, resources, and capacities 
need to be attached to such concepts.
Next to monitoring and evaluating existing programs, it might be 
good to consider establishing and reinforcing existing coordination 
and evaluation mechanisms for international organizations active in 
the same geographical space – if  possible, for example, as a joint or 
coordinated strategic review process. These review processes should 
encourage inclusive narratives of  institutional failures so that lessons 
can be learned. As it stands, the many actors can challenge coord­
ination and quality control, duplicate each other’s efforts, and even 
unintentionally undermine each other’s violence reduction attempts. 
For example, one danger on the ground is that of  creating violent con­
flict prevention fatigue among local actors. International stakeholders 
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constantly invite local officials, civil society representatives, etc. to 
workshops, trainings, and forums without necessarily assessing local 
needs or considering local priorities.
This is not to say that actors should automatically link up to 
more integrated, comprehensive, or holistic approaches (e.g. the 
development– security nexus). Looking for comparative advantages 
and establishing partnerships that clearly define these comparative 
advantages helps create buy­ in. It is also important to share, but to 
not align conflict analysis tools as well as with local stakeholders, 
and to encourage local narratives. This way, we do not assess violence 
potentials according to templates but open a space for discussion 
that helps assess political situations. Conflict analysis is a necessary 
but highly insufficient condition for conflict sensitivity in any case. 
Regular monitoring of  international actors’ activities, regular consult­
ation with a broad group of  stakeholders, as well as ongoing adjust­
ment of  the activities and, possibly, their aims are also necessary. This 
way, actors invite in more narratives of  what could constitute success, 
impact, and performance.
Notes
 1 Let alone its conceptual boundary issues with other terms such as conflict 
transformation or peacebuilding.
 2 The same applies to conflict. For example, several datasets that all claim to 
measure conflict use different indicators to empirically determine when they 
see conflict.
 3 Of this term, the UN has said,
Since Dag Hammarskjöld first articulated the concept over half  a cen­
tury ago, it has continued to evolve in response to new challenges. An 
integral part of broader conflict prevention efforts, preventive diplo­
macy refers specially to diplomatic action taken, at the earliest possible 
stage, “to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread 
of the latter when they occur”.
(United Nations)
 4 It is interesting to note that when the UN and ASEAN meet to discuss the 
issue of preventing conflict, the meeting takes place under both conflict pre­
vention and preventive diplomacy headings; see for example “ASEAN­ UN 
talks” (Ng).
 5 Similar dynamics can be observed if  we look at peacebuilding activities 
within the UN system. One can just hope that competition in the short term 
can be good as this might increase organizations’ turf and innovation cap­










Ackermann, Alice. “The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention”. Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 3, 2003, pp. 339– 347.
African Union. Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division of the AU 
Peace and Security Department. 2018, www.peaceau.org/ uploads/ conflict­ 
prevention­ and­ early­ warning­ booklet­ 13feb18­ approved.pdf.
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). “Concept and Principles of Preventive 
Diplomacy”. ARF, http:// aseanregionalforum.asean.org/ wp­ content/ 
uploads/ 2019/ 01/ ARF­ Concept­ Paper­ of­ Preventive­ Diplomacy.pdf, 
no date.
Carnegie Commission. Preventing Deadly Conflict. 1997, www.carnegie.org/ 
publications/ preventing­ deadly­ conflict­ final­ report/ .
de Carvalho, Gustavo. “Conflict Prevention. What’s In It for the AU?” ISS 
Policy Briefs, Institute for Security Studies and Training for Peace, 2017, 
https:// issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/ site/ uploads/ policybrief103­ 2.pdf.
Della­ Giacoma, Jim. “Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Redefining the 
ASEAN Way”. International Peace Institute, 2011, www.crisisgroup.org/ asia/ 
south­ east­ asia/ preventive­ diplomacy­ southeast­ asia­ redefining­ asean­ way.
Department for International Development. “Preventing Violent Conflict”. 
DFID Policy Papers, 2007, https:// reliefweb.int/ report/ world/ dfid­ policy­ 
 paper­ preventing­ violent­ conflict.
Doyle, Michael W. “Liberalism and World Politics”. American Political Science 
Review, vol. 80, no. 4, 1986, pp. 1151– 1170.
Englebert, Pierre, and Denis M. Tull. “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: 
Flawed Ideas about Failed States”. International Security, vol. 32, no. 4, 
2008, pp. 106– 139.
European External Action Service. “Conflict Prevention, Peace building and 
Mediation”. 2017, https:// eeas.europa.eu/ headquarters/ headquarters­ 
homepage/ 426/ conflict­ prevention­ peace­ building­ and­ mediation_ en.
Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”. Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, pp. 167– 191.
Haftel, Yoram, and Stephanie C. Hofmann. “Institutional Authority and 
Security Cooperation within Regional Economic Organizations”. Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. 54, no. 4, 2017, pp. 484– 498.
Hofmann, Stephanie C. “The Politics of Overlapping Organizations: Hostage­ 
Taking, Forum Shopping, and Brokering”. Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 26, no. 6, 2019, pp. 803– 905, www.tandfonline.com/ doi/ full/ 
10.1080/ 13501763.2018.1512644.
International Committee of  the Red Cross. Protracted Conflict and 
Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences. Geneva, 
International Committee of  the Red Cross, 2016, www.icrc.org/ sites/ 
default/ files/ document/ file_ list/ protracted_ conflict_ and_ humanitarian_ 
action_ icrc_ report_ lr_ 29.08.16.pdf.
Mac Ginty, Roger. “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top­ Down and 

















Political violence prevention 41
  41
Miller, Benjamin. “Explaining Variations in Regional Peace: Three Strategies for 
Peace­ Making”. Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 35, no. 2, 2000, pp. 155– 192.
Ng, Swan Ti. “ASEAN­ UN Talks Focus on Conflict Prevention and Preventive 
Diplomacy”. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 5 Apr. 2013, http:// 
asean.org/ asean­ un­ talks­ focus­ on­ conflict­ prevention­ and­ preventive­ 
diplomacy/ .
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “Conflict prevention and 
resolution”. www.osce.org/ conflict­ prevention­ and­ resolution.
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, and Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. https:// www.un.org/ en/ charter­ united­ nations/ .
— — — . “Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results”. Report of the Secretary- 
General, UN Doc. S/ 2011/ 552, 2011, www.un.org/ undpa/ sites/ www.un.org.
undpa/ files/ SG%20Report%20on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf.
— — — . “Statement by the President of the Security Council”. S/ PRST/ 2018/ 
1, 2018.
United Nations Development Programme. “Democratic Governance and 
Peacebuilding”. 2018, www.undp.org/ content/ undp/ en/ home/ democratic­ 
governance­ and­ peacebuilding/ conflict­ prevention.html.
United Nations General Assembly. “Prevention of Armed Conflict”. Report of 
the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 55/ 985­ S/ 2001/ 574, 2001, http:// unpan1.
un.org/ intradoc/ groups/ public/ documents/ un/ unpan005902.pdf.
United Nations Secretary­ General. “An Agenda for Peace”. Report of the 
Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 42/ 277, 1992, www.un­ documents.net/ a47­ 
277.htm.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute. 
UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook. PRIO, 2013.
World Bank and United Nations. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to 













3  A tale of two “peaces”




As China’s overall national strength keeps increasing apace, its role in 
global governance is now a heated topic. At the same time, President 
Xi Jinping has expressed strong willingness to actively participate in 
reform of the global governance system. In the light of such a back­
ground, China is no longer merely an ordinary participant in many 
important global affairs, but also a core actor, as China’s international 
identity has expanded from a norm taker to a norm contributor. As the 
largest inter­ governmental organization, the United Nations (UN) is 
one of the key actors in global governance as well as the most important 
platform for international politics. For the past four decades, China’s 
increasingly active participation in global affairs and integration into 
the international community has to a large extent been reflected in its 
participation in UN affairs, most notably peacekeeping (He “China’s 
Doctrine” 110). Therefore, research into China’s normative contribu­
tion to the UN peacekeeping regime can aid understanding of China’s 
changing role in global governance.
As many UN peacekeeping operations established in the post­ 
Cold War era now emphasize peacebuilding, this chapter will discuss 
China’s normative contributions in that area. The major questions to 
be answered include: What is the Chinese norm of peacebuilding? And 
what will happen when the Chinese norm encounters the existing dom­
inant peacebuilding norm?
Peacebuilding
In multi­ dimensional peacekeeping operations, while working hard 
to secure a peaceful operational environment, peacekeepers and their 
civilian colleagues are authorized to conduct various peacebuilding 
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economic, and social institutions, and building infrastructure. With 
such a background, the term “peacekeeping operation” is redefined, 
with these operations focusing on peacebuilding, which has become an 
important part of the efforts by the international community to main­
tain peace and security since the end of the Cold War.
The term “peacebuilding” was first proposed by Galtung in 1970, 
and by it he meant addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting 
local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution (Galtung 
“Three Approaches to Peace” 282– 304). Peacebuilding became a familiar 
concept within the UN following Secretary­ General Boutros Boutros­ 
Ghali’s 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, which defined peacebuilding 
as actions to solidify peace and avoid relapsing into conflict (55– 59). 
The Supplement to an Agenda for Peace published in 1995 by the 
UN Secretariat stressed the importance of building state institutions 
(Boutros­ Ghali 47– 56). Another milestone document for peacebuilding 
is the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also 
known as the “Brahimi Report”) put forward by the UN Secretariat, 
which redefines peacebuilding as activities undertaken in post­ conflict 
settings to reassemble the foundations of peace and to provide the 
tools for building something that is more than just the absence of 
the war (Report of the Panel 5). In 2005, the UN began to establish 
a peacebuilding architecture which has three institutional components: 
the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding 
Fund, and the Peacebuilding Support Office (Jenkins 44– 73). The insti­
tutional complex serves as an important platform for the UN and inter­
national community to help build sustainable peace in post­ conflict 
societies. In 2015, the Secretary­ General’s Advisory Group of Experts 
submitted The Challenges of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory 
Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Architecture, which redefines “peacebuilding” and introduces a broader 
approach, “sustaining peace”. According to the review, the concept of 
sustaining peace is supposed to liberate peacebuilding from the strict 
limitation to post­ conflict contexts (17).
Besides this conceptual evolution and institutional development, 
another important part of peacebuilding is its activities and guiding 
norms. Since the early 1990s, UN peacebuilding has had an institutional 
focus. Prolonged violent conflicts usually gravely damage institutions. 
It is widely believed within the international peacebuilding community 
that strong institutions are the pre­ requisite for efforts to build lasting 
peace. Therefore, there has been a focus on rebuilding and reinforcing 
the resilience of key institutions (Challenges of Sustaining Peace 17). 
More importantly, all peacebuilding activities are required to be done 
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according to democratic rules and principles. In other words, a peace 
norm called “liberal peace” has prevailed in peacebuilding discourse 
and practice (Paris At War’s End; Mac Ginty and Richmond).
Liberal peace and its limitations
Liberal peace derives from the practices of Western Civilization, with 
Western Europe and North America as its center. The liberal peace 
norm has two fundamental elements: liberalization and democratiza­
tion, from which Western states have benefited greatly. For centuries 
past, due to its economic and military strength, the West has enjoyed 
an advantageous position on the international stage and has been able 
to export its values and political ideology to other parts of the world, 
playing a dominant role in shaping the international system. Under such 
conditions, the liberal peace is promoted as a universal peace norm and 
has influenced peacebuilding within the UN peace and security archi­
tecture and beyond.
Advocates of liberal peace believe that the most important task of 
peacebuilding in a post­ conflict state is to establish democratic political 
institutions as well as neoliberal economic institutions. As a result, over 
the last three decades, a rough template seems to have emerged for inter­
national responses to post­ conflict challenges (Challenges of Sustaining 
Peace 18): usually within a year or so after international intervention 
is initiated, a popular election is held, followed by various capacity­ 
building and security sector reform efforts according to liberal demo­
cratic standards. At the same time, neoliberal economic institutions 
are set up with help – and pressure – from the international financial 
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Roland Paris’s study shows that although the 14 peacebuilding 
operations established from 1989 to 1999 vary in many respects, they 
have some similarity: all of them had sought to transform war­ torn 
states into liberal democracies. Paris asserts that liberal peace embodies 
a hypothesis: liberalization of political and economic institutions can 
lead to self­ sustaining peace (At War’s End 5).
However, liberal peacebuilding has two major limitations. One is 
that peacebuilding is dominated by a narrow statebuilding agenda. 
According to Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, statebuilding aims 
at building a neoliberal, Weberian state with a clearly defined sover­
eign territory, and with a focus on political, economic, and security 
structure; peacebuilding, on the other hand, has a broader set of tasks 
ranging from individual needs and rights to community and govern­
ance structures (182). With statebuilding in the name of peacebuilding 
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becoming the core task of multi­ dimensional peacekeeping operations 
in the post– Cold War era, the result has been that these operations focus 
attention on addressing a small part of the long list of challenges of 
post­ conflict states.
Another limitation of liberal peacebuilding is that it lacks inclusive­
ness. Any institutions or activities which are regarded as non­ liberal 
or non­ democratic will be rejected or excluded in order to transform 
the post­ conflict state into a Western­ style liberal democracy. Western 
donors play an important role in promoting liberal peace. They often 
attach political conditions to their aid in order to force the peacebuilding 
host states to reform their political and economic institutions according 
to liberal democratic standards. More, liberal peace promotes building 
a strong civil society and plays down the role of state government in 
economic and social affairs.
However, the “one size fits all” peace approach has a mixed record. 
After 9/ 11, US efforts to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan descended into 
chaos, provoking debates over the liberal peace model of peacebuilding. 
Some believe that democratic political institutions and neoliberal 
economic institutions combined may cause political disorder, social 
tension, and even inter­ ethnic violence (Chua). The peace built by lib­
eral peace is a “virtual peace” (Newman et al.; Campbell et al.). These 
debates about the benefits of the liberal peace fall into two camps: “crit­
ical voices” and “problem solvers”.
“Critical voices” range from challenges to the ideological core of 
liberal peace to doubts about its functions. Advocates of liberal peace 
promote the “democratic peace thesis”, which argues that states with 
free markets and democratic politics do not go to war. This belief  or 
assumption sets a good excuse for liberal international intervention 
including peacebuilding because liberal peace benefits not only the 
domestic affairs of post­ conflict states, but also international peace 
and security in a broad sense. However, some are not so optimistic. For 
example, Roger Mac Ginty sharply points out that the “democratic peace 
thesis” is “complete rubbish”, for “liberal states are regularly involved in 
confrontations with states they deem non­ liberal, often under label of 
‘rogue’, ‘failed’, or ‘evil’ ” (40). Other critical voices against liberal peace 
focus on the effectiveness and result of peacebuilding. Some believe 
that peacebuilding has been reduced to a narrow statebuilding agenda 
(Reilly 113; Richmond and Franks 182). The result is that although 
many people in the UN system and international community have an 
original good intention to help post­ conflict states build self­ sustaining 
peace, in reality their comprehensive peacebuilding programs focus on 
building liberal democratic Weberian states. In other words, institution 
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building has become the narrower, core task of peacebuilding. As 
Roland Paris notes, frustration at America’s “regime change” invasion 
of Iraq contributed to a mounting backlash against all forms of liberal 
interventionism including UN­ sponsored peacebuilding. Some discuss 
liberal interventionism as “hubristic and delusional” (Paris “Critiques 
of Liberal Peace” 38).
Although the critical voices can be helpful for one to understand the 
flaws of liberal peace, they have failed to propose useful alternatives 
and help solve the problems in peacebuilding. Some commentators have 
made efforts to provide concrete suggestions to improve liberal peace­ 
oriented peacebuilding. They are called “problem solvers” here. Like 
critical voices, problem solvers too recognize many of the pitfalls of 
liberal peace. However, unlike most critical voices, who usually have 
very pessimistic views about liberal peace, problem solvers are more 
or less optimistic that the existing liberal peace– oriented peacebuilding 
can be improved. Some problem­ solving approaches seek to revise the 
shortcomings of liberal peace intervention by redistributing power, 
including enhancing local responsibility and encouraging local own­
ership. Paris proposes changing the sequence of tasks. He suggests an 
approach of “institutionalization before liberalization” (“Alternatives 
to Liberal Peace” 163– 164). Paris thinks that elections should be 
postponed until there has been a deeper instauration of associated 
institutions which will stabilize the environment for elections and 
render them more than symbolic exercises with only limited meaning 
and impact (Mac Ginty 26). In all, however, problem solvers tend to 
limit themselves to technical improvements without doubting the foun­
dation of liberal peace. According to Paris, there is no realistic alterna­
tive to some form of liberal peacebuilding strategy at all (“Alternatives 
to Liberal Peace” 159).
As mentioned above, liberal peace derives from Western civilization. 
It is by nature a norm with regional characteristics. Due to the West’s 
dominance and hegemony in the international power configuration 
and institutional regime, liberal peace has been promoted to become 
an international norm. The rise of China will undoubtedly lead to 
opportunities for China to influence the norms of global governance, 
including peacebuilding (Li and Peng; Ikenberry).
The rise of China and developmental peace
China’s rise tells a peace story different from that of the West. To under­
stand this, one should first understand the myth of China’s rise: Why 
has China succeeded? Some try to answer this question from a political 
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perspective, attributing China’s success to “authoritarian government” 
and a “whole nation system” (juguo tizhi). Some try to answer this 
question from an economic perspective, arguing that the most important 
reason is that China is a Keynesian state. The government plays a 
leading role in economic affairs through investing in infrastructure and 
keeps the economic system under firm control by strengthening state­ 
owned enterprises (SOEs). Some note that China’s efforts to reform pol­
itical institutions have also contributed to its success (Eric X. Li 56– 57). 
Each of these views explains China’s success from certain perspectives, 
and thus fails to present a full picture.
A rising power always promotes a zeitgeist: the United Kingdom 
promoted free trade and the United States promotes freedom and dem­
ocracy (Zheng). The zeitgeist that the rising China promotes is peace 
and development, which was recognized and written into China’s 
Constitution in 1992 as a guiding principle for its reform and opening 
up strategy. To China, peace, especially internal peace, is the most 
critical pre­ requisite for development. The late architect of  China’s 
reform and opening up strategy, Premier Deng Xiaoping, insisted that 
internal stability should be secured at any cost. With a peaceful or 
stable political and social environment, China can make good use of  its 
limited resources to implement the “economic development– oriented 
strategy”. It believes in the Marxist philosophy of  materialism that the 
economic foundation defines superstructure. To China, many social 
and political conflicts can find their root causes in underdevelopment. 
In other words, successful national development, with economic devel­
opment as the foundation, is the solution to conflicts and key to the 
door of  peace.
The experience of China’s rise can be summarized as a norm called 
“developmental peace”. Like liberal peace, developmental peace too 
embodies a hypothesis: with political and social stability as a pre­ 
requisite, development can lead to sustainable peace. Even though 
China does not have any official agenda to promote developmental 
peace, the norm has begun to exert influence internationally through 
China’s increasing international aid and economic activities, including 
in the field of peacebuilding (He “United Nations Peacebuilding” 91).
A comparison of the two “peaces”
Both liberal peace and developmental peace are peacebuilding norms. 
As is shown in Table 3.1, they differ greatly in many ways. In terms of 
origin, the two peace norms derive from two different civilizations and 





the two peace norms are based on different value patterns and philo­
sophic systems.
Besides normal economic activities, aid is an important way for 
external actors to assist in the peacebuilding process of post­ conflict 
states. When Western countries give aid to peacebuilding host countries, 
they will usually attach a liberal peace package, setting strict political 
conditions. For example, they may require the aid recipient countries 
to reform their political and economic institutions according to lib­
eral democratic standards. They may also want aid recipient countries 
to lower their tariffs and privatize SOEs. However, unlike the Western 
countries, China does not attach political conditions to its aid to other 
countries (Brautigam 76).
The two peace norms have different priorities: liberal peace attaches 
the greatest importance to institution building while developmental 
peace gives priority to economic development. This difference is very 
critical because to post­ conflict states, resources for peacebuilding can 
be very limited, especially at the early stage of peacebuilding. Different 
top priorities may lead to different results from peacebuilding.
Liberal peace prefers a small government, insisting that strong 
civil society like non­ governmental actors should be encouraged 
and empowered to participate in governance and provide public ser­
vices. However, developmental peace prefers a big government and 
downplays the role of civil society, insisting that the government should 
play a leading role in a state’s political, economic, and social affairs. 
Liberal peace advocates fundamentalist rules of market economy, 
opposing interference in market activities from the state government. 
Developmental peace recognizes the role of market, too; but it insists 
that the state government should keep its economic affairs under con­
trol through macro­ control measures such as strengthening SOEs and 
guiding investment in public areas including infrastructure (Lin 5– 10).
Table 3.1  Comparison of the two peace norms in peacebuilding
Comparison aspects Liberal peace Developmental peace
Origin
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When it comes to pace of transformation, liberal peace often advocates 
radical change. Many post­ conflict states are required to abandon their 
non­ liberal and non­ democratic institutions and practices, and accept 
reform packages or “shock therapy”. Developmental peace opposes 
radical change or a “one size fits all” approach. It believes that every 
state has its own conditions; therefore, reform should be done gradually 
through “wading across the stream by feeling the way” (mozhe shitou 
guohe). Liberal peace is a value­ based norm. It promotes good govern­
ance, limiting governance rules and practices to a Western standard. 
Developmental peace is a non­ value­ based and inclusive norm. It 
promotes effective governance, welcoming any governance rules and 
practices that can contribute to peace and development.
Finally, the two peace norms are diffused in different ways. Liberal 
peace has many advocates, including the Western states and their 
international development institutions, the United Nations, inter­
national financial organizations, and international non­ governmental 
organizations. These actors believe that if  post­ conflict states want to 
build lasting peace, they must accept liberal peace. Therefore, liberal 
peace is usually taught to host countries. Although the new Chinese 
leadership under President Xi Jinping has shown confidence in pro­
viding “Chinese approaches” to global governance, so far China has 
not promoted any Chinese normative package internationally. Some 
leading Chinese academics hold that China’s rise has not generated 
any universal norms (Junru Li 14). In other words, although many 
elements of developmental peace have been demonstrated in China’s 
international aid and economic activities including the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the peace norm has not been endorsed by the Chinese govern­
ment or the Chinese aid community. Nevertheless, developing countries, 
including those post­ conflict ones, cannot be prevented from imitating 
and learning China’s experience as well as practice in economic, polit­
ical, and social development.
A case study of when the two “peaces” meet: peacebuilding in 
East Timor
Although liberal peace and developmental peace differ greatly, what is 
happening in peacebuilding proves that many post­ conflict states have 
enough room to accommodate both peace norms. An in­ depth analysis 
of the two peacebuilding processes of Haiti and Liberia shows that 
the effect of the peacebuilding in Liberia, where the two peace norms 
coexist and compete with each other, is comparatively much better than 




process while “developmental peace” cannot play a significant role (He 
“Norm Competition” 116– 121).
An exploration of the process and result of the peacebuilding in 
East Timor can even better reflect the relationship between the two 
peace norms. From 1999 to 2012, the UN had established a series of 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor. Since the UN exited from East 
Timor in 2012, the country has appeared to be walking on a road of 
sustainable peace. The UN regards East Timor as one of few successful 
cases of peacebuilding (Challenges of Sustaining Peace 18). One of the 
main reasons for the success is that East Timor’s peacebuilding has 
accommodated both liberal peace and developmental peace.
When building institutions, although East Timor has to a large 
extent embraced liberal peace, it has not adopted confrontational 
democracy. Instead, East Timor has turned to consensus democracy, 
which provides a platform to include a wide range of political forces 
and avoid unnecessary waste of limited resources. For example, con­
sensus democracy has helped to unite the limited number of East 
Timorese elites, most of whom are veteran politicians grown up during 
the revolutionary struggle against the Indonesian occupation before 
independence. Although veteran politicians like Xanana Gusmao and 
José Ramos­ Horta took power in turn, these “old men” of politics 
contributed significantly to unite the young state and maintain political 
and social stability (He “Developmental Peace” 29– 30).
As there is a stable political and social environment, East Timor can 
allocate most of its limited resources to development. A strong central 
government makes it possible for the young state to effectively manage 
its economic affairs. Political stability also secures continuity of policy 
and allows East Timor to make a long­ term economic development 
plan. With effective governance, East Timor has successfully avoided 
a “resource curse” that bothers many resource rich countries, setting 
up a sovereign wealth fund with the revenue generated from the oil and 
gas in the Timor Sea. The success of peacebuilding in East Timor also 
shows that liberal peace and developmental peace can coexist and forge 
complementary relations, making a joint contribution to peacebuilding 
(He “Developmental Peace” 29– 30).
Conclusion
As there are many challenges in peacebuilding for post­ conflict states, 
any one dominant peace paradigm alone cannot help to build lasting 
peace. Peacebuilding has two most critical tasks: institution building and 
economic development, both of which are indispensable for building 
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sustainable peace. Therefore, in practice, there exists no logic that one is 
more urgent than another.
Liberal peace and developmental peace derive from different patterns 
of practice of two great civilizations, and they have different ideo­
logical concepts as well as normative contents. Nevertheless, both of 
them have advantages over each other in addressing certain challenges 
in peacebuilding in post­ conflict states. Generally speaking, liberal 
peace is more concerned with institution building than development, 
while developmental peace more effectively helps with economic devel­
opment than does liberal peace. Their coexistence can greatly benefit 
peacebuilding in post­ conflict states. Peacebuilding in the twenty­ first 
century will be a tale of two “peaces”.
Note
 * Yin He is Associate Professor at the China Peacekeeping Police Training 
Center (CPPTC). The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author 
and do not represent any stance of the CPPTC or the Chinese Ministry of 
Public Security.
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4  How to curb conflict




While the lion’s share of the contributions to this volume on instruments 
and tools for conflict prevention focus on concrete insights from spe­
cific cases and situations, often involving specific policies from China 
or Switzerland, this chapter takes a step back and offers a survey of 
statistical results from large­ n studies published in economics and pol­
itical science. Both approaches are useful and complementary, as case 
studies take particularly well into account concrete and specific features 
of the context, while an advantage of large­ scale statistical studies is 
that they contain large, well­ defined, and comprehensive control groups 
which allows us to draw general lessons from policies applied elsewhere 
that may have not received enough attention in other contexts. To give 
a concrete example, one of the many studies discussed below is about 
the impact of school construction in Indonesia on the likelihood of pol­
itical violence (Rohner and Saia). This study finds a very strong paci­
fying impact from fostering primary education. Obviously these insights 
cannot be simply blindly applied to other contexts that may be very 
different from Indonesia. Still, the mechanisms highlighted in this work 
may well apply beyond Indonesia, and provide inspiration for (maybe 
smaller scale) pilot projects elsewhere.
Below, I offer a summary of some recent statistical results on peace 
and war in economics and political science, before highlighting more 
concretely, towards the end of the essay, how these findings could 
inspire governments and policy makers. This chapter starts briefly out­
lining why we should care about tackling turmoil: conflicts are very 
costly from both a human and socio­ economic point of view. After this 
short discussion of motivation, the emphasis will, second, shift to a few 
major root causes of fighting, namely poverty, natural resources, and 
ethnic division. Armed with this overview, the third and final part of 
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this short discussion will then focus on potential medications to cure the 
ills of political violence.2
Costs of conflict
Like the causes, the costs of conflict are manifold, ranging from fatal­
ities over economic costs to societal damage. The maybe most imme­
diate concern and easiest cost to grasp is in terms of human suffering. 
According to Bae and Ott, the conflict­ related deaths in the 20th cen­
tury were as large as 109.7 million, corresponding to 4.35 percent of the 
world population. Of these, 60 percent were civilian non­ combatants. 
Hopes that the end of World War II were to give way to a new age of 
perpetual peace were swiftly dashed: between 1945 and the end of the 
20th century, an estimated 3.3 million people lost their lives in 25 inter­ 
state wars, while an estimated 16.2 million people perished in 127 civil 
wars (Fearon and Laitin), and much violence also occurs away from 
the battlefield, when armed troops turn their weapons against civilians. 
Since World War II, some 50 episodes of mass killings have led to 
between 12 and 25 million civilian casualties (Political Instability Task 
Force).3
Also, the economy of a war­ torn country gets damaged in various 
ways. Not only does destruction of physical infrastructure entail a high 
toll, but also days spent fighting correspond to a loss of productive 
labor. Unsurprisingly, the economic costs of conflict are sizable by any 
standard. Collier estimates an average war to reduce annual economic 
growth by 2.3 percentage points, leading to a total loss of 15 percent 
of GDP for the average war duration of 7 years. Even conflicts with a 
below­ average death toll, like the separatist fight in Basque Country, 
can lead to very sizable economic consequences. According to Abadie 
and Gardeazabal, the comparison of the Basque GDP to a synthetic 
control group of comparable regions with similar characteristics but 
without violence, leads to the conclusion that Basque GDP would be 
about 10% higher today in the absence of ETA’s armed fight.
Finally, conflict also imposes costs on the society. While the litera­
ture has found a clear­ cut effect of conflict exposure during childhood 
in reducing human capital accumulation (e.g. Shemyakina; Swee) and 
in increasing future crime propensity (Couttenier et al.), the impact of 
conflict on social capital is more controversial (see e.g. the survey of 
Bauer et al.). While some studies have found that conflict depletes trust 
and boosts ethnic identity (e.g. Cassar et al.; Rohner et al. “Seeds of 
Distrust”), other studies have also found beneficial effects, in particular 







Three prominent root causes of political violence have received consid­
erable attention in economics and political science in recent years: pov­
erty, natural resource abundance, and ethnic heterogeneity.
The conceptual reason for the emphasis on poverty as a potential 
driver of conflict is simple: having a limited amount of time available, 
people have to choose how to spend it and face an opportunity cost of 
all options not selected. Concretely, joining a rebel group means giving 
up work. While the opportunity cost of leaving the work force is low 
when jobs and perspectives are lacking, it is very high for individuals 
with large human capital and well­ paid jobs. Put differently: it is much 
easier to recruit fighters in a weak economy. There is indeed a large lit­
erature finding that poverty is a powerful correlate of conflict (Fearon 
and Laitin; Miguel et al.; Collier and Hoeffler; Collier et al.).
A second major factor that has been often investigated as a root 
cause for conflict is the abundance of natural resources, which represent 
rents that can be grabbed and a higher price for appropriation. Other 
mechanisms put forward in the literature include the fact that natural 
resources may fuel secessionism, that the need of capital for resource 
extraction may crowd out labor intensive sectors and hence lead to lower 
wages, or that the control of mines and oil wells makes the financing of 
rebellion more easily feasible. A variety of articles have documented a 
strong link between natural resources and conflict, including, among 
many others, Fearon and Laitin; Collier and Hoeffler; Dube and 
Vargas; Lei and Michaels; Caselli et al.; Morelli and Rohner; Esteban 
et al. “Strategic Mass Killings”; and Nicolas Berman et al.
A third often­ cited factor is the role of  ethnic diversity. One under­
lying conceptual logic is the idea that ethnicity can be a powerful 
marker for collective action (see e.g. the theoretical papers of  Esteban 
and Ray; Caselli and Coleman). A  variety of  statistical studies have 
found that ethnic polarization goes along with a greater likelihood of 
civil conflict (Montalvo and Reynal­ Querol; Esteban et al. “Ethnicity 
and Conflict”).
Policies for peace
While there is no consensus in the economics of conflict literature on 
what the key policies are to stop political violence, there are a selection 
of policies and institutions that appear promising in the light of the 
empirical evidence. We can group these into four categories: stability; 
incentives; institutions; and trust.
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First, as far as stability is concerned, there has been documented the 
importance of state capacity (Besley and Persson), and in particular the 
crucial role of establishing security and functioning public service provi­
sion (Eli Berman et al.). Second, what has been found to boost incentives 
for peaceful behavior are factors that make the economy strong and that 
provide jobs and long­ run perspectives for prosperity. In particular, edu­
cation is found to reduce the scope for conflict (Collier and Hoeffler; 
Thyne; de la Brière et al.; Rohner and Saia), and employment programs 
and job market access are pointed out as major factors that attenuate the 
incentives for violent behavior (Blattman and Annan; Couttenier et al.). 
Related to this are also the findings in Nicolas Berman et al., highlighting 
that by reducing the potential gains from victorious conflict, peaceful 
behavior can be promoted. In particular, they find that transparency on 
mineral origins and high levels of corporate social responsibility attenuate 
the conflict risk. Third, when it comes to the impact of institutions, sev­
eral articles in the literature have highlighted the non­ monotonic impact 
of democracy. It has been found that regimes with “intermediate” democ­
racy levels face the largest conflict risk (Hegre et al.; Fearon and Laitin), 
and that democracy tends to reduce conflict in rich countries, while it 
may fuel conflict in poor states (Collier and Rohner). Two recent studies 
find a clear impact of full democracy and franchise extension reducing 
conflict (Laurent­Lucchetti et al.; Rohner and Saia). There exists also 
evidence for particular aspects of democracy. In particular, institutional 
constraints, the rule of law, proportional representation, and feder­
alism correlate with having fewer civil wars (Easterly; Reynal­ Querol; 
Saideman et al.; Besley and Persson), and power­ sharing has been found 
to reduce the scope for fighting (Cederman et al.; Mueller and Rohner). 
Fourth, building trust has a variety of angles and aspects. While concep­
tually it is argued that taking measures that promote inter­ group trust 
may boost inter­ group trade and hence increase the opportunity cost of 
forgone trade in the case of conflict (Rohner et al. “War Signals”), the 
empirical evidence shows that reconciliation ceremonies (Cilliers et al.) 
and bilateral pacification of inter­ group hostilities can reduce grievances 
and the scope for conflict (König et al.).
Conclusion
Conflict costs are large by any standards, and directing research efforts 
at this topic are crucial. While the literature in conflict economics 
has gained an overview on major causes and consequences of armed 
fighting, up to recently the study of how particular polices can reduce 




however, a series of interesting results have been reached on how the 
scope for war can be reduced. Further research on this policy­ relevant 
angle to the conflict question is strongly recommended.
In terms of real­ world implications for international policy makers, 
there are plenty of implications to be drawn in the light of the evidence 
cited above, in terms of improving stability, incentives, institutions, 
and trust. To give just one example, education tending in general to 
be a pacifying force, global policy makers and governments may con­
sider supporting international initiatives and programs – for example, 
by helping to fund further schooling. But on top of the aforemen­
tioned policies that are largely defined at a national level, there are also 
some inherently transnational policies that may be promising. Nicolas 
Berman et al. have, for example, found that transparency and certifica­
tion initiatives for minerals extracted can reduce their potential scope 
for conflict. This is an example of a cause requiring broad international 
support and where policy makers and governments around the world 
can make a real difference through international cooperation.
Notes
 1 Dominic Rohner is grateful for helpful comments by Courtney Fung.
 2 This current literature review essay draws on earlier survey papers of Rohner 
(“The Economics of Conflict and Peace”; “The Economics of Peace”). Given 
its short length, the focus is necessarily selective and the goal is to showcase 
some relevant recent work on the economics of conflict, without any claim 
for completeness.
 3 Indirect casualties from epidemics and disease among the weakened 
populations cause at least as many fatalities as direct casualties (Ghobarah 
et al.). Beyond physical injuries and death, psychological effects of conflict 
exposure are widely documented (see e.g. Barenbaum et al.).
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Switzerland is known as a neutral country with an active peace policy. 
The Swiss themselves consider conflict prevention an essential feature 
of  foreign affairs, and, indeed, peace promotion is enshrined in the 
Swiss constitution as one of  five objectives of  its external relations. 
Internally, Switzerland’s political system is underpinned by the need 
to manage diversity in a heterogeneous society, accommodating people 
speaking different languages, practicing different religions, and having 
different socio­ economic backgrounds, in order to ensure peaceful 
coexistence.
How to explain Switzerland’s focus on conflict prevention? What 
are the deep roots of  Switzerland’s internal and external conflict pre­
vention efforts? How does Switzerland prevent conflict? This essay 
explores these questions by first outlining Switzerland’s geopolitical 
profile, taking into account its geography, economy, demography, and 
political history. It then surveys Swiss infrastructures for the preven­
tion of  internal conflict and finally looks at the country’s policy on 
preventing conflicts abroad.
Geopolitical profile of Switzerland
What are the main features of  Switzerland’s geopolitical profile? 
A  glimpse at the world map reveals that Switzerland is a relatively 
small, landlocked country located in the middle of  Western Europe. 
With the exception of  Liechtenstein, Switzerland’s neighbors, i.e. 
Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, are larger countries and count 
among Europe’s great powers that have shaped the turbulent history 
of  the continent. While the Alps mountain range covers about 60% 
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of  Switzerland’s territory, over two thirds of  its 8 million inhabitants 
live on the plateau north of  the Alps with few natural boundaries vis­ 
à­ vis neighboring countries. Historically speaking, the implication of 
Switzerland’s small­ state status is that the country could not primarily 
rely on military defense for its survival. In times when the use of  force, 
and the conquest of  one state’s territory by another state, was common, 
a policy of  neutrality emerged as the best approach for Switzerland to 
avoid being drawn into military confrontations with or between large 
powers. Therefore, its small­ state geography implies that Switzerland 
has an existential interest in a peaceful world order and, in particular, 
in good relations among European powers.
Concerning the economy, Switzerland’s small size implies that its 
internal market is limited. This means that the development of an export 
industry and opportunities to trade with other countries were crucial 
to generate wealth. Looking at Switzerland’s economic history, it was 
indeed in the second half  of the 19th century when growth rates shot 
up thanks to companies producing goods and services for the export 
market (Bergier). In essence, Switzerland’s economic outward orienta­
tion meant that the country depended on a peaceful world order, where 
conflicts are contained and prevented, both for its security and for its 
welfare.
Switzerland’s demographic makeup reveals a heterogeneous society 
with linguistic diversity, German, French, Italian, and Romansch being 
official national languages, as well as religious diversity, as the country 
is divided between Catholics and Protestants. Politically, Switzerland 
functioned as a confederacy until the mid­ 19th century: an alliance of 
territories that worked together in some areas, but remained politically 
independent. In 1848, following a short civil war, Switzerland became 
a federal state. Some power was pooled in the center, although the con­
stituent parts, the cantons, remained strong (Maissen). Switzerland 
thus never had a central authority to impose order and, likewise, the 
heterogeneous nature of  Swiss society meant that no dominant way of 
life emerged, assimilating other cultures. To hold the country together, 
Switzerland had to find ways to manage its diversity and prevent con­
flict. The country therefore needed to develop mechanisms for different 
groups to negotiate with each other and resolve their differences, thus 
ensuring peaceful coexistence.
In sum, this essay argues that Switzerland’s geopolitical profile  – 
its geography, economy, demography, and political history – explains 
why conflict prevention is an existential interest, internally to main­
tain the unity of  the country and externally to ensure security and 
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welfare. The two subsequent sections deepen the internal and external 
dimensions, focusing on mechanisms that put Swiss conflict preven­
tion into practice.
Mechanisms for conflict prevention within Switzerland
After the establishment of  the federal state in 1848, Switzerland pro­
gressively developed an infrastructure to prevent conflicts from emer­
ging and, when tensions did arise, to prevent them from escalating. 
The most important institution in this regard is federalism: the idea 
that power is shared between constituent parts and the center, where 
the constituent parts are also represented. Modeled after the US 
system, Switzerland features 26 cantons (including six so­ called half­ 
cantons), which have their own constitution and possess a high degree 
of  autonomy in many fields, including taxes, education, courts, and 
police. At the federal level, the Swiss parliament, the Federal Assembly, 
consists of  two chambers: the National Council, with proportional 
representation based on population size, and the Council of  States, 
where each canton has two seats (except for half­ cantons, which have 
one seat each) (Vatter). The core idea behind federalism is subsidiarity: 
decisions are taken where people are directly affected by them. This 
reduces conflict vis­ à­ vis the center and between different regions of 
the country, allowing them to preserve their identities and political 
cultures (Fleiner et al.).
A second conflict prevention mechanism is called “concordance” 
(Konkordanz in German). This refers to a political system predicated on 
consensus and compromise, where relevant stakeholders are involved, 
and their interests taken into account, before a decision is taken. One 
aspect of concordance pertains to the composition of the Swiss national 
government, i.e. the Federal Council, which includes seven members 
from the major parties and regions. The bicameral parliamentary system 
means that the interests of cantons are taken into account in the law­
making process. Moreover, the parliament practices an institutionalized 
multi­ stakeholder consultation process (Vernehmlassung in German), in 
which all interest groups concerning a specific policy area are heard (Iff  
and Töpperwien 29– 36).
What happens when there is a conflict? Courts play a certain role. 
For example, the Federal Supreme Court decides in matters where there 
is a conflict between the federal constitution and the constitution of a 
canton. However, the role of courts is relatively limited in the Swiss pol­
itical system. For example, there is no constitutional review, allowing 
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the Federal Supreme Court to invalidate a law adopted by the national 
parliament on the grounds of its inconsistency with the federal consti­
tution (Iff  and Töpperwien 56– 62).
The more common, and more accepted, conflict resolution mech­
anism in Switzerland involves votes and referenda. If  50,000 Swiss citi­
zens sign a petition opposing a bill adopted by parliament, a nationwide 
referendum will be held to take the final decision. 100,000 signatures 
will bring an initiative for a constitutional amendment to a vote. Finally, 
if  the federal government or the parliament wants to change the con­
stitution, a nationwide vote automatically takes place to decide on the 
matter. Decisions adopted in nationwide votes have a high degree of 
legitimacy and are more easily accepted by losers, thus preventing polar­
ization and conflict (Linder). Further reducing conflict in Switzerland is 
a well­ functioning rule of law, as well as the rights and freedoms enjoyed 
by citizens. As a result, there has been a low level of internal conflict 
since the establishment of the federal state in 1848, even if  the com­
promise orientation of the political system means that decision­ making 
is slower than in other countries.
One example to illustrate Swiss internal conflict prevention pertains 
to the conflict in Jura, a French­ speaking and Catholic region that was 
part of the predominantly German­ speaking and Protestant Canton 
of Bern. A  separatist movement emerged in the 1950s, demanding 
autonomy for the “Jurassic” people and decrying Bern’s cultural and 
political domination. Throughout the 1960s, the movement grew more 
militant and committed acts of sabotage, provoking a forceful response 
by the Bernese police (Bassand). As it became apparent that the cre­
ation of a new canton in Jura had widespread support and as the gov­
ernment of the Canton of Bern feared losing control, a series of votes 
were held to address the problem and eventually defuse the situation. 
In 1970, a vote was held in the entire territory of the canton about 
whether or not to amend the constitution allowing for a part of its ter­
ritory to separate and establish a new canton. The vote was affirmative, 
albeit with a small margin. Subsequently, in 1974, a vote took place in 
all municipalities of the Jura asking inhabitants whether they wanted 
to establish a new canton. The result was again affirmative. One year 
later, in 1975, another vote took place in the same municipalities, asking 
people whether they wanted to join a new canton of Jura or remain with 
Bern. Areas with a majority of French speakers voted to join the new 
canton, whereas areas with a majority of German speakers voted to 
remain with Bern, leading to a contiguous territory for the new canton. 
Finally, a nationwide vote took place in 1978 approving a change of the 
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Swiss constitution allowing for the creation of a new canton with all 
rights and privileges. Given the affirmative outcome, in January 1979, 
Jura became the 26th canton of Switzerland, and tensions subsequently 
diminished.1
Switzerland’s efforts to prevent conflicts abroad
What does conflict prevention mean for Switzerland’s external relations? 
The cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy is neutrality. It derived from a 
desire to avoid being drawn into great­ power conflict, an essential sur­
vival strategy practiced by Switzerland as well as other small states. 
There is an internal dimension of neutrality too: given the heterogeneity 
of Swiss society, siding with one or the other side in conflicts could have 
led to split loyalties and jeopardized the cohesion of the country. The 
origins of neutrality go back to 1515 when the Swiss Confederacy lost 
to France in the Battle of Marignano, although it was only formalized 
in 1815 when the European powers at the Vienna Congress stipulated 
Switzerland’s “perpetual neutrality” (Goetschel et al.).
What does neutrality mean and how is it connected to conflict 
prevention? The legal core of  neutrality refers to the duty to abstain 
from supporting warring parties, coupled with the right of  having 
its territorial integrity respected.2 However, neutrality does not dic­
tate a specific foreign policy and indeed, debates about what type of 
external engagement neutrality mandates are prevalent and recurring 
(Rhinow). Since 1848, Switzerland has vacillated between more isola­
tionist and more active interpretations of  neutrality. Actions to pre­
vent conflict abroad are part of  a more active foreign policy based on 
the idea that neutrality is a reputational asset that gives Switzerland 
credibility to promote a peaceful world order. This explains why 
actions to promote peace and prevent conflict are, as today, a central 
component of  Swiss foreign policy during certain periods, but more 
marginal in others.
Active peace­ promotion efforts started in the second half  of the 19th 
century after the establishment of the federal state when a national for­
eign policy took shape. For example, Switzerland took over protective 
power mandates, representing countries vis­ à­ vis others with whom dip­
lomatic relations were ruptured. It also hosted international conferences 
and organizations, for example, a conference in Geneva in 1864, at 
which states adopted the First Geneva Convention, the founding act 
of international humanitarian law. Switzerland also hosted arbitration 
tribunals, including the first such tribunal dealing with claims made by 
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the United States against the United Kingdom for its involvement in 
the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865, which had poisoned the 
relations between the two countries and led to threats of war.
After the Second World War, Switzerland took a more isolationist 
stance and refrained from joining the United Nations in 1945. However, 
during the Cold War, Switzerland engaged in some bridge­ building 
activities. It maintained good relations with countries in the socialist 
block and, in 1950, was one of the first Western countries to recog­
nize the People’s Republic of China. Examples of conflict prevention 
during the Cold War include the involvement of the Swiss military in 
the Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea of 1953, an engagement 
that continues until today. Other examples are the protective power man­
date related to US– Cuba relations, Switzerland’s active diplomatic role 
in the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, and hosting the Gorbachev– Reagan meeting in 1985.3
After the end of the Cold War, peace promotion was elevated to one 
of the core pillars of Swiss foreign policy and enshrined in the Swiss 
constitution.4 While Switzerland’s engagement in military peacekeeping 
has remained limited, civilian peacebuilding expanded. A federal law on 
civilian peace promotion was adopted in 2002, and Switzerland became 
a member of the UN in the same year. Within the Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), a specific division with a funding line 
from parliament was created under the banner of “Human Security”, 
implementing a broad range of measures, ranging from mediation, 
dealing with the past, humanitarian policy, and human rights.5 Support 
for conflict prevention also increased in the Swiss population. For 
example, a representative survey in 2013 showed that over 90% of Swiss 
citizens find it “important or very important” that their country engages 
in international peace promotion (swisspeace).
The result is that in the past 15 years, Switzerland has taken an active 
role in preventing conflicts in different parts of the world. One example 
is Nepal, where Switzerland helped facilitate a comprehensive peace 
agreement in 2006, preventing an escalation of violence and paving the 
way for a political transition that ended a ten­ year civil war (Bächler). 
Likewise, in Sudan, Switzerland provided political and technical support 
in the negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 
2005 (Greminger). A more recent example, acting through a multilat­
eral organization, is Switzerland’s chairmanship of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2014. Under the 
leadership of Switzerland, the OSCE responded swiftly to the Ukraine 
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negotiations. Both mechanisms have helped to curb violence escalation, 
even if  they have not resolved the conflict (Nünlist).
Conclusion
Two concluding insights derive from Switzerland’s experience in conflict 
prevention. The first pertains to the deep roots of conflict prevention 
anchored in Switzerland’s geopolitical disposition as a small state with 
a federal structure and a heterogeneous society. Conflict prevention, 
therefore, represents a fundamental interest for Switzerland. Over time, 
it has become part of national identity, as many citizens consider con­
flict prevention a core value to be upheld inside the country and to be 
promoted internationally.
Second, conflict prevention mechanisms did not automatically 
emerge, but were the outcome of  negotiations, and re­ negotiations, 
between different groups throughout Swiss history. This means that 
the specific mechanisms used in Switzerland for conflict prevention 
are tailored to the specific national context and as such, they are not 
one­ to­ one transferrable to other countries. For example, holding 
popular votes works in Switzerland because they are embedded in a 
compromise­ based political culture. In the absence of  this, popular 
votes risk dividing the populace and fueling conflict, rather than 
preventing it. However, there are aspects of  the Swiss experience 
in conflict prevention  – for example, managing diversity in society 
through a multi­ layered system of  power­ sharing – that do offer rele­
vant lessons for other countries.
Notes
 1 While the creation of the Canton of Jura resolved the situation overall, 
tensions continued to simmer in some areas, in particular the municipality of 
Moutier, which is divided nearly 50:50 between German and French speakers. 
In 1975, Moutier, by a small margin, voted to remain with Bern. Because of 
continued tensions, another vote was held in Moutier in June 2017, and this 
time, again by a narrow margin, a majority voted to join the canton of Jura. 
However, the vote was declared invalid in November 2018 and thus the final 
outcome remains unclear.
 2 On the legal aspects of neutrality, see a background file prepared by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.
 3 On the evolution of Swiss peace policy, see Graf and Lanz.




The Confederation shall ensure that the independence of Switzerland 
and its welfare is safeguarded; it shall in particular assist in the allevi­
ation of need and poverty in the world and promote respect for human 
rights and democracy, the peaceful co­ existence of peoples as well as 
the conservation of natural resources.
 5 For details, see website of the FDFA Human Security Division.
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6  Considerations for the design  




National dialogues are negotiating mechanisms designed to include sev­
eral constituencies during political transitions or post­ conflict periods. 
In some contemporary conflict settings, the traditional peacemaking 
approach of negotiations among a few leaders representing clearly 
defined interest groups may be unable to accommodate the diversity of 
conflict parties. Such conflicts include situations where multiple armed 
groups are active, state institutions have fragmented, or incumbent 
regimes are being challenged and oppositions not well­ organized. It is 
therefore sensible to design peace processes that seek to accommodate 
the diversity of actors.1
National dialogues usually include a minimum of a couple of hun­
dred people and bring together diverse constituencies, such as pol­
itical parties, armed groups, militia, members of government and 
parliament, civil society organizations, professional associations, reli­
gious institutions and leaders, tribal leaders, and prominent citizens. 
The defining characteristics of a national dialogue are: large; inclu­
sive of various constituencies; addressing multiple national issues; and 
mandated to offer recommendations and in some cases take decisions.
The ambition of national dialogue is to move away from elite­ level 
negotiations by allowing diverse interests to participate. National 
dialogues are not purely democratic processes: their participants 
are not chosen through direct one­ man­ one­ vote elections but are 
either appointed or selected by caucus­ type constituencies that are 
smaller than the total population of voting age. Also, national dia­
logue processes design their own debating and decision­ making rules. 
National dialogues try to escape the elitism of peace negotiations, but 
do not provide for a full­ fledged democratic process.
There are three inherent tensions in designing national dialogue 
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first tension relates to their size and composition. How large should 
national dialogues be? What constituencies need to be included and 
how should their representatives be selected? A second tension relates 
to the power and mandate of national dialogues. What is their rela­
tionship to existing state institutions like parliaments and governments? 
Finally, a third tension inherent in national dialogues, and related to the 
second one, is the question of their independence. Should the decisions 
of national dialogues be ratified by existing institutions or should their 
decisions be final? These tensions are usually resolved through negoti­
ations among the key political actors. These negotiations are by defin­
ition messy and difficult. Often, key political actors agree on a set of 
principles that should govern the transition, which they then seek to 
consolidate through an inclusive national dialogue. In other cases, the 
above tensions are resolved during the dialogue process itself, while in 
yet others they lead to the failure of the dialogue.
The preparatory process
The preparation of a national dialogue process can often be lengthy and 
is central to its success. Typically, a widely representative committee is 
established with the responsibility to prepare all aspects of the dialogue. 
The appointment of the preparatory committee can be highly contested 
and often results from extensive negotiations. The composition of such 
a committee and the process through which it is negotiated influences 
whether it is accepted as legitimate by the various political forces.
Once in place, the work of the preparatory committee is itself  a nego­
tiation process which can be lengthy and can lead to an agreement on 
a clear mandate for the dialogue, if  such an agreement is not already in 
place. Typically, the preparatory committee is responsible for: defining 
the criteria for participation in the dialogue and the process through 
which the participants will be selected; supervising the selection pro­
cess; drafting the outline of the dialogue agenda; establishing a support 
structure for the duration of the dialogue, usually in the form of a sec­
retariat; and preparing all the administrative and logistics aspects of the 
dialogue including venue, security, and other aspects.
In Yemen, a 25­ member Technical Committee (TC) was established 
by Presidential Decree in July 2012 and worked for more than six 
months. The TC had the mandate to prepare all aspects of the National 
Dialogue Conference (NDC) but “in no way anticipate or prejudice the 
substantive work and outcomes of the Conference”.2 The November 
2011 Implementation Mechanism had defined the constituencies to be 





constituencies included the political parties which signed the 2011 
agreement that ended the conflict as well as the other constituencies 
listed in the agreement, including the Houthi Movement, youth, civil 
society, and women. The TC was boycotted by the Southern Movement 
(a political movement with secessionist elements in the Southern part of 
the country), although some persons linked to it agreed to join the TC.
The TC worked until February 2013 and published a detailed report 
which included records of its discussions on the key issues related to 
the preparation of the NDC.3 The most important products of the TC’s 
work were the Rules of Procedure for the NDC, which included the 
NDC’s decision­ making procedures and the relationship between the 
NDC’s plenary and its working groups. The TC also decided the div­
ision of the NDC’s 565 seats among the various constituencies. These 
decisions consumed several months of negotiation.
In Benin, president Kerekou appointed a diverse preparatory 
committee to decide the conference’s agenda and composition. The 
committee identified the groups which would be allowed to participate 
in the conference, and specified how many representatives they would 
each be allotted. Subsequently, each group chose their own delegates. The 
500­ member conference included both representatives of the government 
and the military as well as Kerekou’s enemies in political exile (Heilbrunn 
286). It also included representatives of all trade unions, religious leaders, 
voluntary associations, women’s groups, several former heads of state, 
and a variety of public figures (Nwajiaku 429; Wiseman 86).
In Niger, in 1991, a 68­ member preparatory commission was 
established in order to decide the mandate and composition of 
the national conference. The composition of both the preparatory 
commission and the national conference were debated extensively. The 
1,204 delegates to the national conference represented political parties, 
trade unions, professional groups, and civic associations. Both the 
conference and its elected presidium included many members of the 
trade unions and the student movement (“Niger National Conference 
Postponed”; “Niger Further Details”; Gervais 93– 94). In Mali, the con­
ference was appointed by the transitional government and was attended 
by 1,800 delegates including representatives of the newly created polit­
ical parties, religious groups, trade unions, women’s groups, students, 
and peasant representatives (Wiseman 88).
The selection of participants
Given that the goal of political dialogues is to generate society­ wide con­
sensus on major reforms that a country needs to adopt, it is important 
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that as many political, military, and social groups as possible are included 
in the dialogue. Most political dialogues include the main political parties, 
armed groups, and civil society organizations. In some cases, professional 
associations and state institutions are also included. Most dialogues ensure 
the representation of women, youth, and marginalized groups.
The following are some considerations in deciding the composition 
of a political dialogue:
• What groups have sizable constituencies and can claim to be the 
legitimate representatives of these constituencies?
• What groups have the power to influence the implementation of 
any decisions the political dialogue may take?
• What groups have a track record of working in an impartial and 
non­ partisan manner to solve some of the country’s problems?
• What groups have creative ideas on how to solve the country’s 
problems?
• What groups have expertise and knowledge on the issues discussed 
by the dialogue?
Based on the above considerations, a combination of political, mili­
tary, state, and civil society actors is likely to generate a wide consensus. 
In order to achieve this representation, political dialogues often reserve 
a sizable number of seats for independents, civil society actors, expert 
professionals, women, and youth.
The method adopted for selecting the participants of national dialogues 
is closely scrutinized by social and political actors. In the absence of direct 
elections where every adult has the right to cast a vote, designing a represen­
tative, legitimate, and efficient selection process is difficult. Also, questions 
inevitably arise about the authority and legitimacy of those developing the 
selection method. Ultimately, the composition of national dialogues has 
resulted from lengthy negotiations among the key political forces.
The selection method for the dialogue participants is usually 
developed through a several­ step process, which is typically conten­
tious. First, a political agreement is reached, often through the work of 
the preparatory body, on the constituencies which are to be included in 
the dialogue. These constituencies might include political parties, civil 
society, regions, religious leaders, ethnic groups, minorities, and profes­
sional associations. Identifying the constituencies may be straightfor­
ward in some countries where the main social and political groups are 
clear. In other cases, though, introducing certain groups as constituen­
cies with the right to be represented can be contentious. In Yemen, for 
example, some argued that independent youth, women, and civil society 
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were not separate constituencies but should rather be subsumed under 
political parties. However, these three groups were listed in the 2011 
peace agreement and ultimately it proved difficult to prevent them from 
participating in the dialogue as separate constituencies.
As a second step, the preparatory body agrees on the sub­ categories 
belonging to each constituency. For example, a number of decisions need 
to be taken on how to sub­ divide the constituency of “political parties”: 
does it include only parliamentary parties or also extra­ parliamentary 
parties, does it include older parties or also newly established ones? 
In Iraq, the debate over the representation of political parties in the 
national conference was vigorous. Out of the estimated 1,200– 1,400 
participants in the Conference, 144 seats were given to political party 
representatives according to a formula which placed parties in three cat­
egories based on the number of years since their establishment. The 
oldest parties received six delegates, the other categories three and one. 
This was understandably disputed. Leaders of new parties argued that, 
in the absence of elections, it was impossible to evaluate party strength 
and that the criterion was arbitrary. Furthermore, choosing which of 
the more than 150 Iraqi parties to include was a formidable challenge 
(Papagianni “National Conferences in Transitional Periods” 326).
The third step in determining the composition of a dialogue process is 
to decide its size. In some cases, political actors prefer large dialogues of 
several thousand persons. In general, such large dialogues tend to have few 
decision­ making powers as it is difficult to discuss in detail the key issues 
facing a country within a gathering of thousands of persons. In other 
cases, political actors propose very small dialogues of 100 or 200 per­
sons in order to ensure that they engage in detailed discussions, including 
on constitutional principles. This option usually makes it difficult for the 
dialogue to be inclusive and to serve as a negotiation vehicle that differs 
from the elite­ dominated negotiations. The size of the dialogue then is a 
balance between the needs imposed by inclusion and efficiency.
The fourth step in selecting the participants is to design the actual 
selection methodology of the dialogue participants. There are several 
methodologies to be considered which may be grouped under three 
categories:
 1. Appointment of the dialogue participants by the preparatory body 
and/ or the executive or parliament of the country (in cases where 
they are involved in the process).
 2. Self­ selection by the identified constituencies of their representatives 
to the dialogue.
 3. Regional/ local selection processes through caucus­ type gatherings.
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In some cases two or even three of  the above were combined. The 
difficulties with the first approach are linked to legitimacy. Even if  
the preparatory body is well­ respected, appointing the dialogue 
participants might be perceived as over­ stepping its powers. The 
second approach of  self­ selection by the constituencies themselves 
carries the benefit of  real representation for the chosen constituencies. 
Constituencies which are well organized may be able to agree on their 
representatives to the dialogue relatively easily. However, the approach 
does not work well in the case of  divided constituencies or of  con­
stituencies which are not well­ organized. Constituencies such as “civil 
society”, “women”, “religious leaders”, or “regions” may not be able 
to easily agree on their representatives. In these cases, the risk is that 
one faction or a handful of  individuals select the representatives for 
the whole constituency.
The delegates to the 2004 Iraqi national conference were chosen 
through two selection processes. About 548 of  the delegates 
were selected through a provincial process designed by the High 
Preparatory Committee (HPC), while the rest were appointed by the 
HPC. In each of  Iraq’s 18 provinces, the HPC appointed a provin­
cial committee responsible for selecting the participants of  a provin­
cial meeting, which elected the province’s delegates to the conference. 
Persons interested in participating in the provincial meeting submitted 
applications to the committee. Each provincial meeting consisted of 
20 times more persons than the number of  delegates elected by that 
province. Twenty­ five percent of  the delegates of  each province had to 
be women. The committees had three to four days to carry out their 
task: one or two days to inform the public and receive applications to 
attend the meeting, and a similar time for deliberations and choosing 
participants (Papagianni “National Conferences in Transitional 
Periods” 325– 326).
The rest of  the Iraqi national conference delegates were appointed 
by the HPC, whose 100 members automatically got seats in the con­
ference. Initially another 360 national, appointed delegates were 
planned, of  whom 144 would be members of  political parties, 72 
representatives of  civic organizations, 70 tribal leaders, and 74 other 
personalities.
The mandate
National dialogues benefit from a clear and manageable mandate, 
and a well­ defined relationship to ongoing political processes which is 





usually negotiated among key political, social, and military actors and 
endorsed by the relevant existing state institutions. These negotiations 
and endorsements ensure that major actors are committed to the dia­
logue and agree on the goals of the dialogue. This strengthens the legit­
imacy of the dialogue and reduces the possibility of disagreement, once 
the dialogue commences, regarding its goals and powers.
In cases where negotiation among all major groups and endorsement 
by the widest possible number of actors and institutions does not occur, 
there is a risk that some groups refuse to participate in the dialogue or 
may actively undermine it.
Those responsible for preparing political dialogues negotiate the 
following questions:
• What will the dialogue discuss?
It is important that the list of issues to be discussed by the dialogue 
is manageable and not over­ ambitious. A  long list of issues may 
lead to some of them not being properly discussed.
• What powers will the dialogue have?
A political dialogue may have the power to provide recommendations 
which other existing institutions (e.g. parliament or government) 
can adopt or reject. Alternatively, the dialogue may take decisions 
which other institutions are required to accept. A  hybrid model 
would give a political dialogue strong decision­ making powers, 
but would also give other institutions the authority to discuss the 
dialogue’s decisions before endorsing them.
• How will the dialogue relate to existing institutions?
National political dialogues usually do not formally report to 
existing state institutions during their deliberations. However, in 
some cases, representatives of the government or parliament par­
ticipate in the dialogue. This allows these institutions to follow 
developments within the dialogue and may encourage them to 
implement the dialogue’s decisions.
• How long will the dialogue last?
Given that national political dialogues attempt to address con­
tentious and complex issues, they need enough time to discuss 
everything on their agenda, negotiate the needed reforms, and 
reach agreements. At the same time, dialogue processes may lose 
momentum and direction, if  they last too long. Therefore, those 
who design and prepare political dialogues need to agree on a dur­
ation which allows for adequate deliberation without risking losing 
momentum, direction, and attention by leaders and public.
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The working method
Most dialogues tend to divide their work between plenary meetings and 
working groups. Given that the plenary may include several hundred 
participants, in­ depth discussion tends to take place in working groups. 
As a result, most of the substantive work of a political dialogue may 
take place in working groups.
This means that working groups need to be carefully designed and 
usually follow a set of considerations:
• Working groups usually have balanced representation in order to 
ensure that their proposals are accepted by all constituencies par­
ticipating in the dialogue.
• Working groups have clear rules of procedure in order to ensure 
that they function efficiently and effectively.
• Political dialogues benefit from clear rules outlining the relation­
ship between the plenary and the working groups.
• Political dialogues usefully rely upon a mechanism which facilitates 
regular communication among the various working groups and 
ensures that most participants are aware of developments in most 
working groups.
• National dialogues benefit from a mechanism which tracks 
developments in the various working groups and ensures the cohe­
sion of the dialogue’s proceedings.
• Political dialogues benefit from a conflict resolution mechanism 
which assists the members of working groups to overcome disputes 
and reach agreements.
Political dialogues which last a few months tend to meet a few times 
in plenary form, while their working groups may meet daily for exten­
sive periods of time and reconvene after short breaks. In general, polit­
ical dialogues tend to meet and work intensively.
Planning and support
The preparation of political dialogues is a highly political and conten­
tious process. The question of who contributes to the preparation of 
the dialogue is contentious and may influence the legitimacy of the dia­
logue. There are usually three considerations regarding the participants 





• The preparations of a national dialogue benefit from the active 
participation and support of the leaders of all key constituencies. 
High­ level support of the preparations ensures that the decisions of 
the preparatory process will be implemented.
• Ideally, all relevant constituencies should participate in the 
preparations of the political dialogue. This ensures that the 
decisions taken are perceived as legitimate by most constituencies.
• The preparations benefit from technical and expert support which 
may not be available among those responsible for the preparations.
National dialogues are complex events and require detailed adminis­
trative preparations and logistical planning. These preparations can be 
contentious and political. For example, the selection of the venue(s) for 
the dialogue is often not only a logistical task, but also a political one 
due to security and symbolic considerations. Also, the establishment of 
administrative and expert support structures for a political dialogue can 
be a political task as the constituencies participating in the dialogue may 
wish to influence these structures. It is therefore advisable that the admin­
istrative planning is given great attention and, if  possible, is carried out 
by the same body preparing the political aspects of the dialogue.
Political dialogue processes need extensive administrative, logistical, 
and expert support. This support tends to cover the following areas:
• Logistical issues: transportation and accommodation of 
participants; servicing of the venue(s); and security.
• Secretarial issues: note taking; information sharing among the dia­
logue participants; management of documentation; and archiving.
• Expert support: advice on technical and substantive issues through 
presentations by experts, submissions of papers, or seminars; and, 
training.
• Media relations and public outreach: providing footage to the 
media, managing a website, organizing public information 
campaigns, setting up information points throughout the country, 
preparing debates on television, etc.
Usually, a secretariat capacity is established prior to the launch of 
the political dialogue.
Public awareness and participation
When the public is well­ informed about the discussions taking place 
during a political dialogue, the dialogue is likely to be trusted and to 
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enjoy greater legitimacy. Therefore, transparency and information 
sharing strengthen the legitimacy of a national dialogue process. When 
designing a public information and awareness­ raising strategy, it is 
important to ensure that the information reaches as wide of a spec­
trum of society as possible. For example, if  a country has high rates of 
illiteracy, information needs to be shared through media that reach the 
illiterate population. Similarly, if  in certain parts of a country certain 
information media are not available, the appropriate media need to be 
identified.
Additionally, the public could be engaged in the discussions of the pol­
itical dialogue. This may take place through large town hall gatherings or 
smaller meetings with specific constituencies. It may also include the sub­
mission of proposals to the dialogue by civil society and other groups.
Political dialogues benefit from a dedicated body, usually located 
inside the secretariat supporting the dialogue, which carries out the 
various public information and participation activities.
Conclusion
Designing peace processes requires difficult decisions on what needs to 
be discussed and resolved, on who needs to participate, and on what 
formats the parties feel comfortable with. During peace processes, 
agendas, formats, and participants frequently change in response to pol­
itical and military developments. Flexibility and creativity are therefore 
essential ingredients in the success of a process. It is wise for third parties 
to avoid using a blueprint when they work with parties to design a peace 
process, and instead to create bespoke processes for each conflict.
Notes
 1 For various definitions of national dialogues, see: “National Dialogue 
Handbook”. See also Murray; Siebert; Harlander; and Papagianni “National 
Dialogue Processes”.
 2 Presidential Decree no.  30 (2012) on the Technical Committee for the 
National Dialogue Conference (author’s files).
 3 “Final Report of the Technical Committee to Prepare for a Comprehensive 
National Dialogue Conference” (author’s files).
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Article 33 of the UN Charter states that
the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, con­
ciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
(United Nations “UN Charter”)
Third­ party actions range from fact finding, facilitation, mediation, 
arbitration, and adjudication to intervention, including use of force.2 
Mediation is placed in the middle of the above mentioned approaches, 
with an almost perfect combination of intensity and amiability.
However, long before mediation appeared in the UN Charter as an 
effective approach to conflict prevention, management, and resolution, 
China used the approach of Confucius’ “harmony as the instrumen­
tality” to resolve disputes through moral persuasion and consultation 
rather than coercion. Chinese approaches to mediation diplomacy 
emphasize Confucian morality in relation to social harmony, moder­
ation, respect for authority, humility, and benevolence, in contrast to 
the individualistic utilitarian value system of fairness, justice, equality, 
equity, and autonomy in Western cultures.3
This chapter uses a Confucian lens to elaborate on China’s basic 
principles of mediation and provide more evidence­ based analysis 
through a case study of China’s mediation in Syria as a means to dis­
cuss China’s engagement, limitation, and contribution to mediation. 
As China is becoming a more important player in international medi­







approach to mediation, which features in the balance between inter­
national responsibility and national interests, and in adherence to the 
non­ interference and non­ use of force principle with inclusive and 
incremental measures.
Categories and effectiveness of mediation
Mediation is categorized into three types. First, facilitative mediation 
sees the mediator structure a process to assist the parties in reaching 
a mutually agreeable resolution. The mediator does not have any par­
ticular interests in either side or leverage to press the outcome of the 
negotiation; therefore, the mediator will not provide any context to the 
conflicts but will enable an environment and platform for the parties 
to negotiate their own solutions to end the conflict. Second, evaluative 
mediation has the mediator make formal or informal recommendations 
to the parties as to the outcome of the issues (Zumeta). The medi­
ator will practice shuttle diplomacy to separately meet with parties. In 
addition, the mediator will assist both sides to analyze their costs and 
benefits of confrontation or a peacefully negotiated agreement. Third, 
transformative mediation sees the mediator possibly utilize “carrots” or 
“sticks” to ensure recognition of the other side’s requests, preventing 
neglect of the other’s interests during the mediation process.
UN practice and effectiveness of mediation
With the complexity and intensity of conflicts dramatically increasing 
in recent years, the most critical cornerstone for the United Nations 
was the establishment of the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) within 
the Policy and Mediation Division (PMD) of the UN Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) and, within the unit, the creation of the Standby 
Team of Senior Mediation Advisers (“Mediation Support Overview”).
In relation to the evaluation of effectiveness, MSU published the UN 
Guidance for Effective Mediation, which lists five basic challenges that 
mediators have to confront as “mission and mandate, impartiality and 
inclusivity, entry, and consent, strategy, and leverage” (United Nations 
United Nations Guidance 5). These challenges can be translated into 
three decision­ points: the parties are willing to be mediated at the entry 
level; respect for the mediator and best practices of mediation at the 
operational level; and consensus at the regional and international levels 
to facilitate the mediation and increase its rate of success.
Key factors  – like preparedness, consent, impartiality, inclusivity, 
national ownership, coherence, quality peace agreements, international 
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law, and normative frameworks – all support the effective accomplish­
ment of mediation.4 Therefore, effective mediation embodies full prep­
aration and consent from the parties in conflict; the mediator’s impartial 
engagement under a universally accepted international law framework 
(fundamentally the UN Charter and other relevant resolutions); and 
inclusion of the relevant conflict parties and wider society to reach 
quality peace agreements. While, in practice, the knowledge and the 
impartiality of the mediator, the labor division, and the ultimate out­
come of the mediation might be challenged, these relevant factors still 
need to be further examined.
Basic principles in China’s mediation
Beyond the several rounds of Six­ Party Talks regarding the Korean 
Peninsula, China extends offers to mediate conflict in Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
Djibouti and Eritrea, Myanmar and Bangladesh, and the Persian Gulf 
states and Qatar. China is driven by the need to protect its economic 
investments, a desire to raise its international stature, and a recognition 
of its responsibilities as a rising power. These all create an increasing 
impetus for China to adapt its long­ held principle of non­ interference 
to demonstrate its capability in international conflict resolution. To 
be more specific, these realities and intentions indicate that China, in 
most cases, will still adopt facilitative mediation, as China sticks to 
the non­ interference principle. However, given cautious assessment of 
the impact of conflicts on China’s national interests or international 
prestige, China will choose to adopt evaluative or transformative medi­
ation when necessary. In terms of the strategic goals and fundamental 
principles China upholds in mediation, we can concentrate on the 
aspects described in the following sections.
Balance between national interest and international 
responsibility
In recent years, under President Xi Jinping’s vision and guideline of 
Chinese diplomacy in the new era, the capability and willingness to 
build a community of shared future for mankind has required more 
involvement of China in regional and international negotiations and 
mediation than before.
In terms of protecting China’s national interests, mediation will help 
safeguard national security. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, China’s 






a peaceful environment to sustain its economic development. China’s 
mediation activities have in recent years expanded to the Middle East 
and African countries. As Xue Li and Zheng Yuwen analyzed it in The 
Diplomat,
In next decade, the prospect of China’s relations with Middle 
Eastern states mainly lies in the potential for economic cooper­
ation. On the one hand, China wants to play a more significant role 
in security issues in the Middle East, to show its responsibilities and 
capabilities as a rising power. On the other hand, China also hopes 
to get economic and cultural profits from its interactions with the 
Middle East.
(Xue and Zheng)
Compared with the traditional players like the United States and Russia 
which prefer to play off  one side against the other, or regional powers 
like Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia with mixed interests on the ground, 
or the major international organizations like the United Nations or the 
Arab League with either limited resources or unrealistic ambitions  – 
China, unlike the other players, “carries no religious, political, histor­
ical, and colonial baggage, making it an ideal candidate to break the 
gridlocks in the region’s conflicts and to play the role of an ‘honest 
broker’ ” (Chaziza). Therefore, China is now striving to balance being 
an honest broker and mediator in both regional and global conflicts to 
foster lasting peace and prosperity, and the positive outcome and global 
stability that China seeks as a rising global power.
Non- interference and non- use of force principle
As early as 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed three 
principles to address hot issues, namely that
we adhere to the non­ intervention principles into the domestic 
affairs of the other countries instead of imposing the wills to 
the others; we insist on the objectivity and impartiality instead 
of seeking the private interests; we uphold the political solution 
instead of using the force.
(“Wang Yi”)
In academia, there have been several concepts brought forward in 
this regard, among which Wang Yizhou proposed “creative engage­
ment/ intervention”, which underlines three aspects: adherence to 
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UN authority, diplomatic means, and strength in both hard and soft 
power. Zhao Huasheng advocates for “constructive intervention” to 
mediate conflicts, as it is reasonable for China to adhere to the non­ 
intervention principle in countries or conflict zones where there is little 
vital interest or capability to intervene. Others assert that, given that 
China has critical concerns, interests, and leverages, China should not 
hesitate to intervene (Zhao). Chiung­ Chiu Huang and Chih­ yu Shih 
put forward “harmonious intervention”, using “a cultural/ civilizational 
approach to explaining the dynamics of interplay between China’s 
rise and global governance. The key argument [is] that China’s quest 
for security is more centered on the balance of harmonious relations 
than national interest”.5 Another concept is “deliberative involve­
ment”, which means that China, with or without other countries and 
international organizations, under the principles of state sovereignty 
and human rights norms, underlines political and diplomatic means 
to tackle problems. China should consult with parties, and sometimes 
mediate between opposing parties in conflict, which will help to protect 
the human rights of the civilians and realize peace (Li Zhiyong “Norm 
Contestation”).
In addition, China insists on the non­ interference principle in the 
cognate fields of peacekeeping and the responsibility to protect. As 
Mordechai Chaziza observes, “China’s mediation diplomacy is part of 
a carefully devised strategy that suits the country’s non­ intervention 
policy framework” (Chaziza). Though China would have the capability 
to intervene, it still is not willing to intervene with coercive means or 
a military approach, but rather is aiming at conflict management 
instead of conflict resolution. In practice, due to the peaceful and non­ 
confrontational positions China takes, China is sometimes the “only 
mediator that can bring all the opponents to the negotiating table, as it 
did in the case of Afghanistan” (Putz).
Inclusive and incremental approach to reinforce mediation
The World Bank states that “Each conflict is unique, rooted in local 
grievances and resentments. Yet the conflicts that have the greatest 
risk of escalating to violence tend to play out in arenas where access 
to power, resources, justice, and security are negotiated.”6 That report 
thus illustrates the necessity to include community structures, trad­
itional leadership, civil society, and private sector to address conflicts 
more effectively and smoothly. More significantly, the report further 
proposes three elements to better practice conflict prevention and medi­






including investments and medium­ or long­ term institutional reforms; 
and the formation of local– global, governmental– non­ governmental, 
public– private coalitions (World Bank and United Nations 23). In prac­
tice, China advocates an incremental approach in the mediation pro­
cess, emphasizing the critical role of the state actor, investment, and 
longer­ term institutional reforms to ensure comprehensive, long­ term 
solutions. A good example is that China encourages regime improve­
ment rather than regime change. For example, during the seven official 
visits by Kim Jong­ il to Beijing, besides the denuclearization and security 
issues, itineraries included visits to high­ tech corporations and eco­
nomically prosperous zones. To better engage DPRK (the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea) in peace talks, China demonstrates the 
post­ Reform and Opening development of China, as an example for the 
DPRK. However, China’s mediation efforts still have some limitations, 
and most of the engagement still remains in initial phases, and most 
likely in the track of facilitative mediation through hosting, convening, 
and facilitating meetings, rather than more assertively exerting its influ­
ence through evaluative mediation or transformative mediation.
The case of China’s mediation in Syria
Compared with Western countries, China started to engage in inter­
national mediation relatively late and with a limited geographical scope. 
China’s role as a mediator in the ongoing Syria crisis, as well as the other 
conflicts in the Middle East, has extended Chinese willingness, interests, 
and mediation capacity in the past decades. Therefore, I shall examine 
the Syria case to detail Chinese policies and practice as a mediator.
Generally speaking, the conflicts in the Middle East can be 
categorized into four types: conflict between Middle East countries 
and extra­ regional powers; conflict between individual Middle East 
countries; conflict within individual Middle East countries; and trans­ 
regional conflicts. China is increasingly involved in the first three types 
of conflict management. The main implementation mechanisms of 
China include the special envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the 
maritime escort and peacekeeping units of the Ministry of National 
Defense; and economic assistance through the Ministry of Commerce. 
Internationally, the China– Arab States Cooperation Forum, Forum of 
China– Africa Cooperation, the United Nations, and the other inter­
national organizations are the international platforms through which 
China engages in Middle East conflicts (Sun 79).
In regard to the Syria crisis, China appointed a special envoy and took 
on a supplementary role to the United Nations as the lead mediator. 
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China emphasized the political and peaceful means and willingness 
to collaborate with the other regional powers and organizations to 
cope with the Syria crisis. As China underlines the balance between 
national powers and responsibilities to the international community, 
in the Syria case China was inclined to support the image of  a respon­
sible great power as trade between China and Syria only amounted 
to 1.104 billion USD in 2017 (“Zhongguo tong Xuliya”). The special 
envoy Xie Xiaoyan has been dedicated to the Syria crisis, with multiple 
visits to Syria to discuss the ongoing situation with parties from both 
the government and the opposition. In addition, the special envoy 
has coordinated with countries with greater stakes in Syria, such as 
Russia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. As the P5 states of 
the UN Security Council were in disagreement, Special Envoy Xie 
exchanged ideas with the UN special envoy to Syria frequently in 
order to address the crisis. After the US strike on Syria this year, Xie 
participated in the “International Symposium on the Prospect of  a 
Political Settlement of  the Syria Issue” co­ hosted by SIIS (Shanghai 
Institute for International Studies) and SISU (Shanghai International 
Studies University) from May 13 to May 14, 2018, and proposed again 
that a peaceful and political settlement is the only reliable approach 
to tackle the issue.
In the initial days of the Syria crisis, China was criticized heavily for 
its five vetoes, together with Russia. French UN ambassador François 
Delattre said the failure by the UN Security Council to act would “send 
a message of impunity” (“Russia and China”). The vetoes were mostly 
related to the chemical weapons investigation, sanctions, or accusations 
against the government  – a similar pathway that led to the Iraq war 
with disastrous consequences for both Iraq and the rest of the world. 
Moreover, China remains cautious about a “coercive” approach from 
the UN menu, and regime change is a red line which China could not 
cross in any similar international interventions. Besides, the initial days 
of the Syria crisis were framed by the consequence of militarized inter­
vention in Libya, which went beyond the writ of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973.
More significantly, if  we observe the four­ point proposal by China 
and six­ point proposal raised by then­ UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan, 
we can better understand China’s mediation policy in this issue. Under 
the UN six­ point plan, the Syrian government would commit to work 
with the UN special envoy (and appoint an interlocutor for the pur­
pose) on a Syrian­ led inclusive “political process” addressing the 
legitimate demands of the Syrian people. The regime was required to 
immediately cease troop movements and the use of heavy weapons in 
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population centers and begin a pullback of military concentrations in 
and around them; to permit access to and timely provision of humani­
tarian assistance to those in need and release prisoners; and to commit 
to respect freedom of expression and assembly (Hinnebusch and 
Zartman). On China’s side, the four­ point plan is as follows:
Firstly, parties in Syria should make every effort to stop fighting 
and violence, and cooperate actively with the mediation efforts of 
Brahimi. Secondly, Syria should appoint empowered interlocutors 
as soon as possible … so as to end the Syrian crisis at an early 
date … the continuity and effectiveness of Syria’s governmental 
institutions must be maintained. Thirdly, the international commu­
nity should work with greater urgency and responsibility to fully 
cooperate with and support Brahimi’s mediation efforts …, Mr. 
Annan’s six­ point plan and Security Council resolutions. Fourthly, 
all parties involved should take concrete steps to ease the humani­
tarian crisis in Syria.
(“China Announces”)
If  we compare these two proposals, both plans emphasized no 
violence; ceasefire; political negotiation; the contribution by the 
international community, and humanitarian assistance. As the 
newly released data indicates, China provides emergency humani­
tarian assistance through both bilateral and multilateral channels 
to Syrian refugees, totaling 110  million USD. Besides, China also 
signed an agreement with Syria for an additional 2.5  million US 
dollars of  assistance in the form of  buses and customs scanners 
(“Xu Waizhang”). Moreover, in May 2017, China launched the first 
Syria post­ war reconstruction conference in Beijing, which differed 
from the approach of  other Western countries that attached polit­
ical reforms to reconstruction assistance. Compared with the regime 
change proposal by some countries, China underlined “regime 
improvement” instead and is actively involved in boosting the eco­
nomic development of  the conflict­ affected states.
However, Annan’s plan mentioned that political prisoners should be 
released and freedom of  expression and assembly should be respected. 
China particularly underlined that “the continuity and effectiveness 
of  Syria’s governmental institutions must be maintained”. Therefore, 
China’s plan mostly echoed Annan’s proposal while underlining that 
no regime change should be radically imposed on Syria, so as to 
realize the transition peacefully and effectively. In addition, China 
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would not pressure the Syrian government in regard to the political 
prisoners and journalists, which would touch the most sensitive nerve 
of  the Syrian government when there still exist different opposition 
parties, and confrontation and conflicts among these parties are still 
going on.
Li Guofu, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the 
China Institute of International Studies stated,
It is time to use China’s advantage to promote the talks. We have 
good relations with the Syrian government. They trust us. On the 
other side, we have contacts with the opposition, which also believes 
China holds an objective stance on the Syrian issue.
(Li Xiaokun, “China Takes On”)
Other sources echoed this view: “Should China actually host rare peace 
talks between the Syrian government and opposition, it would be a 
big step forward in Beijing’s direct involvement in ending the messy 
conflict”.7
Besides, along with the deterioration of  the situation in Syria, the 
gradual transformation of  Chinese policy in this issue should not be 
overlooked. In October 2016, China for the first time did not align 
with Russia to veto the Syria draft resolution, which was proposed by 
France and Spain to halt the bombing of  Aleppo, but abstained after 
presenting a rival draft that urged a ceasefire but made no mention of 
barring military flights over the city (“Russia’s 12 UN Vetoes”). More 
significantly, though China vetoed a UN resolution, drafted by Britain, 
France, and the United States, that would have imposed sanctions on 
Syria over chemical weapons used in the conflict in February 2017, 
it abstained in a draft resolution demanding President Bashar al­ 
Assad’s government cooperate with an investigation into the deadly 
suspected chemical attack in the rebel­ held town of  Khan Sheikhun 
in April, which marked itself  as the second greatest turning point for 
China’s position on the Syrian crisis. To some extent, it demonstrates 
that China, after prudent thinking, would agree to the investigation, 
with reservations, in order to recover peace and security in Syria. As 
Courtney Fung elaborates, “China committed to three diplomatic 
innovations: casting multiple, successive veto vote; rebranding to 
delegitimize intervention as ‘regime change,’ and engaging in norm­ 
shaping of  the ‘responsibility to protect’ regarding the use of  force” 
(Fung 693), all of  which reflects China’s great concerns about regime 




In the most recently delivered speech by special envoy Xie Xiaoyan, 
China continued to stress the four­ point plan, together with a new 
element, so as to
continue maintaining communication with all relevant parties; 
continue supporting the UN’s role as the main channel for medi­
ation; continue actively participating in Geneva Peace Talks, the 
International Syria Support Group and other peace­ promo­
tion mechanisms; continue offering assistance within capacity 
to the Syrian people; support Syria’s reconstruction process in 
proper ways.
(“Special Envoy”)
From his speech, we can see that in addition to the four­ point plan, 
China has started to consider the “reconstruction process” in the new 
phase, which could be counted as a great leap for China from mediation 
to peacebuilding and sustaining the peace process.
Unfortunately, on April 13, 2018, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France launched airstrikes against Syria, as the United 
States sought to punish President Assad for a suspected chemical attack 
near Damascus. Soon after the attack, Chinese UN Ambassador Ma 
Zhaoxu emphasized Chinese opposition to the unilateral military action 
and urged “the parties concerned to refrain from any act that could lead 
to an escalation of the situation, return to the norms of international 
law and resolve issues through dialogue and consultation”. In addition, 
China again stressed that political settlement is the only way to resolve 
the situation in Syria. In terms of the Chinese contribution, “China 
is committed to working with the international community to facili­
tate peace talks, encourage the cessation of hostilities, violence and 
counter­ terrorism, and advance the process for a political settlement, 
including through the Intra­ Syrian talks” (“Statement by Ambassador 
Ma Zhaoxu”). Therefore, the non­ use of force principle remains the 
threshold and China is strongly against any military actions without a 
UN authority and mandate.
Conclusion
With Chinese economic, political, and military development, as well as 
its national interests spreading more widely in the world, China is cur­
rently pursuing a more active role in global governance. In this process, 
China could further enhance its status as a rising great power and mean­
while consolidate its new type of relationship with the other regional 
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and global powers. As the only developing country in the P5 of the 
UN Security Council, the attitude and principles China maintains in 
international intervention will to a great extent shape its future pol­
icies in conflict prevention and management. Compared with peace­
keeping, which China supports with an increasing scale of personnel 
and financial contributions, China is cautious about moving forward 
in other international interventions. Considering mediation demands 
for resources and leverage, as well as for familiarity with different tools 
and approaches, China has lacked the motivation and experience to dir­
ectly participate in mediation before. However, China is incrementally 
speeding up its involvement in the process, as shown in the Syria crisis. 
China has, relatively speaking, fewer interests and concerns in Syria, 
but China has been making great efforts to advocate a leading role for 
UN mediation as shown through China’s veto or abstention behavior. 
China reserved its veto for its greatest concerns, such as the intervention 
in domestic political affairs, use of force like airstrikes by the United 
States and its European allies, and zero­ acceptance for regime change.
While China still falls behind in the theory and practice of  medi­
ation, it is willing to learn and collaborate with diverse actors, 
including the conflict parties, regional and global powers, and legit­
imate regional and international institutions. Maintaining China’s 
fundamental principles of  non­ intervention and non­ use of  force, 
China is currently working on integrating facilitative, evaluative, 
and transformative measures, to incrementally improve conditions. 
This approach ensures that mediation is more successful, balancing 
China’s national interests and international responsibilities in the 
long run.
Notes
 1 Tiewa Liu is the Associate Professor of Beijing Foreign Studies University. 
The author would like to express her great gratitude for a series of workshops 
kindly sponsored and organized by the Quaker United Nations Office 
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FDFA, which provided the author support for this research. She also owes 
thanks for the invitation from Jennifer Staats to a mediation training course 
sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in 2017 and 
for Professor Pamela Aall’s elaboration and organization of the training 
which became a valuable asset in this research. Special thanks also go to 
Dr. Courtney Fung for her professional and insightful advice in the revision 
of this chapter.







 3 Li Zhaoxing, “Peace, Development and Cooperation­ Banner”, adapted from 
Chaziza.
 4 For more details about the indicators, please refer to United Nations, The 
United Nations Guidance 4.
 5 From a review of the book by Samuel S. Kim. For more information on the 
book, please refer to Huang and Shih.
 6 “Pathways for Peace Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict: 
Main Messages and Emerging Policy Directions”, e­ copy from a World Bank 
publication the author received as reading materials in a workshop organized 
by the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC), and the Swiss FDFA, p. 19.
 7 Li Xiaokun, quoting Tokyo­ based online magazine, The Diplomat.
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8  How to understand the 
peacebuilding potential of   
the Belt and Road Initiative
Dongyan Li
Introduction
In his keynote speech at the Belt and Road International Forum in 
May 2017, President Xi Jinping proposed to build the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) into a “road for peace”. The World Bank and the United 
Nations also put forward a joint report on the Pathways for Peace in 
2018, and emphasized that violence and conflict are big obstacles to 
reaching the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Their 
report argues that conflict prevention is a decisive factor for develop­
ment and economic cooperation, and indeed central to reducing pov­
erty and achieving shared prosperity (World Bank and United Nations). 
This report reflects an increasing trend to strengthen the interaction 
between the peace and development agendas, and to promote cooper­
ation between both sets of actors.
In this context, this chapter explores the peacebuilding potential of 
BRI and how to understand the possible connection between BRI and 
UN peacebuilding. BRI has peacebuilding potential in many aspects, 
but these potentials are limited at the current stage and uncertain in 
the future. International efforts are a necessary condition for promoting 
BRI to contribute more to peacebuilding. The chapter consists of three 
main sections. First, it explains the core of BRI, which is an economic 
cooperation– focused initiative, not a peacebuilding initiative; second, 
it interprets the peace connection and peacebuilding potential of BRI; 
third, it analyzes the limitations and uncertainties of the peacebuilding 
potential of BRI, and tries to predict the possible scenarios.
The Belt and Road: an economic cooperation initiative
There are different interpretations and expectations for BRI both inter­






that BRI should be an economic cooperation initiative, because eco­
nomic cooperation is easier to carry out. If  BRI involves security and 
peace issues, it will potentially become more complicated or sensitive. 
BRI is the abbreviation of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road”. Considering that the countries along the 
“Belt and Road” have different resources and strong economic comple­
mentarity, there is great potential for economic cooperation. The main 
contents of BRI are the connectivity in five areas: policy, infrastructure, 
trade, finance, and people­ to­ people relations. In the five areas, infra­
structure is emphasized first, including investment in factories, roads, 
bridges, ports, airports, and power grids, as well as communication 
networks and oil and gas pipeline networks. It is very clear that eco­
nomic cooperation is the core content of the Belt and Road (Vision and 
Actions).
The mainstream view in China believes that China’s advantage lies 
in economic and development cooperation, so BRI should focus on 
cooperation in both the economic and development fields:
The Belt and Road Initiative is an economic behavior, and it is a 
platform for economic cooperation. It does not involve politics, 
security, and other fields. Such a choice may help eliminate the 
external worries about the expansion of China’s political and mili­
tary power and will be beneficial to international co­ operation and 
strategic mutual trust.
(Li Ziguo “Belt and Road Initiative”)
According to the official documents, BRI will be promoted by bilat­
eral or multilateral economic cooperation, with special emphasis on 
the role of both international and domestic markets. In May 2017, 
the Joint Communique of the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation put forward the basic principles of the Belt and Road, and 
one of the principles is “market­ led behavior”, that is “recognizing the 
role of the market and that of business as key players, while ensuring 
that the government performs its proper role and highlighting the 
importance of open, transparent, and non­ discriminatory procurement 
procedures” (“Joint Communique”).
The Communique emphasized the need to fully understand the role 
of the market and the status of enterprise as the main body of BRI. 
This means that the driving force of BRI is not government, but enter­
prise, and the role of the government is to build the platform for enter­
prise to flourish. Therefore, the mainstream view sees BRI as separate 
from peace and security cooperation initiatives, as BRI is a series of 
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market­ led economic cooperation projects, themselves distinct from 
China’s foreign aid projects.
The Belt and Road: a road for peace
According to the official definition, BRI is an economic cooperation 
initiative, aimed at building an economic cooperation platform, and 
focusing on infrastructure connectivity. But on the other hand, this 
initiative has an intrinsic and extendable UN peacebuilding link. BRI 
depends on a peaceful environment. Consolidating peace and sustaining 
peace are the needs of BRI itself. To this end, BRI economic cooper­
ation can be a driving force for China to promote peace.
Along with the advancement of BRI, the connections between BRI 
and the United Nations global agendas, including the 2030 Agenda, the 
refugee, and the migration agendas, as well as the UN peace agenda, 
are getting closer. Existing research points out the security risks 
and challenges facing the Belt and Road, noting that along with the 
continued advancement of BRI, peace and security issues will be more 
prominent. The three elements of economy, politics, and security are 
closely interlinked and complementary (Wu 17– 22).
There are three major categories of security risks. The first category 
of risk is the problem of political and social unrest resulting from both 
domestic and international causes such as slow economic development, 
serious social injustice, ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as regional 
power struggles. For example, countries such as Myanmar, Pakistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan face political instability. The West Asian and North 
African countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen 
are suffering serious domestic unrest and conflict. The second category 
of risk is from the “three forces”: extremism, terrorism, and separatism. 
The areas and countries along the Belt and Road are the areas with 
most active “three forces” caused by ethnic and religious strife. In these 
areas, terrorism and transnational crime are particularly serious. The 
third category of risk is geopolitical risk, including the tensions between 
major powers and the tensions between regional countries. Eurasia is 
also a conflict­ prone area with many disputes in territorial and terri­
torial water disputes (Wu 20– 22; Xue “Diplomatic Risks” 68– 79).
In China, BRI risk studies increasingly realize that, in addition to 
conflicts between countries, conflict risks are also emerging from the 
relations between actors at different levels including governmental actors 
and non­ governmental actors. BRI is a multi­ actor project involving 
the central government, local governments, enterprises and different 




interests, there are contradictions and conflicts between different actors, 
and China is facing increasing tensions in international economic 
cooperation. For example, Chinese companies in Pakistan and some 
African countries have been frequently attacked; China’s infrastructure 
projects in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam are protested against by 
anti­ government factions, businessmen, and NGOs in these countries. 
China’s economic cooperation with Myanmar is a typical case that 
reflects mixed and intertwined conflicts, including the conflict between 
the central government of Myanmar and local armed forces, the conflict 
between Chinese businessmen and Myanmar businessmen, as well as 
the conflict between local NGOs and Chinese companies. This situation 
suggests that BRI requires risk prevention.
BRI places great emphasis on the importance of establishing and 
maintaining a peaceful environment. In his keynote speech at the Belt 
and Road International Forum in May 2017, Xi Jinping proposed 
building the Belt and Road into “five roads”, the first of the “five roads” 
being “a road for peace”. President Xi emphasized that “the ancient 
silk routes thrived in times of peace, but lost vigor in times of war. The 
pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative requires a peaceful and stable 
environment” (“Full Text of President Xi’s Speech”). For the first time, 
China officially linked the Belt and Road to peace. This means that 
China needs a peaceful environment in order to achieve the develop­
ment of BRI and that China is willing to promote world peace through 
the Belt and Road (Xu 173– 174). In 2017, the Joint Communique of 
the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation reiterated the 
principle of peace and made a commitment to promoting peace and 
mutually beneficial cooperation.
For building the road for peace, the following principles have been 
put forward: (1) foster a common, comprehensive, cooperative and 
sustainable security; (2)  create a security environment shared by all; 
(3) resolve hotspot issues through political means, and promote medi­
ation; (4) enhance counter­ terrorism; (5) strive to eradicate poverty and 
social injustice; and (6) build a new type of international relations based 
on win– win cooperation (Full Text of President Xi’s Speech). Based on 
these principles, it is possible to put forward some specific actions and 
measures to build the “road for peace” in the process of BRI.
Obviously, China’s statements and commitments cannot eliminate 
the view of a “China threat”. Both within and outside China, there 
are different interpretations and understandings of the Belt and Road. 
One of the popular arguments is that the purpose of China’s Belt 
and Road is to expand China’s political and military power globally 
(Bowen). However, despite these critical dismissals, we cannot deny the 
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possibilities that BRI can bring about opportunities for peace, and we 
cannot deny the possibilities of strengthening the links between BRI 
and peacebuilding. China expresses the political will for peace promo­
tion, and there is also a strong motivation for China to promote and 
sustain peace in the Belt and Road countries. Therefore, a positive 
approach is to promote the Belt and Road to contribute to conflict pre­
vention and peacebuilding.
The peacebuilding potential of the Belt and Road
With regard to concepts, UN peacebuilding is a part of UN peace 
operations. According to the UN resolutions on the establishment of 
the Peacebuilding Commission, peacebuilding activities are aimed at 
assisting countries emerging from conflict, reducing the risk of relapsing 
into conflict, and laying the foundation for sustainable peace and devel­
opment (Peacebuilding Commission).There are four core elements of 
peacebuilding.
 1. Peacebuilding activities are aimed at post­ conflict countries rather 
than the building of broad­ based international peace.
 2. The purposes of peacebuilding are preventing post­ conflict coun­
tries from falling into conflict again and laying a foundation for 
sustainable peace and development.
 3. Peacebuilding emphasizes the interaction of institutional reform, 
development, human rights, and peace, with broad missions 
including reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, 
strengthening the rule of law, improving human rights, assisting 
elections, promoting conflict resolution, and reconciliation 
techniques (Report of the Panel).
 4. Peacebuilding emphasizes the multi­ actor partnerships among 
governments, international organizations, non­ governmental 
organizations, and the private sector, with special emphasis on 
the role of civil society organizations and women’s participation 
(Peacebuilding Commission).
The nature of BRI is different from UN peacebuilding and the 
“Pathway for Peace” proposed by the United Nations and the World 
Bank. BRI is solely an initiative of China, not part of the agenda of 
international organizations. BRI adopts a cooperative approach based 
on voluntary and equal consultation, not a third­ party intervention 
approach, and non­ interference remains a major principle of China. 




peacebuilding missions like institution building and elections assistance. 
However, from a Chinese perspective, there are three overlaps between 
BRI and UN peacebuilding.
First, many of the countries covered by peacebuilding projects, such 
as Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, 
and Yemen, are also participating countries of BRI. Second, UN 
peacebuilding activities are very broad and there is room for cooperation 
with Belt and Road. One of Secretary­ General Boutros Boutros­ Ghali’s 
peacebuilding projects is to bring states together in joint programmes to 
develop agriculture, improve transportation, or utilize resources such as 
water or electricity that they need to share. He believed that this would be 
a way to reduce hostile perception and promote reconciliation (Agenda 
for Peace). In defining the concept of peacebuilding, the Brahimi 
Report believes that peacebuilding also includes the implementation of 
humanitarian demining programmes, emphasis on HIV/ AIDS educa­
tion and control, and action against other infectious diseases. In these 
respects, BRI has the possibility of cooperation with UN peacebuilding 
(Report of the Panel). Third, some BRI countries face serious conflict 
risks, and China’s efforts to promote peace in these countries will con­
tribute to UN peacebuilding.
The peacebuilding potential of the Belt and Road is prominent in the 
following aspects.
An inclusive platform that can be used to promote peacebuilding
BRI aims to provide a broad platform for economic cooperation with 
many layers and possibilities for participation. President Xi Jinping 
emphasized that China would build more cooperation platforms, and 
allow all sectors of societies and groups to participate in BRI cooper­
ation, including international organizations, regional organizations, 
non­ governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and 
think tanks. Since BRI was proposed, China has established Belt and 
Road cooperation with many international organizations, including 
UNDP, UNICEF, the Human Settlements Programme, the World 
Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
and the International Criminal Police Organization (“Outcome List”).
These organizations are also partner organizations related to UN 
peacebuilding.
Strengthening the exchanges between the people along the Belt and 
Road is one of the important contents of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
On the initiative of the Chinese Association of Civil Organizations 
for Promotion of International Exchanges, a cooperation network of 
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civil society organizations along the Silk Road was established, with 
more than 160 Chinese and foreign civil organizations now part of 
this cooperation network. In 2017, this Association, with more than 
90 Chinese social organizations, formally launched the Chinese Social 
Organizations’ Action Plan to Promote the Belt and Road Initiative 
(2017– 2020).
Such an inclusive platform for the Belt and Road cooperation can be 
used as a platform for peacebuilding, especially as a “people for peace” 
platform. This kind of cooperation network is also a model encouraged 
by the UN peacebuilding. If  the Belt and Road is progressing smoothly, 
it is very likely to establish partnerships with more peacebuilding­ related 
organizations and agencies, promoting future cooperation between 
peacebuilding actors and the Belt and Road actors.
Economic and development cooperation for peace
Promoting peace and security through economic and development 
cooperation is China’s consistent notion based on the “China experi­
ence”. China attaches importance to development and peace and actively 
supports the 2030 Agenda, and emphasizes the high degree of connect­
ivity between BRI and the 2030 Agenda. The Joint Communique of the 
Belt and Road International Forum mentioned that the 2030 Agenda 
with the set of Sustainable Development Goals provided a new blue­
print of international cooperation. While emphasizing the decisive role 
of conflict prevention for economic development, UN peacebuilding 
reports also emphasized the interlinked relations between peace, devel­
opment, and human rights. Development is obviously a relevant element 
of peacebuilding. One realistic approach for China’s “development for 
peace” is to establish a closer interconnection between BRI and the six­
teenth goal of the 2030 Agenda  – to promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies  – as well as the interconnection between the Belt and Road 
and UN peacebuilding. Strengthening the cooperation between devel­
opment actors and peacebuilding actors is a possible direction of China 
“development for peace” and the BRI “road for peace”. For example, 
youth and women’s employment is included in UN peacebuilding, and 
China can provide support for youth and women’s employment in Belt 
and Road countries through BRI projects.
The International Committee of the Red Cross is one of the Belt and 
Road partners, and emphasizes the mutual benefits of social stability 
and development. Specific infrastructure construction and personnel 
training projects led by the ICRC have the potential to supplement 




energy infrastructure, supports hospitals and orthopedic centers, 
trains locals to develop skills, and helps people start sustainable small 
businesses (Maurer). China supports the ICRC humanitarian cause, 
and encourages the Red Cross Society of China to enhance practical 
cooperation with the ICRC under the BRI framework (“Chinese Vice 
President”).The partnership between the ICRC and BRI can be the 
model for other peacebuilding actors.
Enhance capacity of peacebuilding
The cooperation between China and the countries along the Belt and 
Road has included items related to the enhancement of peacebuilding 
capacity: (1) economic and development capacity training; (2)  peace 
education and peace training; (3)  humanitarian assistance and med­
ical and health training; (4) capacity building for protecting the basic 
rights of children and women. These are included in the goals of the 
Chinese Social Organizations’ Action Plan for Closer People- to- People 
Bonds along the Belt and Road (2017– 2020) and can be expanded to 
more aspects related to peacebuilding (Chinese Social Organizations’ 
Action Plan). The Action Plan made a commitment to “maintaining 
peace and security in the regions along the Belt and Road”. The Action 
Plan also mentioned that Chinese social organizations would organize 
activities like international peace day, peace forum, and peace educa­
tion, and make contact with the local peace organizations along the Belt 
and Road to jointly maintain the peaceful environment.
In July 2016, the Ministry of Education of China Issued the Belt and 
Road Education Action Plan, which involves different governmental 
and non­ governmental actors as well as different aspects of educa­
tion and training projects. For example, the Belt and Road Education 
Action Plan mentioned that “we will also boost implementation of 
youth exchange programs along the Silk Road”, and “we will deepen 
cooperation on cultivation and training of talent. Such multi­ layered 
cooperation in vocational and technical education will help to cul­
tivate the different kinds of talent that are much needed by the Belt 
and Road countries” (Education Action Plan). The Belt and Road 
Education Action Plan emphasized that “it is our shared responsibility 
to strengthen the pillars of regional peace through educational cooper­
ation and exchange and thereby expanding people­ to­ people exchanges” 
(Education Action Plan).
Conflict prevention or peacebuilding is a broad concept, including 
issues like restoring economy, youth employment, and combating trans­
national crimes and counter­ terrorism. BRI can provide some support 
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in these areas. One possibility is that BRI can provide “hard support” 
to “soft peacebuilding”, for example, the infrastructure support for 
peacebuilding­ related training, education, and research.
Limitation and uncertainty
As mentioned above, in many aspects, BRI has potential for promoting 
peacebuilding, and it is possible to establish a complementary rela­
tionship between the Belt and Road actors and peacebuilding actors. 
However, the link between BRI and peacebuilding is still limited and 
uncertain, and BRI has not established official connection with UN 
peacebuilding.
Development for peace, not peace for development
Despite the recognition of  the interactions between development and 
peace, the major peacebuilding potential of  BRI is promoting peace 
through economic and development cooperation, rather than pro­
moting development through peace operation or conflict prevention. 
Both UN peacebuilding and BRI have emphasized the interconnec­
tion between development and peace, but they each have a different 
focus and priority. UN peacebuilding is a broader concept, and pays 
great attention to political affairs, especially supporting national 
efforts to establish, redevelop, or reform institutions. Unlike the UN 
peacebuilding agenda, BRI puts economic and development cooper­
ation first, and takes infrastructure as a priority. So BRI will choose 
peaceful and stable countries to promote economic cooperation. As 
an economic cooperation initiative, the peacebuilding contribution of 
BRI is limited.
Unfavorable factors, uncertain outcomes
The progress of BRI is affected by both internal factors and international 
factors. Relations between big powers, cross– Taiwan strait relations, the 
South China Sea issue, and China’s relations with neighboring coun­
tries are regarded as China’s core security interests. These are major 
international and internal factors that may greatly influence BRI (Xue 
“Diplomatic Risks” 68– 79). At present, relations between major powers 
remain tense. The tension between China and the US military alliance 
in the Asia­ Pacific region is considered to be the most important factor 
in China’s foreign policy. Instabilities in this region will contain China’s 






political will and capability to increase the investment in the Belt and 
Road and UN peacebuilding depend on these factors.
BRI will give priority to countries with good political relations and 
willingness to cooperate with China, as well as countries with a stable 
environment. A  good international political relationship will lead to 
smooth progress of economic cooperation. In turn, smooth economic 
cooperation will contribute to peace and security cooperation, including 
further cooperation in non­ traditional security issues, like the cooper­
ation in the fields of combating and preventing transnational crime, 
human trafficking, corruption, as well as anti­ terrorism. This is an ideal 
scenario of BRI cooperation. However, not all countries along the Belt 
and Road have such an ideal political environment and condition, and 
there are many unfavorable factors that will affect the progress of the 
Belt and Road. Officially, BRI is still an economic cooperation initia­
tive without established goals and schedules. In the Chinese language, 
“initiative” is a word with more flexibility and ambiguity compared to 
words such as “strategy” or “agenda”. If  the situation is unfavorable 
for economic cooperation, BRI will proceed with caution, shrinking in 
scope and adapting as necessary.
From infrastructure to peacebuilding: necessary conditions are 
required
The physical infrastructure projects of BRI, like railway construction, 
road construction, or oil pipeline construction, will not automatically 
make contributions to peacebuilding. On the one hand, the infrastruc­
ture projects can be used for peace purposes – such as election venues, 
media centers, or hospitals, which China has already done through its 
infrastructure projects under the flag of UN peacekeeping. On the other 
hand, infrastructure projects may even be the cause of domestic or 
international disputes, as mentioned above. In addition, Belt and Road 
projects themselves also face various security risks, including the threat 
from terrorism.
The current situation is that the enterprises lack peacebuilding 
awareness and knowledge, and infrastructure projects cannot auto­
matically contribute to peacebuilding. Some necessary conditions 
are required for promoting BRI infrastructure projects to contribute 
to peacebuilding. The necessary conditions include: establishing a 
connection between the Belt and Road Initiative and UN peacebuilding, 
adding concrete peacebuilding arrangements to BRI, promoting 
cooperation between BRI and peacebuilding, and enhancing the active 
interaction between the Belt and Road actors and peacebuilding actors.
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China’s willingness is obviously a decisive factor, but the position of 
relevant countries and international organizations is also indispensable. 
With regard to peacebuilding, the influence of international factors is 
more prominent, the enhancement of the interconnection between the 
Belt and Road and peacebuilding depending mainly on the promotion 
of external factors, including the efforts of the United Nations and 
regional organization. If  the Belt and Road goes smoothly, and the 
peacebuilding efforts of international organizations are strong enough, 
it is very likely that the Belt and Road will make a greater contribution 
to peacebuilding. If  China’s political will and enthusiasm decline, or the 
Belt and Road process slows down or shrinks, the peacebuilding poten­
tial of BRI will also decline.
The United Nations has its own intellectual advantages and prac­
tical experience in the areas of  peacebuilding, supplementing gaps 
in the BRI. However, it remains necessary for UN agencies to take 
more active steps to cooperate with BRI in peacebuilding, and help 
to establish the interconnection between economic cooperation and 
peacebuilding. Joint projects between the United Nations, Chinese 
Belt and Road actors, and the Belt and Road countries should be 
promoted. These efforts could include training, research, and eco­
nomic cooperation programs. UN agencies should do more to 
enhance cooperative relations between the UN Pathways for Peace 
and the Belt and Road for Peace.
Conclusion
Peacebuilding is a comprehensive concept including development­ 
related issues. UN peacebuilding emphasizes the interlinkages between 
peace, development, and human rights, and calls for strengthening the 
cooperation between peace actors and development actors. According 
to the definition of the United Nations, conflict prevention is also a 
comprehensive prevention that requires an interaction of different 
measures and actors. From the perspective of UN peacebuilding, BRI, 
as an economic cooperation– led initiative, could and should make its 
contribution to UN peacebuilding and conflict prevention. However, 
at this stage, the BRI peacebuilding potential is still very limited. The 
BRI peacebuilding potential is constrained and affected by different 
factors, both “China factors” and “non­ China factors”, which interact 
and influence each other. Though BRI has potential for peacebuilding 
in many aspects, this potential remains conditional and uncertain. BRI 
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Conflict prevention is crucially important for creating stable and safe 
environments for people and states, for development and business. In 
two aspects, security sector reform (SSR) is particularly important for 
conflict prevention. First, SSR helps security institutions, as well as 
those institutions mandating and overseeing their work, to be in the 
best possible position to provide effective, efficient, and accountable 
security in order to prevent the escalation of insecurity and violence. 
Second, in cases where security institutions are among the very sources 
of insecurity, they need to be reformed so that they prevent – and not 
cause – insecurity.
SSR supports conflict prevention, and conflict prevention is an 
important pillar for peace, stability, and development. Putting it dif­
ferently, investing in SSR such as developing SSR strategies, programs, 
and activities and promoting good security sector governance (SSG) 
principles, supports stability, prevents violent conflicts – both sudden 
and protracted ones  – and sustains safe environments for economic 
investment, cooperation, and development. Failing to invest in it would 
be a strategic mistake from both political and economic standpoints. 
The following pages offer an overview of SSG and SSR, conflict pre­
vention, and the link between them, before reflecting on the Swiss 
tradition of  promoting good SSG globally and on the opportunity for 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to promote good SSG among 





The security sector, good security sector governance, and 
security sector reform
The 2008 report on security sector reform by the UN Secretary­ General 
offers a solid framework for a common, comprehensive, and coherent 
approach by the United Nations and its member states, reflecting shared 
principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implemen­
tation of SSR (Hänggi and Scherrer 3– 4). The report notes that:
It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defense, 
law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions 
responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. 
Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of 
cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many 
instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes 
actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and 
implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and 
civil society groups. Other non­ state actors that could be considered 
part of the security sector include customary or informal author­
ities and private security services.
(United Nations “Securing Peace and Development” para. 14; 
OECD/ DAC; United Nations Development Programme 87)
As the security sector’s main purpose is to provide security as a public 
service to a state and its population, SSR needs to follow basic good 
governance principles. What do those principles of “good governance” 
mean when applied to security institutions? A brief  look at some core 
good governance principles highlights their importance for the security 
sector:
• Participation: Security institutions and their personnel are repre­
sentative of the population they serve, including women and men, 
and all ethnic groups.
• Equity/ inclusivity: All members of society can join the security 
institutions, are treated equally by them and can participate in 
commenting on them – they see them as “their institutions” that are 
providing an important public service.
• Rule of law: The impartial enforcement of and adherence to law is 
crucial; security providers are not above the law and do not enjoy 
impunity; legal frameworks also must reflect the aspirations and 
roles of modern and professional security institutions.
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• Transparency: Civil authorities and civil society actors have access 
to information about the work of their security institutions.
• Responsiveness: The professional and timely delivery of security 
and justice as a public service can be expected; the institution 
displays a distinct service­ orientation.
• Consensus orientation: Coherent policies and responsibilities of the 
sector are based on inclusive and broad stakeholder consultation 
processes; ownership, direction, and scope of reforms are broad­ 
based and broadly supported.
• Effectiveness and efficiency: Effective and professional management 
of security institutions and delivery of services is in place, based on 
a smart use of human capital and financial resources, while avail­
able resources match mandates, tasks, and efforts towards meeting 
good governance principles.
• Accountability: Security sector actors provide explanations and 
justifications, and accept responsibility for actions and decisions; 
they have structures in place that guarantee internal accountability 
and accountability to democratic and civilian authorities, as well as 
civil society organizations.
By promoting good governance principles in reform efforts, security 
institutions are more accountable to the state and its people; effective, 
efficient, and affordable; respectful of international norms, standards, 
and human rights; and considered as legitimate security providers by 
all stakeholders. They are respected, instead of feared by the people 
they serve.
The academic and practitioner literature as well as official and oper­
ational and institutional statements highlight that meaningful SSR 
should additionally embrace the following principles:
• SSR should be people­ centered, locally owned, and based on demo­
cratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law, so that 
it can provide freedom from fear and measurable reductions in 
armed violence and crime. This principle must be upheld in both 
the design and the implementation of SSR programs. It should not 
simply remain at the level of proclamation and intention (Nathan; 
Donais).
• SSR must be seen as a framework to structure our thinking about 
how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their 
populations, through more integrated development and security 
policies and greater civilian involvement and oversight. National, 
broad and public consultation processes as well as a national 
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security strategy are thus inherent requirements of feasible SSR 
strategies.
• SSR activities should form part of multisectoral strategies, based 
on broad assessments of the range of security and justice needs of 
the people and the state. They have to respond to the needs of all 
stakeholders.
• SSR must be implemented through clear processes and policies that 
enhance institutional and human capacities to ensure that security 
policy can function effectively and justice can be delivered equitably 
(United Nations “Maintenance of International Peace”; European 
Commission; Council of the European Union; Hänggi).
While various types of reforms could take place (and have always 
taken place) within the security sector that do not aim at meeting SSG 
principles, these do not qualify as SSR. Such reforms include trad­
itional train­ and­ equip activities that are part of military or police 
reforms outside the remit of SSR. While strengthening the effectiveness 
of security institutions’ performance, such reforms change very little in 
the way security institutions are run, governed, and perceived not only 
by the government, but also by the population they serve. Yet, these 
limited, technical reforms within individual security institutions (such 
as the military or police) are often preferred over more far­ reaching 
SSR. Experience with close engagement throughout many regions of 
the world, including Asia, shows that, while the main tenets of SSG 
and SSR are usually not put in question, SSR sits less comfortably 
with governments favoring more centralized rule and limited oversight 
of security institutions by civilian actors. In such contexts, both polit­
ical and military elites might fully appreciate the principles of SSG and 
SSR, yet for various reasons they do not want to be subjected to parlia­
mentary oversight or managed by civilian ministries. In such situations, 
SSR can still focus on sensitization and investment in certain good gov­
ernance principles, while waiting for a more conducive political environ­
ment supporting more far­ reaching reforms.
Quite often  – and this is the case not only in particularly difficult 
and challenging SSR environments – skepticism about SSR grows from 
a feeling that the approach to SSG and SSR needs to be adjusted to 
a country’s cultural, political, and historical contexts. Sometimes the 
main tenets of SSG and SSR are considered to be unduly influenced by 
Western or Northern notions of governance and the roles of security 
institutions in society (Schnabel “Ideal Requirements”). However, exten­
sive engagement in SSG and SSR debates and applications in various 
regions around the world shows that their main tenets are not rejected 
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as Western/ Northern notions. The challenges and responses that neces­
sitate SSR remain very similar, regardless of whether seen from the 
North or the South: however, while the focus of SSR should be on SSG 
principles, the scope and sequencing of reforms must be attuned to local 
contexts and conditions (Aguja and Schnabel). Thus, while the concepts 
of SSG and SSR are not challenged in their basic foundations, different 
levels of willingness and preparedness to engage in SSR exist, depending 
on the nature of the political system, political stability, and economic 
well­ being of the society concerned. As will be argued in more detail 
below, an effective, efficient and accountable security sector that is able 
to protect society against internal and external threats makes a strong 
contribution to internal and external peace and stability.
The need for SSR
Under which circumstances can we assume that a security sector is in 
need of reform? If  the sector is not inclusive, is partial and corrupt, 
unresponsive, incoherent, ineffective, and inefficient and/ or unaccount­
able to the public, then the sector (or any of its affected institutions) is in 
need of reform. The term “reform” describes an institutional and pro­
cedural transformation of the security sector that leads to improvements 
in the performance of a legitimate, credible, well­ functioning, and 
well­ governed security sector that, as a public service provider, delivers 
internal and external, direct and structural security.
The extent of the reform required in each specific instance depends 
on the changes and adaptations required for making the sector fulfill 
its roles in an efficient and accountable manner, and rarely involves a 
total overhaul. Some components and aspects of a nation’s security 
sector might be functioning very well, while others might be in need of 
extensive improvements. Thus, identifying where, how, and when indi­
vidual institutions might need to be (re)built, restructured, changed, 
and/ or fine­ tuned is an important step. It requires a solid assessment 
of the sector’s roles, tasks, and requirements in light of national and 
local assessments of society’s security and development needs. Security 
sector assessments and SSR planning therefore ideally build on current 
and realistic national security policies and strategies.
What SSR does
Activities to reform, improve, and adjust a security sector focus on 
developing an effective, affordable, and efficient security sector, for 





Reforms also include ensuring democratic and civilian control of the 
security sector, for example through strengthening the management 
and oversight capacities of government ministries, parliament, and civil 
society organizations.
Thus, referring again to the UN report mentioned earlier in the text, 
security sector reform
describes a process of assessment, review and implementation 
as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities 
that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable 
security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and 
with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.
(United Nations “Maintenance of International Peace” para. 17)
In operational terms, SSR covers a wide range of activities (Hänggi and 
Scherrer 15):
• Overarching activities, such as security sector reviews and their 
development, needs assessments, and development of SSR strat­
egies and national security policies.
• Activities related to security- and justice- providing institutions, such 
as restructuring and reforming national defense, police, and other 
law enforcement agencies as well as judicial and prison systems 
based on SSR strategies and national security policies.
• Activities related to civilian management and democratic oversight 
of security and justice institutions, including executive management 
and control, parliamentary oversight, judicial review, oversight by 
independent oversight bodies and civil society organizations.
• Activities related to SSR in post- conflict environments, such as dis­
armament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), control of 
small arms and light weapons, mine action, and transitional justice.
• Activities related to cross- cutting concerns, such as gender issues and 
child protection.
These SSR activities – and SSR’s contribution to peacebuilding and 
the prevention of violence and armed conflict – have political, economic, 
social, and institutional dimensions. The political dimension focuses on 
the promotion and facilitation of civilian and democratic control over 
security institutions; the economic dimension ensures appropriate allo­
cation and consumption of society’s resources for the security sector; 
the social dimension holds that the provision of the population’s phys­
ical security should be guaranteed, and not threatened by the security 
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institutions; and, directly related, the institutional dimension focuses 
on the professionalization of all actors in the security sector (Wulf 5; 
Schnabel “Security­ Development Discourse”).
Making the case for pursuing genuine SSR – and regional 
experiences
The consequences of ineffective and unaccountable security institutions 
can be detrimental to a society’s safety, stability, and security: suspicions 
and rumors spread about non­ transparent security institutions among the 
public, media, and political decision­ makers; human rights abuses and the 
absence of a proper response to them, and corruption and other miscon­
duct by security institutions, create fear and distrust among the popula­
tion. Furthermore, poor reputation of security institutions raises doubts 
about the legitimacy of state institutions in general and reduces society’s 
trust in, and loyalty to, the state and its institutions. Consequently, state 
and society are more likely to experience political crises, violent con­
flict, and low human and economic development. Investing in SSR helps 
tackle those problems and can contribute to reversing such negative ten­
dencies and to mitigating some drivers in the escalation of tensions to 
open violence. Centralized political systems are less likely to embrace the 
holistic character of the security sector. By focusing reforms exclusively 
on security institutions’ capacity to strengthen their effectiveness through 
train­ and­ equip programs, while leaving aside investments in civilian 
management and oversight, they do not engage in SSR per se. More 
effective and less accountable security institutions may sway even further 
from their public duty of security provision and be feared and distrusted 
by the society they serve.
On the other hand, genuine SSR, embracing efforts to focus on 
both security provision and civilian oversight, create more effective 
and accountable security institutions, benefiting society in a number 
of ways: With more transparent, cost­ effective, and legitimate security 
provision, security institutions are seen as important assets by the popu­
lation; they enjoy a positive reputation within society and are seen as 
attractive employers; they bring broad benefits to society in the form 
of better security provision and the creation of a friendly environment 
for human and economic development; and they guarantee better pro­
tection of rights, security, stability, and rule of law. All of these benefits 
of SSR are critically important for conflict prevention and post­ conflict 
recovery. Throughout the Asian region, experience shows that honest 
efforts by governments and security institutions towards strengthening 




equipment, and training activities, but also their accountability by 
investing in better relations with the media, civil society, and parlia­
ment have paid off  in the short term, as reforms increased their reputa­
tion domestically as well as internationally. For instance, international 
investments have increased. At the same time, in places where reforms 
slowed down or were reversed, or security institutions were found to 
have committed major human rights breaches, international investments 
quickly pulled out.
Throughout the region, movement towards good SSG and subse­
quent SSR is challenged by a number of  factors. In South Asia these 
include a shortage of  independent and strong oversight/ management 
bodies in the security sector; growing terrorist threats and organized 
crime; long histories of  internal conflict; mixed success with DDR of 
armed non­ state groups; or emerging existential and environmental 
threats. In Southeast Asia, the challenging environment for good 
SSG and subsequent SSR is characterized by, among other things, 
praetorian states  – security institutions directly and indirectly inter­
vening in politics and civilian leadership, including the military’s role 
in parliament; an absence of  independent and strong oversight/ man­
agement bodies in the security sector; long histories of  protracted 
internal conflicts and dragging peace processes; uneven success with 
DDR of armed non­ state groups; growing terrorist threats, vio­
lent religious extremism, and organized crime; attempts by security 
institutions to crack down on public dissent, despite high “collateral 
damage” among the civilian population; and a lack of  profession­
alism and SSG expertise in the security sector – among both security 
institutions and oversight institutions. In East Asia, the challenging 
environment for good SSG and subsequent SSR is characterized by, 
among other things, security providers who are accountable to non­ 
pluralist democratic systems and alternative governance structures, as 
well as politicized security providers and strong presence of  military 
influences in politics; oversight and management bodies in the security 
sector that are not freely elected; or ongoing armed conflict and the 
potential for nuclear proliferation.
However, there are also numerous positive developments that con­
tribute to creating an increasingly conducive environment for sus­
tainable SSG/ R: There are established democracies in the region with 
professional security institutions, strong civilian control of  security 
agencies, and solid respect for good governance principles. There is 
overall a considerable need and demand for SSG and SSR assistance, 
in addition to the considerable potential for some countries to act as 
donors and partners for such assistance in the region. Several countries 
Security sector reform 123
  123
in the region have fast­ growing economies, triggering an increase of 
middle­ class and politically educated populations, along with polit­
ical demands to carry out reforms and the resources to do so. Some 
countries in the region are historically large contributors to UN peace­
keeping operations, while others would like to follow in their path. 
Peacekeeping training could thus potentially act as a driver for meeting 
international standards and initiating discussions on SSG and SSR 
activities. Moreover, some countries are interested in increasing their 
international development activities. In addition, there is political will 
for and commitment to regional experience­ sharing, and in areas such 
as economic cooperation or disaster management, such regional and 
inter­ subregional cooperation has taken place, for instance via the 
ASEAN+3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia­ Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), or the East Asia Summit (EAS). 
Much can be learned from experiences across – and within – Asia with 
the design, performance, and reforms of  countries’ security sectors, 
and the impact and pay­ off  of  such reforms on these countries’ peace, 
stability, and prosperity.
SSR is a politically highly sensitive undertaking. Each country finds 
its own speed and sequencing in the design and implementation of SSR.
How do SSR and conflict prevention interlink?
The early prevention of the escalation of disputes and tensions to poten­
tially violent conflicts, including through SSR, is a most pragmatic invest­
ment in peace and stability. Moreover, in political, economic, as well as 
human, terms it is much less costly to halt escalating violence than to deal 
with its consequences. Conflict prevention can mitigate or at least reduce 
the extraordinarily high human, political, social, and economic costs of vio­
lent conflict; it can preserve stability and peace, and it can advance human, 
regional, and international security and thus secure the foundations for 
prosperous development and trade (Schnabel and Carment).
Preventive efforts work best if  applied as a continuum across all 
stages of a conflict. Development agencies and both humanitarian and 
civil society organizations (or security sector institutions) contribute to 
long­ term, structural measures that stabilize societies and their polit­
ical and economic structures and institutions. However, political actors 
focus more on crisis diplomacy at advanced stages of conflict escal­
ation. Further along the spectrum of preventive strategies, particu­
larly when initial prevention has failed and tensions have escalated, the 
deliberate and strategic use of rewards and punishments are expected 




convince them of the mutual advantages in pursuing compromise 
solutions. Finally, when there is no consent by the conflict parties, but a 
sense of an international responsibility to prevent potential grave acts 
of mass violence or direct threats to international peace and security, 
third parties including the United Nations and regional organizations 
may be expected to intervene militarily. Conflict prevention thus ranges 
from long­ term development activities and the promotion of good gov­
ernance, including in the security sector, to traditional diplomacy, and 
from crisis diplomacy to more forceful and intrusive forms of preventive 
interventions.
State governments hold the main responsibility for efforts to prevent 
disputes from escalating into violence. Actors above and below govern­
ment levels put pressure on political elites and encourage and empower 
populations to demand democracy, transparency, and accountability. In 
that regard promoting good governance is key to the constructive trans­
formation of conflict and the prevention of violence. External support 
plays an important role in triggering, facilitating, and maintaining 
local and regional initiatives until those are self­ sustaining. Here the 
United Nations, regional organizations, individual foreign ministries 
and development agencies, as well as international nongovernmental 
organizations play a crucial role in encouraging and financing local and 
national initiatives.
In a study carried out as part of the background research to 
support the 2017 World Bank/ UN study Pathways for Peace: Inclusive 
Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, security sector reform
is seen as a means of progressively building resilient security and 
justice systems while addressing many of the root causes and 
drivers of conflict that stem from ineffective, poorly managed, or 
unaccountable security and justice institutions. Security and justice 
institutions are commonly the primary interface between the state 
and the population they are meant to serve. In many contexts they 
are the litmus test for the effectiveness of the state. Their protracted 
ineffectiveness or poor integrity represent potential for the escal­
ation of conflict.
(DCAF 2)
The report further argues that
there is an opportunity to build on examples of the application 
of SSR principles that have demonstrated an indispensable role in 
preventing violent conflict and addressing the underlying drivers of 
conflict. As demonstrated in the case of SSR processes [in many 
countries where SSR activities have taken place], a sustained, 
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comprehensive and integrated SSR approach significantly 
contributes to conflict prevention in times of transition.
(DCAF 2)
SSR plays an important role for measures that  – in combination 
or by themselves – can help reduce the main forces of violent conflict. 
These measures include the support for democratic transition and con­
solidation; support in establishing legitimate, representative, and inclu­
sive government authorities; building professional and accountable 
security institutions; prevention of state­ sponsored or ­ tolerated human 
rights abuses; and ensuring that the ethnic composition of the security 
institutions mirrors the population at large. Measures also include 
the sufficient and broad provision of public services; stabilization of 
the national economy, including the creation of a stable, transparent, 
and non­ discriminatory environment for private sector development 
and investment; and trade liberalization and uniform economic devel­
opment along ethnic lines; resolution of long­ standing inter­ group 
grievances, including armed ones, and facilitation of reconciliation; 
and the prevention of human flight and the creation of an attractive 
environment for local talent and expertise. All these are important pre­
ventive measures in their own right, but also in combination with SSR. 
The measures contribute to the promotion of good governance, by 
promoting accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, responsiveness, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and rule of decent law.
The concept of SSR emerged from the security and development 
debate. Having evolved in the late 1990s from experiences in fragile 
post­ conflict contexts, it was based on the recognition that reforming 
a country’s security sector and putting security institutions under 
civilian control are important contributions to and requirements for 
peace, stability, and long­ term prevention of violent conflict. These, in 
turn, are prerequisites for sustainable economic and human develop­
ment. While SSR’s important role was not recognized in the Millennium 
Development Goals, it was recognized in the World Development Report 
2011 on “Conflict, Security and Development” (World Bank) and of 
course in the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 (particularly Sustainable 
Development Goal 16 on “Peace, justice and strong institutions”).
Switzerland’s commitment to building SSG and SSR capacity 
around the globe and the relevance for China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative
In the context of this joint Chinese and Swiss effort to explore oppor­




for decades been committed to promoting conflict prevention through 
capacity building in security sector governance. Almost 20  years ago 
Switzerland initiated the creation of DCAF – Geneva Centre for 
Security Sector Governance, in order to offer non­ partisan support to 
efforts by national and international actors to bring security sectors 
around the world closer in line with good governance principles.
Throughout this volume, contributors, particularly the Chinese 
contributors, point to China’s various new initiatives in international 
relations, including its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI aims 
to improve regional cooperation on a trans­ continental scale, by 
strengthening infrastructure, trade, and investment links between China 
and some 65 other countries covering Central, South, and Southeast 
Asia, the Gulf countries, North Africa, and Europe. While the BRI 
aims to bring lasting prosperity and peace to the countries benefiting 
from the initiative, a welcoming environment for regional cooperation, 
development, trade, and economic investment already requires a signifi­
cant level of peace and stability. Investments made in the context of 
the BRI will only last if  and as long as basic stability and security are 
enjoyed by participating countries. Many of these countries, however, 
suffer from weak security sector governance, which features prominently 
among the causes of instability, conflict, and violence. Thus they are in 
dire need of SSR. As this chapter argues, investments made towards 
better functioning and increasingly accountable security sectors, backed 
by populations who trust their security institutions, will address some 
of the causes of tension and help prevent potential escalations to vio­
lent conflict. Investments made in SSR are thus complementary to 
the BRI’s investments in infrastructure, trade, and development. The 
returns on meaningful SSR will be felt by the affected populations, their 
governments, neighboring nations, and China. The BRI would thus not 
only bring development, jobs, and wealth to its participating countries, 
but also increased peace, stability, and order. Moreover, the BRI could 
offer a highly useful platform for cross­ national and inter­ regional 
experience­ sharing on SSR.
Given Switzerland’s expertise in SSR support and China’s interest in 
stable and prospering BRI participating states, the BRI could serve as a 
vehicle to promote good security sector governance throughout the BRI 
community, possibly as a joint Chinese– Swiss initiative.
Conclusion: investing in SSR as a means to support conflict 
prevention and building sustainable futures
SSR makes sense in its own right, as it improves the delivery of security 
services and accountability of security providers. SSR reduces the 
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likelihood for security institutions becoming a source of insecurity. SSR 
builds their capacity to effectively mitigate threats to people’s security 
and prevent the violent escalation of disputes. Investments in SSR are 
simultaneously investments in conflict prevention, and they improve 
security and stability domestically and regionally. As well, investments 
in SSR in neighboring regions are always investments in one’s own 
security.
In sum, SSR is vital for conflict prevention, and both are vital for 
stability, which is a key ingredient for successful regional cooperation, 
business, and development. Matching Switzerland’s experience in pro­
viding SSR support with China’s interest in preventing violent conflict 
and advancing peace through development as part of BRI would be 
a win– win situation for everyone involved: Switzerland would be able 
to lend non­ partisan support to meaningful, context­ specific SSR 
initiatives throughout China’s numerous BRI projects; China would 
promote and support these activities in order to create a stable environ­
ment for development and investment; and the affected societies would 
benefit from a more effective and accountable security sector and long­ 
term, sustainable conflict prevention and economic development.
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10  “A community of shared future 




The concept of “a community of shared future for mankind” is not only 
the top­ level design for China’s diplomacy in the new era, but also the 
Chinese proposal to address global challenges. The new concept inherits 
the fundamental principles and spirit of the Charter of the United 
Nations, on the one hand, and provides a new approach to tackle new 
threats in the globalized world, on the other. The cooperation between 
China and the United Nations to jointly build a community of shared 
future for mankind is significant for the prevention of conflict. While to 
achieve the goal of universal peace and common development through 
a new type of international relations is the fundamental way to prevent 
conflict, the co­ construction of “One Belt and One Road” will bring 
strong momentum for developmental peace.
Background
In October 2017, the political report of  the Nineteenth National 
Congress of  the Communist Party of  China (CPC) mentioned the idea 
of  “a community of  shared future for mankind” six times, pointing 
out that “the Chinese people are willing to work with the people from 
the rest of  the world to promote the construction of  a community of 
shared future for mankind and create a better future for mankind” 
(Xi “Secure a Decisive Victory”). The Nineteenth National Congress 
of  CPC also confirmed that a community of  shared future for man­
kind is an important component of  President Xi Jinping’s thoughts 
on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era and the main 
goal of  the major­ country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. 







The concept of “a community of shared future” has guided China’s 
diplomacy in recent years in several ways. First, China has made great 
efforts to promote the regionalization of “a community of shared 
future” by building up “a community of shared future” with ASEAN, 
Africa, Latin America, Arab countries, etc. Second, China has provided 
even stronger support for UN­ centered multilateralism. Besides being 
the second largest contributor to both the UN’s regular and its peace­
keeping operations budget, China also established the 1 billion USD 
China– UN Peace and Development Fund and the 3 billion USD 
South– South Cooperation Fund, and donated to several UN agencies 
to support UN peacekeeping operations and the development agenda. 
Third, China has made use of the opportunities of hosting summits (to 
include the G20, BRICS, and APEC, among others) to integrate the 
concept into the norms and agenda of these international organizations.
The case of the South China Sea indicates how China tries to pre­
vent conflict by building a community of shared future. A community 
of shared future in the South China Sea is a part of such a community 
between China and ASEAN, or more broadly in Asia. China calls for 
a South China Sea of “peace, friendship and cooperation” through the 
enforcement of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. China 
also proposed a principle of “shelving the differences and seeking joint 
development” and a dual­ track approach to solve the dispute by pol­
itical and diplomatic means. To China, the best and the only way to 
prevent conflict in the South China Sea is to construct a community of 
shared future based on the existing regional and subregional cooper­
ation mechanism including the China– ASEAN Summit (10+1) and the 
China– ASEAN Free Trade Area.
However, some major powers and neighboring countries still have 
doubts about how China would build a community of shared future, 
given the fact that China has strategic competition with the United 
States, political stalemate with Japan, and an ongoing territorial dis­
pute with India. In addition, questions remain on how this very Chinese 
concept can be accepted by international society and transformed into 
an internationally recognized norm and value.
A community of shared future for mankind is the inheritance 
and progression of the Charter of the United Nations
The Charter of the United Nations is the cornerstone of a community of 
shared future for mankind and the basis and starting point for the pre­
vention and resolution of conflicts. In accordance with the Charter, the 
United Nations has four purposes, along with seven principles. To build 
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a community of shared future for mankind, China advocates the idea of 
global governance featuring extensive consultation, joint contribution, 
and shared benefits; the idea of a new type of international relations 
with mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win– win cooperation, as 
well as the idea of neighborhood diplomacy including amity, sincerity, 
mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. These ideas are both the inheritance 
of and the development of the purposes and principles of the Charter, 
and are also of great significance for the prevention of conflicts.
When the United Nations was founded, the main problems facing 
the international community were colonial dominance and the conflict 
and wars among countries. Since then, the Cold War between the East 
and the West, the North– South gap, hegemonism, and power politics 
have become sources of major challenges and conflicts. Accordingly, the 
Charter sets out the basic principles governing international relations, 
such as sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
and non­ interference in internal affairs of other countries. Today, the 
international community is facing new crises such as finance, environ­
ment, refugees; new threats including terrorism, climate change, infec­
tious diseases, cyber security; and new challenges of populism, social 
fragmentation, and religious antagonism. The idea of a community of 
shared future for mankind provides China’s wisdom and solutions for 
the international community to deal with these new crises, threats, and 
challenges.
For example, in the global governance approach advocated by 
China, extensive consultation means mutual respect, brainstorming, 
considering the interests and concerns of all parties, thus embodying 
the wisdom and creativity of all parties; joint contribution means 
giving play to different advantages and capacities of each other so 
that all countries can build cooperation platforms and address global 
challenges together; shared benefits means bringing more cooperation 
fruits in a fairer way to all peoples and helping to build a community 
of shared interest, a community of shared destiny, and a community of 
shared responsibilities.
Another example is the new type of international relations featuring 
cooperation and win– win situations as not only suitable for the eco­
nomic field, but also widely suitable for political, security, cultural, and 
human rights fields. Cooperation is utilized to achieve win– win results 
to replace the approach of “the winner takes all”, aiming to resolve 
disputes through dialogue and resolve divergence with consultation. 
Realizing cooperation and win– win results through consultations, con­
tribution, and shared benefits is beneficial in significantly avoiding the 
occurrence, escalation, or spread of conflicts.
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A community of shared future for mankind is highly compatible 
with the cause of the United Nations
A community of shared future for mankind consists of a community of 
shared security, a community of shared development, and a community 
of shared human rights, which are at the core of the cause of the United 
Nations. As can be seen from the Charter, the United Nations and a com­
munity of shared future for mankind share common ideas and thoughts, 
principles and norms, spirit and values. The maintenance of peace, the pro­
motion of development, and the protection of human rights are the goals 
of the cause of the United Nations and also the pillars of a community 
of shared future for mankind. Since its founding, the United Nations has 
taken measures like preventive diplomacy, mediation, conciliation, polit­
ical negotiations, and the international rule of law to avoid the occurrence 
and escalation of conflicts. The Security Council was established to strive 
towards a community of shared security across the globe.
The promotion of development has increasingly become the focus 
of the work of the United Nations, and the development system is a 
part of the United Nations system with widest functions and most 
institutions. The United Nations, by implementing the four ten­ year 
international development strategies, promoting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and formulating the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, has made major achievements in eradicating 
poverty, combating climate change, and promoting sustainable devel­
opment. Safeguarding human rights is also one of the main objectives 
of the United Nations. By formulating international legal documents 
for human rights, establishing specialized institutions for human rights 
affairs and promoting human rights, the United Nations promotes and 
safeguards human rights, staying committed to building a community 
of shared human rights across the globe.
Universal security and common development proposed by a 
community of shared future for mankind is a fundamental way 
to prevent conflict
Universal security and common development is the basic path for 
building a community of shared future for mankind and the funda­
mental way to prevent conflicts. The United Nations is committed to the 
goal of sustainable peace through conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding, and other peace operations. Peace operations are not 
only the primary means of conflict management by the United Nations, 
but also the major manifestation of global security governance, and 
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thus remain a public security product for the international community. 
In today’s world, security issues are characterized by inter­ connectivity, 
trans­ nationality, and diversity. Only by adhering to cooperation and 
co­ building can lasting security be realized. China advocates a view 
of global security featuring commonality, comprehensiveness, cooper­
ation, and sustainability, and builds a sense of cooperation to deal with 
security challenges. To jointly construct a community of shared future 
for mankind featuring universal security is a Chinese solution for global 
security governance and an effective way to achieve sustainable peace. 
Universal security means not only the security of the rich, the strong, 
and the majority, but also the security of the poor, the weak, and the few.
Common development is an effective way to realize sustainable devel­
opment. In September 2015, the United Nations Development Summit 
adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a guiding 
document for global development governance and international devel­
opment cooperation. In recent years, China has actively advocated the 
idea of common development by hosting the G20 summit, the BRICS 
summit, and the APEC leaders’ informal meetings. In promoting the 
construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the establishment 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the implementa­
tion of neighborhood diplomacy and foreign aids, China takes common 
development as the guideline for its actions. To build a community of 
shared future for mankind featuring common development is a Chinese 
solution for global development governance and an effective way to 
achieve sustainable development.
However, we need to analyze the nature of development and the way 
to achieve development goals. Only inclusive and sustainable develop­
ment is the key to conflict prevention. In some countries, exploitation 
of resources and degradation of the environment as the result of devel­
opment leads to a lot of turmoil. In other countries, the wide disparity 
between rich and poor, and the injustice of wealth distribution in the 
process of development arouse much social disorder. In some cases, slow 
and gradual development is more appreciated, and too quick and too 
much development brings social instability. So, it is the development 
model, not development itself  that has much to do with conflict or peace.
Statistics may indicate that richer countries are more stable and 
have less conflict than those poor countries, but it is hard to conclude 
that poverty itself  will lead to more conflicts. In Southeast Asia for 
example, GDP per capita in Laos and Cambodia is much lower than 
that in Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, but it is clear that there are 
more conflicts in the latter three countries. The same phenomena exist 
in South Asia between Bhutan and Sri Lanka. In those countries with 
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more conflicts, social problems such as minority separatism, ethnic inde­
pendence, and religious divergence may have more links with conflicts. 
So, it is the root of poverty and the social problem behind poverty, not 
poverty itself, that brings more conflicts.
China will make great contributions to preventing conflict by 
working with the United Nations to promote the new type of 
international relations
The cooperation between China and the United Nations is a new way to 
promote the new type of international relations, jointly implement BRI, 
and build a community of shared future for mankind. If  a community 
of shared future for mankind is the goal, then the new type of inter­
national relations is the mode, and the implementation of BRI is the 
pathway. The new type of international relations is a new concept and 
new thinking offered by China for dealing with new changes in the inter­
national layout, new challenges in the international community, and the 
new reforms in the international order.
The new type of international relations is to persist in win– win 
cooperation and oppose zero­ sum games. The new type of international 
relations is “to replace confrontation with cooperation and replace 
monopoly by win­ win” (Wang). Common interests are the founda­
tion and condition for achieving win– win cooperation, and the United 
Nations is the main platform and mechanism for member states to 
realize the common interests for mankind, such as peace, development, 
and human rights.
The new type of international relations is to adhere to multilat­
eralism and oppose unilateralism. The United Nations is the product 
and embodiment of multilateralism. Today, the United Nations is at 
its time of greatest need to strengthen multilateralism to address global 
challenges like terrorism, climate change, and the threat of nuclear pro­
liferation. China is a natural partner of the UN­ led multilateralism. 
Cooperation between China and the United Nations can provide a 
powerful impetus for multilateralism.
The new type of international relations is to insist on the political 
settlement of international conflicts and oppose the use or threat of 
use of force. Political means should be the main option for resolving 
international conflicts. The case of Iraq and Iran proves from both 
positive and negative aspects that seeking common ground and con­
vergence of interests of all parties based on multilateral negotiations 
and consultations and considering the security concerns of the parties 
concerned is conducive to the settlement of the disputes. In contrast, 
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unilateralism and military means, even if  they achieve temporary 
results, cannot resolve the root of security problems. China persists 
in resolving major international issues through peaceful negotiations 
and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, opposes 
any unilateral military action that circumvents the United Nations, and 
discourages member states from easily adopting coercive measures such 
as sanctions and embargoes.
The new type of international relations is to adhere to the democra­
tization and rule of law in international relations and the opposition of 
power politics and hegemony. The United Nations advocates the ideas 
of just security and fair development, promotes the legal settlement 
of international disputes, standardizes state behavior, restricts state 
power, and balances national interests by the rule of law, to promote the 
rule of law in international relations. Power politics and hegemonism 
are the main factors hindering democratization and the rule of law in 
international relations, as well as an important source of inequality 
and irrationality in the international order. As the largest developing 
country, China is the beneficiary and promoter of the democratization 
of international relations. In the process of upholding win– win cooper­
ation, multilateralism, political settlement of international disputes, and 
democratization and rule of law in international relations, China and 
the United Nations have tremendous room for cooperation to jointly 
construct and lead the new type of international relations.
China will cooperate with the United Nations to implement 
the Belt and Road Initiative, which will provide a powerful 
momentum for developmental peace
President Xi Jinping elaborated on the idea of such a community on 
many international occasions, including key speeches at the United 
Nations. The first speech was in September 2015 when President Xi 
attended the general debate of the 70th session of the General Assembly 
at United Nations Headquarters in New York to deliver an important 
speech entitled “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of 
Win­ Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for 
Mankind” (Xi “Working Together”). The second speech was in January 
2017 when President Xi delivered an important speech at the United 
Nations Office at Geneva entitled “Work Together to Build a Community 
of Shared Future for Mankind” (Xi “Work Together”), thereby fully 
explaining to the international community the concept of a commu­
nity of shared future for mankind. After the vision of a community 




in the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the Security 
Council and the Human Rights Council several times (A/ RES/ 72/ 27; S/ 
RES/ 2344(2017); A/ HRC/ RES/ 34/ 4; E/ CN.5/ 2017/ 2). In 2016 and 2017, 
the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly respectively 
adopted resolutions calling for strengthening regional cooperation to 
provide a safe and secure environment for the implementation of BRI 
(S/ RES/ 2274(2016); A/ 71/ 9).
The cooperation between China and the United Nations to jointly 
implement BRI is conducive to the overall advancement of the Initiative, 
upgrading it into an international development agenda. The cooper­
ation between China and the United Nations in implementing BRI can 
be first reflected in its connecting with the United Nations 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development. The implementation of BRI should be 
guided by the new development agenda, so that BRI can be a new 
model of international development cooperation and global develop­
ment governance. In particular, with the guidance and assistance of the 
United Nations development system, the projects and measures of the 
BRI should be linked up with the development plans of the regional, 
national, and local governments along the route to germinate and grow.
Second, BRI implementation should not be limited to economic, 
trade, and investment projects, but also includes many cultural, edu­
cational, scientific, and health and other exchange activities, which 
requires cooperation with United Nations subsidiaries and specialized 
agencies, so that projects and actions with universal value and global 
significance can be carried out professionally and locally.
Third, the South– South Cooperation advocated by the United 
Nations and BRI advocated by China can be complementary and mutu­
ally supportive. On one hand, BRI provides the impetus for new South– 
South Cooperation; on the other hand, the South– South Cooperation 
will provide a multilateral framework for BRI. The implementation of 
BRI will effectively strengthen, deepen, enrich, and bring innovation to 
South– South Cooperation, while South– South Cooperation can also 
provide experience for BRI to transform itself  from a Chinese initiative 
to a new mode for South– South Cooperation.
Conclusion
As the main goal and top­ level design of Chinese major power diplo­
macy in the new era, the idea of “a community of shared future for 
mankind” proposed by President Xi will undoubtedly have implications 
for world peace and security. Yet, the so­ called Chinese idea/ solution 
needs to be integrated with existing international principles and norms, 
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and/ or transformed into the new ones. China has greatly contributed 
to UN peacekeeping operations in the last 30 years. However, China’s 
contributions in terms of peacekeepers and finance are yet to be 
translated into China’s higher status and more influence in decision­ 
making and management of UN peace operations. Compared to peace­
keeping operations, China invests less and remains low profile in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding. “A community of shared future for man­
kind” provides a future direction for the prevention of conflicts from a 
Chinese perspective. But, more importantly, how to transform the idea 
of this community into international norms and values serving for con­
flict prevention is a common challenge for both China and the rest of 
the world.
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Future collaborative efforts to  
prevent conflict
Rachel F. Madenyika and Jason G. Tower 
In an increasingly globalized and inter­ connected world, violent con­
flict is more protracted, highly volatile, and resistant to containment 
within national borders. In some instances, it combines perilously with 
social media, cyber networks, environmental deprivation, and disease. 
This project, “Policy Dialogue on Conflict Prevention”, highlights that 
conflict prevention is about making societies resilient to violent con­
flict, which is achieved by strengthening their local capacities for peace 
through reinforcing systems, structures, resources, attitudes, and skills 
at the local, national, regional, and global levels. Much attention is 
focused on reactive approaches to conflict – rebuilding and resolving – 
but prevention must hold the same level of importance. It remains insuf­
ficient to merely prevent a relapse of war; the international community 
must make a greater effort to respond to warning signs to pre­ empt the 
eruption of deadly violence (Woocher).
This manuscript is the outcome of a pilot project that sought to 
foster exchange between Chinese and Swiss researchers on ways of 
contributing to the ongoing United Nations’ and international debate 
on peacebuilding in general and the prevention of violent conflict in 
particular.  The document is intended to be an in­ depth overview of 
three policy dialogues that took place over a period of two years. The 
overarching goal of the project was to encourage a sustained dialogue 
between Chinese and Swiss experts in this field; exploring avenues 
for enhanced sharing of knowledge and coordination. The scholars’ 
contributions were intended to open the debate and to offer a forward 
looking exercise that addresses fundamental questions such as: why 
conflicts should be prevented; whether “mainstream approaches” are 
still relevant; and how dominant Swiss and Chinese approaches to pre­
vention both converge and diverge.
The UN has responded to the increase in conflict and insecurity 
throughout the world by acknowledging that peacebuilding needs 
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to take place before, during, and after the outbreak of conflict. This 
highlights a shift within the UN towards “Sustaining Peace”1 – a “hol­
istic approach” to the mutually reinforcing linkages between its three 
pillars2  – that recognizes the primacy of politics, while also stressing 
an approach that strengthens the nexus between peace and security, 
sustainable development, and human rights policies. Together with the 
peace mandate of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and 
in particular Goal 16, these transformative frameworks have reoriented 
the UN’s efforts to sustain peace to accomplish the spirit of the UN 
Charter. Most recently, the recommendations of the United Nations 
and World Bank report highlight a global focus on prevention and seek 
to improve understanding of how domestic development processes 
interact with security, diplomatic, humanitarian, justice, and human 
rights efforts to prevent conflict from becoming violent, reviewing sys­
tematically what has worked and not worked. Nevertheless, despite the 
many policies, reviews, and studies, the question of which issues deserve 
focus, the balance between long­ term and short­ term action, and the 
roles of internal and external actors, are still actively being debated. 
As with any international collective endeavor, continued inclusion of 
diverse perspectives is fundamental.
China’s increasing participation in UN peace operations, both in 
conflict­ afflicted and in post­ conflict states, has been notable. As China’s 
involvement in complex and fragile states deepens, dialogue and coord­
ination with key international stakeholders working on prevention of 
violent conflict is imperative and comes at a crucial moment, as scholars, 
in particular, are presently considering how to address increasing vio­
lent conflict. This project, which brought together Chinese and Swiss 
scholars over a period of two years was able to provide learning on 
dominant models of violent conflict prevention, while assisting the 
scholars to build a stronger understanding of different models being 
implemented locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally. As such, 
these dialogues, which provided an open exchange of ideas around pre­
vention, were important and timely.
This volume reviews the state of the conflict prevention field from 
various lenses and considers norms and political commitments, insti­
tutional capacities, and policy options. The international commu­
nity, academics and practitioners alike, continues to enhance tools for 
conflict prevention and refine their application. There were four key 
areas of convergence that resonated throughout this volume and with 
participants of this project in general. First, although not necessarily 
obvious, there are similar national commitments to maintaining peace 





illustrates this commitment through its engagement with peacekeeping 
operations as the largest contributor of personnel, and the second lar­
gest financial contributor among the P5, while Switzerland continues to 
be central to UN mediation, human rights, and peacebuilding efforts. 
Second, development approaches must be inclusive. The UN– World 
Bank report questions our long­ standing assumption that income 
growth alone leads to peace. While clearly stating that inclusion matters 
as much as growth of institutions in ensuring resilience against conflict, 
the report emphasizes that successful prevention is built on coalitions 
of various actors, and that policies for prevention need to address 
grievances around social and economic inclusion. Third, this volume 
recognizes that development of new, and strengthening of existing, 
international norms are necessary to guide and inform multilateral 
action directed towards prevention. Lastly, the authors of this volume 
acknowledge that focusing on preventive action at local, national, and 
international levels is conducive for long­ term sustainable peace.
This successful project and innovative collection of work highlights 
the similarities in both states’ approaches to addressing and improving 
efforts to achieve conflict prevention, pointing to the strong poten­
tial for future synergies and fruitful Swiss– Chinese collaboration and 
continued dialogue.
Notes
 1 Security Council Resolution 2282 (27 Apr. 2016), UN Doc. S/ RES/ 2282; 
General Assembly Resolution 70/ 262 (17 Apr. 2016), UN Doc. A/ RES/ 70/ 
262.
 2 www.antonioguterres.gov.pt/ vision­ statement/ .
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